Editing MaterialFalsityArgumentsWithLorneFalkenstein

Material Falsity Arguments By Lorne Falkenstein
Picture of Dr. David C. Ring
Dr. David C. Ring
December 11, 2024
Overview

Lorne Falkenstein’s A reversed, enhanced color photographic headshot cutout of a bald Lorne Falkenstein wearing a black collared shirt is used for visual identification. An enhanced color photographic cutout of a bald Lorne Falkenstein shot from the lower waist and up, wearing a black suit and an open-collared white shirt, is used for visual identification. document is about Descartes’ Meditations IIIb, where he presents proofs for the existence of God and introduces the notions of material falsity and constant creation.

List all of the multiple arguments about material falsity of ideas that the author of this text uses and present them in the form of premises and one conclusion for each argument. Label each argument based on the main point found in the conclusion.

Argument 1: Material Falsity and Opposite Qualities

Premises:

Sensible qualities come in opposite pairs (e.g., bright/dark, loud/soft).
Opposite qualities cannot both exist in the same place at the same time.
One member of each pair of opposite qualities appears to be just the exclusion or negation of the other.
If one member of each pair is an idea of nothingness or privation, it cannot have come from anything outside of us.
Its cause must be some imperfection in our nature, leading us to represent nothing as if it were something.
Conclusion:

A materially false idea is an idea that represents nothing as if it were something.
Argument 2: Material Falsity and External Causes

Premises:

Materially false ideas cannot possibly have an external cause.
If they are in fact of nothing, then nothing is all that exists outside of us when we experience them.
If there is nothing outside us to cause the ideas, we must suppose that we ourselves must be their cause.
Conclusion:

Materially false ideas must be caused by ourselves, not by anything external.
Argument 3: Material Falsity and Sensory Experience

Premises:

If our ideas of sensible qualities are due to some imperfection in our nature, the blind ought to be able to form ideas of color, which they cannot.
Similar points apply to those lacking other sense organs or experiences (e.g., those who have never tasted pineapple cannot form the idea of such a quality).
To preserve his position, Descartes would have to maintain that even though we produce these ideas ourselves, our capacity to produce them is not within our control but is actualized under particular circumstances.
Conclusion:

It is not clear what would constitute a circumstance in which ideas are produced in contrast to one where they are not produced without supposing that there are external objects that affect us in some way.
Argument 4: Material Falsity and Positive Qualities

Premises:

If one member of each pair of opposite qualities is privative, the other must be something positive and real.
Something bearing that real quality must actually exist in us to produce ideas of that quality.
It is not always clear which of two opposed qualities is the real one and which the privation.
Both can seem equally real and positive (e.g., cold feels like a real sensation, darkness is seen as black).
Conclusion:

None of our ideas of sensible qualities, neither the privative nor the positive, can with any certainty be supposed to require an external cause.
Argument 5: Material Falsity and Ideas of Extension

Premises:

Ideas of extension and its modes (shape, size, position, motion) do not come in opposite pairs.
These ideas are clearly and distinctly perceived and can be described by the science of geometry.
These ideas impose constraints on our thought, indicating that they must be something positive and real.
Conclusion:

Space or extension must be something positive and real, not nothing, as nothing cannot impose constraints on how we think of things.