Difference between revisions of "Third Meditation Latin English Heffernan"

Third Meditation Latin/English translated by George Heffernan

MEDITATIO III. De Deo, qudd existat.

Claudam nunc oculos, aures obturabo, avocabo omnes sensus, imagines etiam rerum corporalium omnes vel ex cogitatione mea delebo, vel certe, quia hoc fieri vix potest, illas ut inanes & falsas nihili pendam, meque solum alloquendo & penitius inspiciendo, meipsum paulatim mihi magis notum & familiarem reddere conabor. Ego sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, pauca intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, imaginans etiam & sentiens; ut enim ante animadverti, quamvis illa quae sentio vel imaginor extra me fortasse nihil sint, illos tamen cogitandi modos, quos sensus & imaginationes [35] appello, quatenus cogitandi quidam modi tantiim sunt, in me esse sum certus. Atque his paucis omnia recensui quae vere scio, vel saltem quae me scire hactenus animadverti. Nunc circumspiciam diligentiūs an forte adhuc apud me alia sint ad quae nondum respexi. Sum certus me esse rem cogitafitem. Nunquid ergo etiam scio quid requiratur ut de aliqufi re sim certus? Nempe in hac prima cognitione nihil aliud est, qt.tin clara quaedam & distincta perceptio ejus quod affirmo; quae sane non sufficeret ad me certum de rei veritate reddendum, si posset unquam con-tingere, ut aliquid, quod ita clare & distincte perciperem, fal- 118

MEDITATION III: Concerning God, that he exists.

[1.] Now I shall close my eyes. I shall stop up my ears. I shall call away all my senses. I shall also delete all the images of corporeal things from my cogitation — or rather shall I, because this can hardly be done, certainly regard these images, as empty and false, as being nothing— , and by conversing with and more penetratingly inspecting me alone I shall attempt to render me myself gradually more known and familiar to me. I am a cogitating thing, that is, a thing doubting, affirming, denying, understanding a few things, being ignorant of many things, willing, not willing, as well as imagining and sensing. For as I have noticed before, although those things which I sense or imagine would perhaps be nothing outside me, I am still certain that those modes of cogitating which I call "sensations" and "imaginations," in so far as they are only certain modes of cogitating, are in me. [2.] And with these few words I have reviewed all the things that I truly know, or at least all the things that I have hitherto noticed that I know. Now I will look around more diligently to see whether there might perhaps be still other things within me at which I have not yet looked. I am certain that I am a cogitating thing. Do I therefore also now know what would be required in order that I might be certain of anything? In this primary cognition there is, namely, nothing other than a certain clear and distinct perception of that which I affirm: which would indeed not suffice to render me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever happen that something that I did so clearly and distinctly perceive were false. And so I now seem

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sum esset; ac proinde jam videor pro regura generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quod valde clare & distincte percipio. Verumtamen multa prius ut omnino certa & manifesta admisi, quae tamen postea dubia esse deprehendi. Qualia ergo ista fuere? Nempe terra, coelum, sydera & caetera omnia quae sensibus usurpabam. Quid autem de illis clare percipiebam? Nempe ipsas talium rerum ideas, sive cogitationes, menti meae obversari. Sed ne nunc quidem illas ideas in me esse inficior. Aliud autem quiddam erat quod affirmabam, quodque etiam ob consuetudinem credendi clare me percipere arbitrabar, quod tamen revera non percipiebam: nempe res quasdam extra me esse, a quibus ideae istae procedebant, & quibus omnino similes erant. Atque hoc erat, in quo vel fallebar, vel certe, si verum judicabam, id non ex vi meae perceptionis contingebat. Quid versa? Cūm circa res Arithmeticas vel Geometricas aliquid valde simplex & facile considerabam , ut quod duo & tria simul juncta sint quinque, vel similia, nunquid saltem illa satis perspicue intuebar, ut vera esse affirmarem? Equidem non aliam ob causam de iis dubitandum esse postea judicavi, qtthm quia veniebat in mentem forte aliquem Deum talem mihi naturam indere potuisse, ut etiam circa illa deciperer, quae manifestissima viderentur. Sed quoties haec praeconcepta de summi Dei potentii opinio mihi occurrit, non possum non fateri, siquidem velit, facile illi esse efficere ut errem, etiam in iis quae me puto mentis oculis quAm evidentissime intueri. Quoties vero ad ipsas res, quas valde clare percipere arbitror, me converto, tam plane ab illis persuadeor, ut sponte erum-pam in has voces: fallat me quisquis potest, nunquam tamen efficiet ut nihil sim, quandiu me aliquid esse cogitabo; vel ut

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to be able to establish as a general rule that all that which I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true. [3.] But yet I have previously admitted many things as completely certain and manifest which later I have still found to be dubious. What kinds of things therefore have these been? Obviously the earth, the heavens, the stars and all the other things that I grasped with the senses. But what concerning these things did I clearly perceive? Obviously that the ideas or cogitations themselves of such things were before my mind. Yet not even now am I denying that these ideas are in me. But there was something else that I affirmed and also that — due to the custom of believing it — I thought that I clearly perceived, yet that I did not really and truly perceive, namely, that there were certain things outside me from which those ideas proceeded and to which they were completely similar. And it was in this that I was deceived — or if I judged the true, it certainly did not happen by virtue of the power of my perception. [4.] But then what? When I considered something very simple and easy about things arithmetical or geometrical, such as that two and three added together were five, or similar things, did I not then intuit at least these things perspicuously enough that I might affirm that they are true? I have indeed later judged that these things are to be doubted for no other reason than because it came to mind that some God could perhaps have given to me such a nature that I were to be deceived even about those things which would seem most manifest. But so often as there occurs to me this preconceived opinion about the very high pow-er of God, I cannot not admit that — if he were only to will it— it is easy for him to effect that I would err even in the things that I think that I most evidently intuit with the eyes of the mind. Yet so often as I turn to those things which I think that I very clearly perceive, I am so fully persuaded by them that I would spontaneously erupt in these words: "Whoever can, may de-ceive me, he will still never effect that I would be nothing, so long as I shall be cogitating that I am something, or that it would

riqi a iquando verum sit me nunquam fuisse, ciim jam verum sit me esse; vel forte etiam ut duo & tria simul juncta plura vel pauciora sint quam quinque, vel similia, in quibus scilicet repugnantiam agnosco manifestam. Et certe ciim nullam occasionem habeam existimandi aliquem Deum esse deceptorem, nec quidem adhuc satis sciam utriim sit aliquis Deus, valde tenuis &, ut ita loquar, Metaphysica dubitandi ratio est, quae tantiim ex ea opinione dependet. Ut autem etiam illa tollatur, quamprimum occurret occasio, examinare debeo an sit Deus, &, si sit, an possit esse deceptor; hac enim re ignorati, non videor de ulli alia plane certus esse unquam posse. Nunc autem ordo videtur exigere, ut prius omnes [37] meas cogitationes in certa genera distribuam, & in quibusnam ex illis veritas aut falsitas proprie consistat, inquiram. Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen: ut ciim hominem, vel Chimaeram, vel Coelum, vel Angelum, vel Deum cogito. Aliae vero alias quasdam praeterea formas habent: ut, ciim volo, ciim timeo, ciim affirmo, cilim nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quarn istius rei similitudinem cogitatione complector; & ex his aliae voluntates, sive affectus, aliae autem judicia appellantur. Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsae proprie esse non possunt; nam sive capram, sive chimaeram imaginer, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quarn alteram. Nulla etiam in ipsa voluntate, vel affectibus, falsitas est timenda; nam, quamvis prava, quamvis etiam ea quae nusquam sunt, possim optare, non tamen ideo non verum est illa me optare. Ac proinde sola supersunt judicia, in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar. Praecipuus

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ever be true that I have never been, since it be now true that I am, or even perhaps that two and three added together would be more or less than five, or similar things, in which, I recognize a manifest contradiction." And since I would have no occasion for thinking that there is a deceiver God, and so far I would not even satisfactorily know whether there be any God at all, the reason for doubting which depends only on this opinion is certainly very tenuous and — as I would so say — metaphysical. But in order that even this reason for doubting might be removed I ought, as soon as the occasion will occur, to examine whether there be a God, and if there be, whether he could be a deceiver. For this matter being unknown, I do not seem to be able ever to be fully certain about any other matter. [S.] But order now seems to require that I would first classify all my cogitations into certain kinds, and that I would inquire as to in which of them truth or falsity were properly to consist. Some of these cogitations are — as it were — the images of things— which ones alone the term "idea" properly fits— , such as then when I cogitate a human being, or a chimera, or heaven, or an angel, or God. But other cogitations have, in addition, some other forms, such as when I will, when I fear, when I affirm, when I deny, I surely always then apprehend some thing as the subject of my cogitation, but by cogitation I also encompass something more than the similitude of that thing. And of these cogitations some are called "volitions" or "emotions", but others are called "judgments." [6.] Now as for what pertains to ideas, if they were to be regarded solely in themselves and I were not to refer them to something else, they cannot properly be false. For whether I would imagine a goat or a chimera, it is no less true that I imagine the one than the other. Moreover, no falsity is to be feared in the will itself or in the emotions. For although I could wish for depraved things, and although I could even wish for those things which nowhere are, it is still not therefore not true that I wish for them. And thus there remain judgments alone in which I have to be cautious in order that I would not be deceived.

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autem error & frequentissimus qui possit in illis reperiri, consistit in eo quod ideas, quae in me sunt, judicem rebus quibusdam extra me positis similes esse sive conformes; nam profecto, si tantilm ideas ipsas ut cogitationis meae quosdam modos considerarem, nec ad quidquam aliud referrem, vix mihi ullam errandi materiam dare possent. Ex his autem ideis aliae innatae, aliae adventitiae, [38] aliae a me ipso factae mihi videntur: nam quod intelligam quid sit res, quid sit veritas, quid sit cogitatio, haec non aliunde habere videor qtthin ab ipsamet mea naturi; quod autem nunc strepitum audiam, solem videam, ignem sentiam, a rebus quibusdam extra me positis procedere hactenus judicavi; ac denique Syrenes, Hippogryphes, & similia, a me ipso finguntur. Vel forte etiam omnes esse adventitias possum putare, vel omnes innatas, vel omnes factas: nondum enim veram illarum originem clare perspexi. Sed hic praecipue de iis est quaerendum, quas tanquam a rebus extra me existentibus desumptas considero, quaenam me moveat ratio ut illas istis rebus similes esse existimem. Nempe ita videor doctus a naturi. Et praeterea experior illas non a mea voluntate nec proinde a me ipso pendere; saepe enim vel invito obversantur: ut jam, sive velim, sive nolim, sentio calorem, & ideo puto sensum illum, sive ideam caloris, a re a me diversa, nempe ab ignis cui assideo calore, mihi advenire. Nihilque magis obvium est, qtthm ut judicem istam rem suam similitudinem potius qLthm aliud quid in me immittere. Quae rationes, an satis firmae sint, jam videbo. Cūm hic dico me ita doctum esse a naturi, intelligo tantiim spontaneo quo-

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Furthermore, the foremost and most frequent error that could be found in judgments consists therein that I were to judge that ideas that are in me are similar to — or conform to — certain things posited outside me. For if I did in fact consider these ideas only as certain modes of my cogitation and I did not refer them to anything they could hardly give to me any material for erring. [7.] Furthermore, of the ideas some seem to me to be innate, while others seem to me to be adventicious, and still others seem to me to be made by me. For that I were to understand what a thing be, what truth be and what cogitation be: these things I seem to have not from elsewhere than from my own nature itself. But that I were now to hear a noise, that I were to see the sun and that I were to sense a fire: these things I have hitherto judged to proceed from certain things posited outside me. And sirens, hippogryphs and similar things, finally, are feigned by me myself. Or perhaps I can also think that all these ideas are adventicious, or that all of them are innate, or that all of them are made. For I have not yet clearly seen through to the true origin of them. [8.] But here it is first and foremost to be asked about the ideas that I consider as though they were derived from things existing outside me what reason would move me in such a way that I would think that those ideas are similar to these things. Obviously I seem to have been thus taught by nature. And moreover, I know by experience that these ideas do not depend on my will, and therefore that they do not depend on me my-self. For often these ideas are before me even involuntarily: just as— whether I would want to or not want to — I now sense warmth, and therefore I think that this sensation or idea of warmth comes to me from a thing different from me, namely, from the warmth of the fire by which I am sitting. And nothing is more obvious than that I were to judge that that thing im-mits into me its similitude rather than something else. [9.] I shall now see whether these reasons be firm enough. When I say here that "I have been thus taught by nature", then

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dam impetu me ferri ad hoc credendum, non lumine aliquo naturali mihi ostendi esse verum. Quae duo multum discrepant; nam quaecumque lumine naturali mihi ostenduntur, ut qubd ex eo qu6d dubitem, sequatur me esse, & similia, nullo modo dubia esse possunt, quia nulla alia facultas esse potest, cui aeque fidam ac lumini isti, quaeque illa [39] non vera esse possit docere; sed quantum ad impetus naturales, jam saepe olim judicavi me ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse impulsum, ciim de bono eligendo ageretur, nec video cur iisdem in ulla alii re magis fidam. Deinde, quamvis ideae illae a voluntate mei non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positis necessario procedere. Ut enim impetus illi, de quibus mox loquebar, quamvis in me sint, a voluntate tamen mei diversi csse videntur, ita forte etiam aliqua alia est in me facultas, nondum mihi satis cogni-ta, istarum idearum effectrix, ut hactenus semper visum est illas, dum somnio, absque ulli rerum externarum ope, in me formari. Ac denique, quamvis a rebus a me diversis procederent, non inde sequitur illas rebus istis similes esse debere. Quinimo in multis saepe magnum discrimen videor deprehendisse: ut, exempli causi , duas diversas solis ideas apud me invenio, unam tanquam a sensibus haustam, & quae maxime inter illas quas adventitias existimo est recensenda, per quam mihi valde parvus apparet, aliam vera ex rationibus Astronomiae desumptam, hoc est ex notionibus quibusdam mihi innatis elicitam, vel quocumque alio modo a me factam, per quam aliquoties major qithm terra exhibetur; utraque profecto similis eidem soli

do I understand only that I am brought to believe this by a certain spontaneous impetus, not that it is shown to me by some natural light that it is true. Which two things are very different. For whatever things are shown to me by the natural light — such as that from thence that I were to doubt, it would follow that I am, and similar things— can in no mode be dubious, because there can be no other faculty that I could trust equally to that light and that could teach me that such things are not true. But as for the natural impetuses, already I have often judged earlier that I have then been impelled by them to the worse alternative when it were a matter of choosing the good, and I do not see why I would trust the same impetuses more in any other matter. [10.] Then again, although these ideas might not depend on my will, it is not therefore so, that they necessarily proceed from things posited outside me. For just as these impetuses of which I then spoke, although they might be in me, still seem to be differ-ent from my will, thus also is there perhaps some other faculty in me which is not yet sufficiently known to me and which is the effecter of these ideas, as it has hitherto always seemed that these ideas are formed in me while I am dreaming and without any help of external things. [11.] And finally, although these ideas might proceed from things different from me, it does not from thence follow that those ideas must be similar to these things. Indeed, I seem to have often found a great discrepancy in many things: just as I find within me, for example, two different ideas of the sun, the one, as though derived from the senses, which is maximal-ly to be reckoned among those ideas which I think are adventi-cious, and through which the sun appears to me to be very small, but the other, derived from the reasoning of astronomy, that is, elicited from certain notions innate to me or made by me in some other manner, and through which the sun is exhibited as being several times greater than the earth. Both these ideas cannot in fact be similar to the same sun existing outside me,

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in quibus consideratur tantim realitas objectiva. Hoc est, non modo non potest, exempli causa, aliquis lapis, qui prius non fuit, nunc incipere esse, nisi producatur ab aliqui re in qui totum sit vel formaliter vel eminenter, quod ponitur in lapide; nec potest calor in subjectum quod priiis non calebat induci, nisi a re quae sit ordinis saltem aeque perfecti atque est calor, & sic de caeteris; sed praeterea etiam non potest in me esse idea caloris, vel lapidis, nisi in me posita sit ab aliqua causa, in qui tantumdem ad minimum sit realitatis quantum esse in calore vel lapide concipio. Nam quamvis ista causa nihil de sui realitate actuali sive formali in meam ideam transfundat, non ideo putandum est illam minus realem esse debere, sed talem esse naturam ipsius ideae, ut nullam aliam ex se realitatem formalem exigat, praeter illam quam mutuatur a cogitatione mea, cujus est modus. Quod autem haec idea realitatem objectivam hanc vel illam contineat potius qum aliam, hoc profecto habere debet ab aliqui causa in qui tantumdem sit ad minimum realitatis formalis quantum ipsa continet objectivae. Si enim ponamus aliquid in idei reperiri, quod non fuerit in ejus causa , hoc igitur habet a nihilo; atqui quantumvis imperfectus sit iste essendi modus, quo res est objective in intellectu per ideam, non tamen profecto plane nihil est, nec proinde a nihilo esse potest. Nec etiam debeo suspicari, cūm realitas quam considero in meis ideis sit tantiim objectiva, non opus [42] esse ut eadem realitas sit formaliter in causis istarum idearum, sed sufficere, si sit in iis etiam objective. Nam quemadmodum iste modus essendi objectivus competit ideis ex ipsarum natura, ita modus essendi formalis competit idearum causis, saltem primis & praecipuis, ex earum natura. Et quamvis forte una idea ex alii nasci possit, non tamen hic datur progressus in infinitum, sed tandem ad aliquam primam debet deveniri, cujus causa sit in-

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is considered. That is, for example, not only cannot a stone which has not previously been begin now to be unless it would be produced by something in which there were formally or eminently all that which is posited in the stone; and heat cannot be introduced into a subject that was not previously hot except by a thing that were of an order at least equally as perfect as is the heat, and thus of the other things; but moreover, even the idea of heat or of a stone cannot be in me unless it had been posited in me by some cause in which there were at a minimum just as much reality as I conceive there to be in the heat or in the stone. For although this cause were to transfer none of its actual or formal reality into my idea, it is not therefore to be thought that it must be less real, but rather is it to be thought that the nature of that idea is such that of itself it would require no other formal reality besides that which it borrows from my cogitation, whose mode it is. Furthermore, that this idea would contain this or that objective reality rather than some other: this it must in fact have from some cause in which there were at a minimum just as much formal reality as this idea contains objective reality. For if we were to posit that something is found in the idea that had not been in its cause, this it has, then, from nothing. And yet however imperfect that you will that mode of being might be in which the thing is objectively in the intellect through the idea, it still is in fact plainly not nothing, and therefore it cannot be from nothing. [15.] Nor must I suspect that, because the reality that I consider in my ideas be only objective, it is not necessary that the same reality be formally in the causes of these ideas, but rather that it suffices if it were in them too objectively. For just as that objective mode of being belongs to the ideas by the nature of them, so the formal mode of being belongs to the causes of the ideas— at least to the first and foremost ones — by the nature of them. And although one idea could perhaps arise from another, an infinite regress is still not given here, but rather must it come down, finally, to a primary idea, whose cause would

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star archetypi, in quo omnis realitas formaliter contineatur, quae est in idea tantum objective. Adeo ut lumine naturali mihi sit perspicuum ideas in me esse veluti quasdam imagines, quae possunt quidem facile deficere a perfectione rerum a quibus sunt desumptae, non autem quicquam majus aut perfectius continere. Atque haec omnia, quo diutius & curiosius examino, tante clarius & distinctius vera esse cognosco. Sed quid tandem ex his concludam? Nempe si realitas objectiva alicujus ex meis ideis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nec formaliter nec eminenter in me esse, nec proinde me ipsum ejus ideae causam esse posse, hinc necessario sequi, non me solum esse in mundo, sed aliquam aliam rem, quae istius ideae est causa, etiam existere. Si vera nulla talis in me idea reperiatur, nullum plane habebo argumentum quod me de alicujus rei a me diversae existentia certum reddat; omnia enim diligentissime circumspexi, & nullum aliud potui hactenus reperire.

Ex his autem meis ideis, praeter illam quae me ipsum mihi exhibet, de qua hic nulla difficultas esse [43] potest, alia est quae Deum, aliae quae res corporeas & inanimes, aliae quae Angelos, aliae quae animalia, ac denique aliae quae alios homines mei similes repraesentant.

Et quantum ad ideas quae alios homines, vel animalia, vel Angelos exhibent, facile intelligo illas ex its quas habeo mei ipsius & rerum corporalium & Dei posse componi, quamvis nulli praeter me homines, nec animalia, nec Angeli, in mundo essent.

Quantum autem ad ideas rerum corporalium, nihil in illis occurrit, quod sit tantum ut non videatur a me ipso potuisse proficisci; nam si penitius inspiciam, & singulas examinem eo modo quo heri examinavi ideam cerae, animadverto perpauca

be like an archetype in which all the reality that is in the idea only objectively be contained formally. So that by the natural light it would be perspicuous to me that the ideas in me are like certain images which surely can easily be deficient in the perfection of the things from which they have been derived, but which cannot contain anything greater or more perfect.

And the longer and the more curiously I examine them, the more clearly and distinctly do I cognize that all these things are true. But what shall I, finally, conclude from them? Surely that if the objective reality of any one of my ideas were so great that I would be certain that the same reality is neither formally nor eminently in me, and therefore that I myself cannot be the cause of this idea, it necessarily follows therefrom that I am not alone in the world, but rather that there also exists some other thing which is the cause of that idea. But if no such idea were to be found in me, I shall plainly have no argument that might render me certain about the existence of anything different from me. For I have most diligently looked around at all things and have hitherto been able to find nothing else.

But of these my ideas, besides that one which exhibits me myself to me— about which there can be no difficulty here— , there is another one, which represents God, there are others, which represent corporeal and inanimate things, others, which represent angels, others, which represent animals, and finally others, which represent other human beings similar to me.

And as for the ideas that exhibit other human beings, or animals, or angels, I easily understand that they can be composed of the ideas that I have of me myself and of corporeal things and of God, even if there were no human beings besides me, nor animals, nor angels, in the world.

But as for the ideas of corporeal things, there occurs in them nothing that would be so great that it would not seem that it can have come from me myself. For if I were to inspect more penetratingly and were to examine these ideas individually in that manner in which I have yesterday examined the idea of the wax, I notice that there are only very few things in them

tantum esse quae in illis dare & distincte percipio: nempe magnitudinem, sive extensionem in longum, latum, & profundum; figuram, quae ex terminatione istius extensionis exsurgit; siturn, quem diversa figurata inter se obtinent; & motum, sive mutationem istius situs; quibus addi possunt substantia, duratio, & numerus: caetera autem, ut lumen & colores, soni, odores, sapores, calor & frigus, aliaeque tactiles qualitates, non-nisi valde confuse & obscure a me cogitantur, adeo ut etiam ignorem an sint verae, vel falsae, hoc est, an ideae, quas de illis habeo, sint rerum quarundam ideae, an non rerum. Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis posse reperiri paulo ante notaverim, est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis, dim non rem tanquam rem repraesentant: ita, exempli causa, ideae quas habeo caloris & frigoris, tam parum clarae [44] & distinctae sunt, ut ab its discere non possim, an frigus sit tantam privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum. Et quia nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt, siquidem verum sit frigus nihil aliud esse quam privationem caloris, idea quae mihi illud tanquam reale quid & positivum repraesentat, non immerito falsa dicetur, & sic de

Quibus profecto non est necesse ut aliquem authorem a me diversum assignem; nam, si quidem sint falsae, hoc est nullas res repraesentent, lumine naturali notum mihi est illas a nihilo procedere, hoc est, non aliam ob causam in me esse quam quia deest aliquid naturae meae, nec est plane perfecta; si autem sint verae, quia tamen tam parum realitatis mihi exhibent, ut ne quidem illud a non re possim distinguere, non video cur a me ipso esse non possint.

Ex its vero quae in ideis rerum corporalium clara & distincta sunt, quaedam ab idei mei ipsius videor mutuari potuisse, nempe substantiam, durationem, numerum, & si quae alia sint

that I clearly and distinctly perceive: namely, magnitude, or extension in length, breadth and depth; figure, which arises from the determination of this extension; position, which different shaped things obtain among themselves; and movement, or the change of this position; to which can be added substance, duration and number. But the other things, such as light, and colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat and cold, and other tactile qualities, are not cogitated by me except very confusedly and obscurely — so much so that I even be ignorant as to whether they would be true or false, that is, as to whether the ideas that I have of them would be ideas of certain things, or not of things. For although shortly previously I might have noted that falsity — properly said, or formal falsity — cannot be found except in judgments, there still is in fact a certain other— material— falsity in ideas, then when they represent a non-thing as if it were a thing: just as, for example, the ideas that I have of heat and cold are so little clear and distinct that I could not discern from them whether cold would be only the privation of heat or heat would be only the privation of cold, or whether both of them would be real qualities, or neither would be. And because there can be no ideas except — as it were — ideas of things, if it would indeed be true that cold is nothing other than the privation of heat, the idea that represents it to me as if it were something real and positive will not without merit be called "false". And thus of the other ideas.

To which ideas it is in fact not necessary that I would assign an author different from me. For if they would indeed be false, that is, would represent no things, it is known to me by the natural light that they proceed from nothing, that is, that they are in me not for another reason than because something is lacking in my nature and this nature is plainly not perfect. But if they would be true, because they still exhibit to me so little reality that I could not even distinguish it from a non-thing, I do not see why they could not be from me myself.

But some of the things that are clear and distinct in the ideas of corporeal things I seem to have been able to borrow from the idea of me myself, namely, substance, duration, num-