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Alessandro Bertinetto Perform the Unexpected: Ontology of Music and Improvisation

ISBN: 9788897527343 First Edition: May 2016 Copyright 2016

Alessandro Bertinetto Perform the Unexpected: Ontology of Music and Improvisation

The image reproduced on the cover is a “graphic score” by Mirio Cosollini, entitled ‘Exluded’, 2010.

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Index INTRODUCTION I. ANALMCA ACCOUNT OF MUSIC

1. Art and anthology

2. Music and anthology

3. The onlologies of Werktreue: I and pripali theories de1 dibatWo contempowneo

3.1. I I goodmonian model

3.2, The sbuthowlismo delrontology Opeltoken

3.3. Continuism and pen5urantism

4. The anthology of music at the test of practice (of 'improvisation)

II. THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSICAL IMPROVISATION

1. concept of improvising The improvision

2. 612366ffierfonnative and ninth

3. Creativity as a process

4. Improwisation and composition

5. The pinprietà clen'improwisadone

6. 6bnSg,ddn333p,nnin,n

7. 55pear and not know. The paradox epistemieo I 'improvisation

8. Between habit and dedgone on the mome.9.-Ii mv,sation as a PPS ontaneo intentional

9. The surprise of sound: improvisation and interpretation

10. The expressiveness of musical improvisation

11. The exemplarity p6626, 33 of improvisation

IIL PAGANINI DOES NOT REPEAT. IMPROVISATION AND TEPEROICEN ONTOLOGY

1. The anthology .1..0115 k i and musical reprovisarione

2. Possible obie5ioni and necruari risposle: a di fuu del I a5perificita detrimprovvisazione

3. Improvised compositions

4. Impose to determine indeterminate works

5. Improwisar and on the work A 1n331co36 report: improvised ornince of 6366 22,666333266

IV. FREEZING THE FLEETING MOMENTUM: RECORDED IMPROVISATION

1. Recording and ontology of music

2. Improvisation and recording: a rappor aradossal

3. The menfo of Vevaneseenza

4. The topic of context

5. The topic of the, in presence

6. Event improverndica I and opposition or creative combination? , 063322,3236,6'

8. The king • ration at the service of the sudden ... The raorno of the lost aura?

V. EX IMPROVISO. FICTION OF THE WORK, REALITY OF PERFORMANCE

4YeNetreue: love him "a o este., , Musical Scriptures

3. Fictionalism and real music, Oui and now. Music like improvisation

VI. COUNTERFEIT IMPROVISATION: UNFAITHFUL UNIONOLOGY

1. The counterfeit: a lipop,opriation

2. What is not the counter ffartura

2.1. With, filling vs quotation Contreeffanura vs falsification, pLq,~pia

3. Contraff altura vs version

3. The contraflapse: an ontological puzzle ...

3.1. The counterfeit ne11 a practice of con■position and d execution 01 The counterfeit ne1 the practice of jazz improvisation

4. .5 and the ,u a ,olution ermeneug,,,Iesteeica

5. Counterfeit as eukural appropriation. primate 2,33 30232 su113,roIogia

VII. NORMATIVELL (TRAS)FORMATIVE. THE IMPROVATIVE LOGIC OF MUSICAL ONTOLOGY

I. improvisation as a form.. and open re-reorsive system , Nornunivity and improwisation

3. 11 tem, of improwisation • The performative interaction: grandmother.. and recognition through 'inte,A, • interpla nza for former rea1-time

4,1. 11 coontinamento 'sing '

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4.12 Intersubventive recognition: individual and collectivity in the improwi.interactive action Improvisation and converse

4.1 lingeration r publicity and musicians

5. L.eration with the and as hyrnre

6. ,7rinralo of performance

7. The perspective of the participants~primacy to on the ontology

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOURTH M COVER Aleuandm Bertmetto

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Alessandro Bertinetto Perform the unexpected. : Ontologia of music and improvisation evaluations

Insertion

Fundamental characteristic of making musicar Vin,rowisazion, Derek Bailey

‘17myreviation is the most natural and widespread form of making music’ Stepban Nechmenovitch

In Il pensiero dei suoni (Milano, Bruno Mondadori 2012) was missing, for reasons of space, a chapter dedicated specifically to the ontology of music. This book expressly intends to fill that gap. However, its cut is different. While the 2012 volume was of an introductory nature, this is more markedly theoretical in nature. It is not limited to presenting and discussing the different philosophical positions relating to the ontology of music, but intends to defend two theses, which also intertwine and overlap in the order of chapters. By cm verso, I intend to discuss the specific character of the ontology of musical improvisation. On the other hand, I want to support how improvisation, which escapes the rigid arrangements of the mainstreant of the ontology of music, helps us to reform the ontology of music as a whole, establishing the primacy of performative, practical and aesthetics over omology. Improvisation - this at least my belief - thus makes an excellent service to the ontology of music as an anthology of an artistic practice. This also justifies the apparent paradoxical nature of the title. It would not be out of place to wonder: how can you perform the unexpected? I can execute an instruction that is already available, not something that is not only not there, but is not expected or expected either. In English the verb "tu perfonn" has a neutral meaning and, perhaps with the exception related to the reproduction of recorded music, it can be used indifferently for all forms of making music; which also applies to all those artistic practices, such as dance and the crazy, which, like music, are precisely intended as ‘performing arts’. Instead, the Italian verb "perform", but also the verb "interpret" (which better makes the creative dimension of the activity of one or more musicians who play a musical opera), assume that there is already something (a composition) precisely to perform or interpret: something expected, even from the bread of the listener who knows the program of the concert that is preparing to listen. Instead, in the improvisation virtà of the coincidence of invention and performance- it is precisely the unexpected to become the highlight of aesthetic experience, although even the statement that this unexpected is performed cannot fail to sound oxymoric and even paradoxical. The paradox dissolves not only by clarifying, I will make, the assumptions of improvisation, which - even if unexpected - is not Co nitrite; but also and above all if you claim, as I intend to argue, that what happens in improvisation is the paradigm of what always happens in the musical experience, which is precisely the experience of a paformative practice. Music is not real as an opera (waiting); real music is always that (for unexpected principle) of the performance. Even the performance or interpretation of a musical work is in itself incompected and unexpected is always the concrete reality of the work, which lives only in the performance. The logic of the work / performance relationship as well as the Ira relationship the various works and between the different performances must therefore be understood in terms of the (rras)formative articulation of improvisation, in which what happens now is unheard of, (transforms) the sense of the past and its meaning will in turn be Bras) formed by what will happen next. In short, what happens in the microcosm of a specific improvisational situation is the conceptual paradigm to understand what happens in the macrocosm of musical ontology as a whole, where this involves the primacy of practices, performance and aesthetics on the ontology in the subject of music philosophy. At least, this is the thesis I will try to articulate throughout the book. However, in order not to deceive the reader, it is good to put your hands forward. Although arguments that looking suddenly we can understand the primacy of aesthetics on the ontology on the subject of art philosophy, this volume does not push very deeply the philosophical examination of the aesthetics of improvisation (on which they aim however already focused on in other works, here occasionally recalled). In fact, to the specific theme of the aesthetics of improvisation (in the general context of art and not only in the specifically musical one) I will soon dedicate an essay, already in preparation, aimed in particular at dismantling the trite common place of the imperfect na.a of this practice and to argue instead the paradigmatic character for artistic creativity. This volume has the following articulation. In chapter I I present and discuss, showing the problems, the most widespread models of music ontology in the analytical field, those based on the ideal of fidelity to the opera (Werktreue).

In chapter 2 I examine the specific ontological qualities of musical improvisation, discussing its main types (non-intentional, reactive, conscious), the peculiar theoretical aspects and the relationships with composition and interpretation, also focusing extensively on the issues of intentionality and expressiveness.

In chapter 3, without going into the details of the different genres of improvisation in the various musical practices, I show that improvisation in itself escapes those ontological constructions that reduce music in terms of repeatable objects (concrete and above all abstract). I argue that these ontologies faithful to the ideology of fidelity to the work (and in particular the current most in vogue today: the type/token ontology) are not able to convincingly seize the ontological properties of improvisation in order to be able to account for its peculiar aesthetic character. Indeed, these ontologies make it very difficult to understand both the aesthetic character of the improvision and that of the meaning that improvisation can have for music as a whole.

Chapter 4 continues this discussion through the comparison between improvisation and recording, which proposes some interesting aesthetic and philosophical problems.

In chapter 5 I defend the thesis that focusing attention on improvisation, instead of all on musical works, is a way to reconfigure the discourse of musical ontology, making it consistent with artistic and aesthetic practices. The ontology of music built from the sudden highlights the fictional/constructive aspect of the concept of work, the energetic character of music as an activity that takes place here as therefore the primacy of performance, practice and their aesthetic dimension. This emerges with particular vigor, among other things, with the jazz practice of counterfeiting. The investigation into the counterfeiting I carry out in chapter 6 shows, in fact, both the poverty of those ontologies of music that fail to realize their own unjustified assumptions and, once again, the interest that improvisation can have in an ontological investigation of aesthetically (and ermeneutically) conscious music.

I conclude the general argument in Chapter 7, which is devoted to the understanding of non-naction, temporality and imeractivity of improvisation. Also thanks to the resumption of some concepts of Gadamer's hermeneutics, I argue that improvisational normativity is the model for articulating the ontology of music (and art) as a whole, in a way consistent with the thesis of the (trans)formative character of musical works and practices. Demonstrating that the normative logic of improvisation can be adopted. to set the ontology of music in the sense of the primacy of aesthetics and artistic practice, I thus close the circle of the whole discourse of the book.

Summarizing and pointing out these introductory lines, my suggestion is to look at the connection between musical ontology and improvisation in the opposite direction to the path beaten by a conspicuous part of the theories available today in the field of musical ontology. Instead of trying to fit musical improvisation into rigid preconstituted ontological boxes (an operation destined for failure), the strategy I intend to follow is to reconfigure the musical ontology in the light of a philosophical exploration of improvisation. To avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, I immediately specify that I have no absurd claim to identify music with improvisation. I will rather support the following: (I) improvisation in the strict sense puts important aspects of music in the foreground—first of its being energy, activity, performance—that the ontological investigation cannot and must not neglect; (2) an extended notion of improvisation is fundamental to articulate an ontology of music based on aesthetic practice, according to which the musical work is to be understood as fiction that

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Like any improvisation practice, this volume required a lot of preparation, but in this form it is a completely unexpected performance. His chapters draw their origin from articles published (in English, German, French and Italian) in magazines and collective volumes. Chapters I and 5 stem from the strong reworking of Musical Ontology. A View through Improvisation, "Cosmo. Comparative Studies in Modernism" 2, 2013: 81-101. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 develop, re-organize and integrate with different original parts materials published in construction articles (Improvistation and Formativity, "Sophilosophical Yearbook" 25/2009 (2010): 145-174; Paganini Does Not Repeat. Improvisation And The ljpe/Taken Ontology, "Teorema" XXXI/3, 2012: 105-126; Paganini ne répète pas. rimprovisation musicale et l'antologie type/token, io A. Arbo - M. Ruta (ade.), Oncologie musicale.- perspectives et débats, Paris, Hermann/GREAM 2014: 321-367, Improvisation: Zwischen Experiment und Experimentalitiit?, "Proceedings of the VIII. Kongress da Deutschen Gesellschaft fiir Asthetik" (Experimentelle iksthetils), 2012; "Mind the gap". Improvisation as acting intentionally,..ltinera. Journal of Philosophy and Theory of the Arts" 10, 2015: 175-188) and in the process of publication (The expressiveness in musical improvisation, in S. Oliva - C. Serra - S. Vizzardelli (edited by), Proceedings of the conference "Grammar of music, grammar of perception", Rome, the Glifo (forthcoming); The surprise of sound. Improvisation and interpretation, report presented at the Freedom and Legiformity Conference on Experience in the Languages and Practice of Music, Macerata, 12 November 2015). Chapter 6 is a fairly faithful version of Improvisation and connaffatti. About the primacy of practice in the ontology of music, in A. Arbo and A. Bertinetto (eds.), Musical ontology, special issue of "Aisthetts" 6/2013: 101-132 and a partial German translation of it. Chapter 7 integrates and reworks different materials, partly published in some essays (Performing Imagination. The Aesthetics of Improvisation, "Klesis - Revue philosophique" 28, Imagination et pelformativité, 2013: 62-96; Recursive formativeness and construction of normativity in improvisation, in A. Sbordoni (ed.), Improvisation today, Lucca, LIM 2014: 15-28; Improvisation: Zwischen Experiment und Esperimentalikit?, cit. ; Jazz als Gelungene Performance. isthetische Normativiat und Improvisation, "Zeitschrift fdr Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft" 59/1, 2014: 105-140; "Do noi fear mistakes — there are none" (Miles Davis). The Mistake as Surprising Experience of Creativity in Jau, io M. Saints - E. Zorzi (eds.) Education as Jazz — Interdisciplinary Sketches or a New Metaphor, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholar Publishing 2016: 85-100), but again many parts are presenting here for the first time. The research work of which the volume is the partial result benefited from a study stay at the Freie Universitiit in Berlin, funded by Alexander van Humboldt Sti.fhing (2011-2013) and participation in the project "Aesthetic experience of the arts and the complexity of perception" of the Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Spain: acronym FF12015-64271-P), which I am very grateful to the doctoral students and doctoral students of the PhD Course "History of Societies, Institutions and Thought. From the Middle Ages to the Contemporary Age" of the Universities of Udine and Trieste, who wanted to read and discuss with me a previous version of the book, proposing many useful observations to improve its forms and commutes: Mirto Cosottini (student and teacher), Francesca Longo, Emilia Marra, Elena Nardelli, Nicoletta Taurian, Valentina Zampieri and Lorenzo L. Pizzichemi. Among the colleagues with whom I was lucky enough to sift through the goodness of the ideas proposed here, I mention Luca Cossettini, Gesa zur Nieden, Alessandro Arbo and Ilaria Riva who read the text and with their comments and criticisms urged the deepening of the reflection and the clarification of the argument. I thank them from the bottom of my heart, as well as Silvia Vizzardelli, who wanted this book in her necklace and waited for it patiently.

This book is dedicated to Leila and Elisa, who surprise me every day. Avigliana (TO), April 18, 2016

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I. The analytical anthology of music

1. Art and anthology

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According to Achille Vasi the anthology questions ‘what is there’, while metaphysics, as research on the ultimate nature of things, studies ‘what is what is there’. The ontology would in this sense be ‘a preliminary chapter of metaphysics’ (VARZI 2008: 12). Applying these definitions to art, it would result, therefore, the following: first it is established by an ‘ontological’ reconnaissance that there are things we call works of art; then metaphysics wonders what the things we call works of art are. However, precisely in relation to the philosophy of art, in the contemporary debate the difference between the two disciplines (ontology and metaphysics) is in many cases so attenuated that it disappears completely. Often philosophers (in particular analytical) of art do not stop this difference and speak indiscriminately of metaphysics or ontology (cf. BARTEL 2011; CURRIE 1989; DAVIES 2009; DODD 2007; KANIA 2006, 2008A AND 2008B; KRAUT 2007; LEVINSON 1990; MAITLAND 1975; NUSSBAUM 2003; PREDELLI 2001; THOMASSON 1999; YOUNG-MATHESON 2000; ZANGWILL 2001). I sown the difference often seems to concern the level of investigation of the constitutive properties of an object or an artistic practice: while phenomenology describes the properties of an object in their appearance to a subject, ontology describes the manifest properties of objects regardless of the subjects; metaphysics goes as far as to their unperceptible foundations, acquiring the status of fundamental anthology and therefore A thesis generally shared by art ontologists is that before, and for the purpose, to be able to judge, understand and appreciate from an aesthetic point of view the works of art, as well as the different practices and different artistic genres, so as to solve concrete problems - such as for and,: how to perform the restoration of a work of art, how to interpret a song, how to Musical works, and so on. More precisely, the thesis (exemplaryly presented by KRAUT 2007) is as follows. Aesthetic theory is descriptive, not normative. It must explain the world of art, coding the canons of legitimacy operating in the different artistic practices. His task is not to propose regulatory evaluation criteria. Rather, to understand what are the specific evaluation standards suitable for the different artistic genres, e.g. to adopt evaluation criteria appropriate to a specific type of music, but not to others, one must first resort to ontology (or metaphysics). In fact, as Kraut (KRAUT 2007: 77) claims, 1...1 the nommtive assertions about the appropriate malo to approach music require a metaphysical foundation: they acquire their nominal strength by ascertaining more basic about which properties music possesses effectively, or which properties deserve anention, and why. In other words: the recommendations on ‘appropriate musical perception’ require metaphysical assumptions on top of the naMra of music <that is about which own. it possesses) Go about the relative impartenu of these properties. This would result in the dependence of the nonnative aspects of the experience of art from ontology and therefore the primacy of the ontological investigation on the interpretation and evaluation of works. In fact, in order to be able to judge e.g. a work as epigonal or innovative and an execution as correct or incorrect, or as bold or traditional, it is necessary to know what their properties are. If, for example, we have to evaluate a picture, it is therefore a question of understanding ‘how much it is painted and how comic it is’ (KRAUT 2007: 117). In short, this implies that the anthology is part of artistic practices (KRAUT 2007: 169). It is the anthology that offers the ‘foundations of legitimation of our shared practices’ and for this reason we must turn to it to understand e.g. that ‘[...] the demolition of historic buildings is inappropriate due to the essential connection of architectural structures to our shared cultural past’. Still, only the ontology of architecture can tell us whether or not a certain restoration is permissible (KRAUT 2007: 171). The primary question of the philosophy of art would therefore be to understand what art is, what the different artistic genres are, what a painting is, what a musical work is, what their properties are. According to most of the defenders of the primacy of ontology on aesthetics on the subject of the philosophy of art, such anthological questions also seem to require metaphysical answers, that is, relating to fundamental ontology, because the use of descriptions limited to empirical objects and the phenomenal appearance of works of art would not be able to satisfy the need to determine and sufficiently explain the an In fact, it is possible that there are no perceptual differences between a work of art and an ordinary object and that their difference must then be sought at a more ‘deep’ level, inaccessible to the senses alone (on this possibility Arthur Danto built the building of his philosophy of art cf. DANTO 2008). Therefore, according to some philosophers of art, to be adequate to bear subsequent interpretations and evaluations, the description of the objects that we identify (perceptively or not) as works of art requires a metaphysical type investigation that tells us what kind of object is that object that we call a work of art or artistic performance: e.g. Picasso's Guernica painting, the Third A contemporary dance ballet, and so on. Often, those (even outside of the analytical aesthetic debate) have undertaken metaphysical research of this type, have used pairs of metaphysical concepts such as particular/universal, concrete/abstract, real/ideal and their intersections to determine what those objects and events we call works of art and artistic performances are. In addition, some have proposed donated metaphysical anthologies, identifying a fundamental difference between works of art capable (at least apparently) of having different occurrences (such as the novel I Promessi Sposi by Manzoni, which is available in several copies; a symphony by Beethoven, executable several times; Apocal'se Now, distributed in several copies; the think Others have instead supported alternative theories such as muniste theories, according to which works of art are multi-incannable types of action, as they are able in principle, if not in fact, to have multiple occurrences (cf. CURRIE 1989), or theories according to which the work of art is the concrete performance by an artist (DAVIES 2004). The panorama of the different positions on the subject of the ontology of art is very broad and complex. Since the reader can already have several tools to get a precise idea (including a selection CARROLL 2000; WARBURTON 2004; FOCOSI 2012; D'ANGELO 2014), rather than exploring and discussing the details here I will immediately address the issues related to the specific artistic practice that is the subject of this study: music, the art of sounds (cf. BERTINETTO 20120: 17-32).

2. Music and anthology

Music offers the art anthologie scholar a very rich and lively field of investigation, moreover connected to experiences that we can have on a daily basis, without great effort. We usually listen, live or through recordings, concert performances, symphonies, quartets, songs. In the vast majority of cases, however, we experience the performances of musical compositions. The practice that has oriented the production and reception of music in the West, at least starting from the insertion of music in the nore of fine arts, and at least in the tradition of so-called classical music, is that of the composition of works that must be performed.

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Although there are different practices (improvisation is among them the most significant for historical relevance, aesthetic ambitions and philosophical weight), in the standard scenario musical works -such as Bach's Cantates, Haydn's Qaartetti, Beethoven's Symphonies, Chopin's Nocturnes as well as, at least in some ways, the standards of Col Porter and the Beatles and De André THOM 1992; DAVIES 2001; DAVIES 20110). A composer produces a musical work and this is then accessible to the public through his performances. This means that, in order to be properly perceived and appreciated, these works must be performed. They are ‘objects’ available through exec.ione and through execution (or, in the case of recordings, through reproduction). Also, at least generally, they can be, and are intended to be, performed several times. ',ns....dr.. P. ismsnar dastmand nnssn ... P., M dssm.s ~che e non t/exattale euete malate vo. s lo ninth de fede: come Scherzo di Saldarci 0716480). M mild ai and P. "P.M. ...h, later, rosi "me works pigs patieu, do not pacano be and perform pie whe, perrhi portrays in otrium or pears h is ne ...parc eset.rn in the moon because born the baskets are go dicane and M is irremediabilmememe lost In memory, or, an.ra 3). A different question, epici fundamental. is if a miukale cmnplennnenre work forgotten and not reneperahl k But I still have an o, it mural: but to make this anetao. we have hUogno of a theory of the ipera nualcale. If as satter. at the end of this lamm. athletics is the assumption from the anthology, the negative response. The musical work therefore has an intimate relationship with its performances, through which it is appreciated. However, musical works are not identical to their performances. We access the musical work through the experience of listening to musical performances (better to specify it right away: when what we listen to is not improvisation). But what do we actually have access to through performing a musical work? What are these entities that we call musical works? For art ontologists, answering this question is relevant for the reason just explained: in order to be able to base our appreciative judgments on the musical work and its execution, it is essential to know what they are, or what they consist of and how the work can be identified. Otherwise it would not be understood if certain properties that could be grasped when listening are part of the work or not and are detected to me to judge it (ARBO 2014a). In other words, we are not able to properly judge the musical work and its performance, if we cannot determine its mutual relationship. In fact, in order to know whether the performance of a musical opera is correct or good or bold or innovative, we need to know if it properly presents the musical work; however, if we do not know what the musical work is, we cannot determine its relationship with the performance and we cannot know in what sense it can present it in a correct, good, bold, innovative way. Therefore, the reason often given in support of the primacy of ontology on music aesthetics is as follows: in order to be able to make judgments based on the performances we experience when listening to music, we need to know what musical work is and how it can be identified. First of all, it doesn't seem difficult to say what an execution is. One or more musicians produce sequences of sounds and silences that we listen to for a certain period of time. The execution therefore has a space-temporal location: the execution of a musical work is a spatial-temporally identifiable event. We can identify the executions through indications such as "that sequence of sounds and silences produced by Tizio and Caio on Thursday, April 18 at 9 pm at the Giocosa theater in Turin". It remains to be understood in what sense by listening to a certain sequence of sounds we listen to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or Across the Universe of the Beatles. what sense is that is it that we experience not only of a particular performance or recording, but also of the performed or recorded work? On an intuitive level it is not at all difficult to understand what it means to ‘listen to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony’ means ‘listening to an execution of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony’. The same goes for Across the Universe: listening to Across the Universe is equivalent to listening to the third track of the album Let ir be (1970), or, but this already complicates things, a covar of his, like the one offered by David Bowie on the album Young Americano (1975). However, it seems obvious to distinguish has the opera and performance, between the opera and the track or recording and also between a song and its cover (limited to the opera/execution ratio, a good introduction to the theme is found in KIVY 2007a, 243-269). So listening to the performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is and is not (how) listening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Listening to the Beatlesian recording of Across the Universe or its Bowie cover is and is not (like) listening to Across the Universe. Let's take a simple example, ignoring recordings and versions for now and focusing exclusively on the work/execution ratio. Last night’s London performance of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is not Beethoven’s Fifth. Rather, such an execution offered an interpretation of this work, an interpretation different from the interpretation of the same work that took place last year in Berlin. The two executions are different for various reasons. They were produced at different times in different places. They didn't have the same duration. One of the two was, say, powerful and elegant, while the other was pedantic and boring. The second performance can therefore be understood as a pedantic and boring performance of Beethoven's majestic Fifth. However, things can get even more complicated. In fact, possianào hypothesize that the elegant performance was performed by an excellent synthesizer and that the pedantic performance was performed by a traditional orchestra made up of storms such as violins, cellos, oboes, etc. Very different performances would therefore have offered two very different interpretations of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Probably many would be led to consider one of them -the elegant-incorrect execution, as Beethoven could not have the intention of entrusting the execution of his work to a synthesizer. However, it would not be completely unacceptable to consider the pedantic execution to be incorrect. In fact, it is reasonable to think that Beethoven could not have the intention that his work would be performed in a pedantic way. If I need to take into account the author's intentions, then it may be that both hypothetical performances of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony are to be considered incorrect. Al. question is 3e the impositions of the composer -often difficult to decipher - must always have the last paro.: in the course of this book he will argue that it is not so, peneri it is necessary to keep with, and above all, the tastes and intentions of interpreters and public and. general, of the particular context of the event performat How is this possible? Let's recap what has been said emerges. - Listening to the performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is like listening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, because this cannot be heard except through his performances.

• Listening to the performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is not like listening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, because the opera and its performances are not the same thing.

In support of these these theses we can bring (I) (what seems) an indisputable belief of common sense and (2) a reasoning on what seem to be the properties attributable to works and executions. (»It seems obvious that the musical work can be repeated in different performances. That is, we would have a single work, always identical to itself, which has several executions. It is the thesis from which move what we can call the ‘odologies of Werktreue’, or mine those oncologies (nominal and structuralist) that constitute the mainstream of the analytical ontology of music. Starting from the axiom, assumed as indisputable, of the repeatability of the work without loss of identity, they explain the relationship between the work and its executions, taking for granted the normative validity of the ideal of fidelity (Treue) to the work (Werk) by patte of the executions, an ideal imposed in a determined historical era (which for many coincide PESTELLI 1991; GOEHR 1992; TARUSKIN 1995). Here, as we will see (particularly in chapters 5-7), resides the

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Great problem of the contemporary ontology of music. The repa of the opera sem. also apply for the music records.. the tra, Cia 1201,11a, SII ,. different such as, CO. '3, pus receive different reproductions (and this roma NOUTO10 randriontenti quanti:avi annhe in the I and mode of listening: the Mpl, for example I mos!. and sem,. pis private and paprellizzatos I. DISTASO 2011). sln this dear oldlansopetai potentially a che fore srsn tre if not with qual. demolir and not simply with da, the opera Pa canzone). the eventual version o ',venni. col,. the recorded track. the sopophazione (surontology of the cover F SEDIIVAL 2011s MAGNI Ma-AMO 1.110HIP 2013; VARZ1 2013). As already asservaso. in order not to complicate suldio ecressivamenie the speech. I will limit myself, at least initially. to consider sobasao the classic relationship work and execution. Pear,. is ossesso rapnano to orient most of the musical ontology. often in an exclusive and ideologically prejudiced Poppo way. (2) We also want to be able to say that the opera and its performance (and also the recorded song and its reproduction) have some common I properties, but not others. In fact, the musical work may have been composed in Vienna, performed simultaneously in Paris and London, and be the last of the composer's youth productions. It seems obvious that none of these properties are attributable to his executions. Similarly, it seems normal to be able to attribute some aesthetic properties to the work and others to its performances. The work can be majestic and triumphal, while its execution last night was mesta and cheesy: a mesta and cheesy execution of a work that however, it seems to be supported, remains majestic and triumphal, and does not become mesta and cheesy because of a mesta and cheesy execution (but in the capp. 5-7 I will In sums, work and executions seem to be entities of a different kind, but they maintain a relationship that seems essential. To understand if it is, and if anything in what sense and measure, the ontology of music aims to answer the following questions: What is a musical work? What is performing a musical work? What kind of relationship is that between work and execution? The ontology of music would therefore take on the task of explaining the type of entity that is the musical work taking into account the following: (a) the opera has an intimate relationship with the performances (that is, with `things' that happen in the world), but it cannot identify with them, since their properties are, at least in appearance, different; (b) the musical works For reproductions of the same recorded track). The ontological theories of musical work differ in the way they process these statements and their connections (cf. DAVIES 2011at 25-26). In general, however, the ‘ontology of the Werlareue’ remain on a merely classificatory level and think of work and executions as strictly separate entities, even if in relation, where only the focus of the dynamic intention between work and execution (that is, between the different executions), and therefore of the fact that opera and execution are what are only thanks to each other, for In order to be able to show with reason the failure of the 'oncologies of the Werlareué and propose an alternative model, based as we will see on the specific logic of the practice of improwisation, it is necessary to briefly examine briefly the main theoretical models that those ontology have proposed in order to explain what the musical work and its performances are, taking into account

3. The anthologies of Werktreue: the main theories of contemporary debate

The main theoretical models elaborated in the contemporary ontological-musical debate (analytical) are as follows: (I) The ‘nominalist’ thesis of musical works as classes of performances faithful to the score. (2) 11 ‘structuralist’ model of musical works as type (types). (3) The ‘continuist’ theory of musical works as objects with different temporal parts.

3.1. I I goobssan model

Nominalism admits the existence of only the details. According to this position, in music there are only the concrete executions that we perceive, not the abstract works that we do not perceive. So, as Nelson Goodman (GOODMAN 2008) argued, music must be understood in terms of concordance between particular entities: a certain execution and the signs of a notational system, the score. The musical work would be to be understood as the class of those performances that are in accordance with the score. Precisely the scores are the central elements of this theory. The first observation that can be addressed to Goodman's position is that, by defining the work as the class of conformity of performances that respect the scores, he contradicts nominalism. In fact, the concept of class should not find a place in a nominal system. However Goodman claims to use non-nominalistic concepts for convenience: on request, such concepts, including the class one, can be reworked in a nominalistic sense (GOODMAN 2008: 7). Let's also allow this to be true. Even so, there is no shortage of problems. He has, in fact, still objected (cf. KIVY 2007: 249-253) that if the work is understood as the class of performances in accordance with the score, it becomes impossible to attribute different properties to the work and its executions; but, as mentioned above, we would like to be able to say that a work is majestic, while one of its execution is half. This is not a decisive objection, because, as we will understand later (chapter 7), it may not be incorrect to argue that it is only possible to attribute ownership to the work through its executions. This would make it lean towards a dynamic conception of the work as an entity that (transforms) into and through its executions. However, this is not the idea of Goodman, who indeed binds the correctness of the executions to the rigid and immutable identity of a particular and concrete entity: the score. Thus, the main objection usually addressed to Goodman's nominalism concerns rather this thesis of his (GOODMAN 2008: 162): Since the only requirement of the work is a complete congruence with the score, the flat plate execution deprives a, material errors counts precisely as a siffatto specimen, unlike the most brilliant execution that has only one wrong note This thesis contrasts with the The right notes and no wrong notes, tough as good or excellent interpretations in which some notes of the score are not played, nevertheless we have no doubt in identifying the execution as the execution of the work of which it is execution. Goodman explains that his purpose is to code a coherent ontology, not to adapt the ontology to our practices. Unfortunately, however, this is precisely the point in question: what we need is a theory capable of explaining our musical practices and experiences, not a theory so blatantly contrary to them, which claims to tell us how our practices should be in order to conform to a supposed fundamental ontology. What we need, in short, is not a revLsiomista (or prescriptive) metaphysics; however, as we will see, not even a descriptive metaphysics is capable of carrying out the task of enduring our experiences and our aesthetic judgments, if, assuming that we have intuitions or beliefs of common sense assumed as indisputable and astoricameme STRAWSON 1978 and KANIA 20086; for a broad and informed discussion see. GIOMBINI 2015, chap. 2; for the criticism of the concept of intuition as a basis for the ontology of music cf. YOUNG 2011a and RUTA 2013). (In an interesting amendment to Goodman's theory that preserves its notninaliono, trying to mitigate its pamdossal character, it is offered by MUTUI

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(1999a and 1999I1. with the following argument: to play 'musical opera O batto have a serious intention to play O. even if in realizing aintenMone si m.,. some nom, it seems therefore that inconvenience the concept M intention is not enough the context of a deienninota pratka to be able to act as a criterion for the evaluation PINI seems to be plausible that it bases the sensplice 'mention of an individual joint reshment of a group of individuals to play the Quinta di Bredur■rn to perform really expected 'opera Even if rescruzione of a musical work is an intentional action it must be.JC Meniamo impor... distinguishes, ira cm. cosual and pettmon Maenzione to perform!). separam dalreffenim action. from his esia Compre that exists which ria M similar, and from the correhne activities interprelativemahantive. not in itself sufficient to perform demmo O. The solution dl Predellí M therefore reveals just as paradmmole M that of Goodman. For the reasons just outlined, the goodmanian model has fallen into disrepute today. Let's see if the structuralist model is better equipped to explain our music production and use practices.

3, The strusturalisme of the anthology typeaoken

The structuralist model, based on the rype/token distinction, is the most widespread and most popular among the analytical philosophers of music. It has several variations, but in general the thesis is that musical works must be distinguished from performances, since we can assign a set of ownership to the work and a different set of ownership to the performance of the work. The musical work, therefore, is a type or genre (type or kind) that has several occurrences (token). In addition, the musical work is a type of particular genre: it is an ideal or normative type (cf. WOLTERSTORFF 2007). It establishes the correctness of its occurrences (it is normative with respect to its occurrences) and admits both correct and incorrect occurrences. A musical work is then an entity that is 'substantiated in different occurrences, some of which are correct and others incorrect. The correct performances are those fully appropriate to the musical work as a type, that is, to its instructions for performance. The correct executions are those ‘faithful’ to the musical opera. This seems to be the most elegant and plausible solution to the problem of reeability, that is, to the problem of how the musical work can repeat itself identically in the different performances while remaining the same immutable musical work, and to the problem of the attribution of different properties to the musical work and its performances. In fact, the structuralist solution adapts well to musical practices based on repeatable works for execution of principle, apparently effectively explaining the relationship between works intended for execution and their executions. It also seems able to explain in what sense a musical work can generate executions that are as correct as they are incorrect, as standard as they are non-standard. If, according to the solution proposed by the structural model, there are criteria for the identification of a work through execution, it would be possible to clearly distinguish the executions that adequately meet those criteria from those that fail to do so. However, this thesis clashes with some difficulties. Those usually highlighted in the analytical literature concern the genre of entity that is the musical work as type, the conditions of identity of the work and the way in which it can be preserved in the different occurrences of the type. These difficulties can be articulated in the form of a paradox that arises from an inconsistent triad of propositions (cf. LIVINGSTON 2013): (A) Works of art are artifacts created by human beings and musical works are works of art. (B) Musical works are abstract objects. (C) Abstract objects cannot be created. The position known as Platonism (here I fly over the historical plausibility of the use of this label) denies (A), arguing that musical works are universal abstract ideals that do not exist in our spatiotemporal world as do their occurrences (token), that is, executions. The abstract type is not ‘created’, it is not born and does not perish. Therefore, musical works, as abstract ideal types, are discovered, and not created, by composers (cf. WOLTERSTORFF 2007, KIVY 2007a and 20076, DODD 2000, 2004 and 2007). However, there are not a few problems with the Platonist model. First of all, it clashes with the widespread intuition that works are created, and not only discovered, by composers. However, this objection is not decisive. In fact, the very validity of this intuition is historical, relating to a context of practices. Just as the opposite intuition, that is, the conviction on which Platonism is based, according to which the works would instead be discovered, should not simply be assumed in an uncritical manner as an indisputable assumption of a musical ideology, regardless of the consideration of the circumstances in which it acquires regulatory strength (cf. YOUNG 2011a; RUTA 2013; ARGO 2014a; GIOMBINI 2015: cf. capp. 5-7). So, another consideration seems more relevant. We would like to be able to say that we can enter into a relationship (causal and temporal) with the work, composing it or listening to it: but how is it possible to enter a causal and/or temporal relationship with an abstract timeless type? Moreover, the Platonist model does not explain how it is possible to consider a musical work — e.g. Mahler's Tenth Symphony— as unfinished. In fact, ideal types cannot be non-finished, just as a work can be non-finished instead. More generally, the Platonist thesis is not able to account for modal flexibility —i.e. the fact that the musical works could have been (at least a little) different from what they actually are (cf. ROHRBAUGH 2003 and BENSON 2003: 60). Obviously it is completely incompatible with the idea, which I will defend later (particularly in chapter 7), that the works (transform) into and thanks to their performances. Finally, Platonism considers structures as the essential elements of musical works (because only structures can be discovered). Thus, he is forced to admit that, if two different people make up the same sound structure, they produce the same musical work (DAVIES 2009: 160). The limits of Platonism are therefore evident (and in chapter 610 we will understand more concretely also thanks to the examination of a particular musical practice, counterfeiting). In fact, there may be musical works that share the same sound sequences, but they are nevertheless different works by virtue of the different properties that must be taken into account for their appreciation. In addition, non-structural elements (such as duration, phrasing, rhythm, timbre, instrumentation and dynamics) can also be essential for the determination of the building blocks of the work. In some musical practices these are among the most important elements (cf. TRIVEDI 2002: 78). For example, it is not possible to think of jazz in exclusively structural terms, that is, by abstracting the structures of a musical piece with the particular timbre colors of the instruments played by the individual musicians, the dynamics, the swing, etc. Similarly, as Alessandro Arbo (ARBO 2014a and 20146) observes, a song by De Gregori or De André is not only a series of chords with a melody and a text: even the sound quality of the recording, the specific ‘gree of the voice’ of the singer-songwriter (as could be said with Roland Barthes) are observational elements of Therefore, those who sing La canzone di Marinella properly would not be performing the work of De André, very simply because his voice is not that of De André (even if he can resemble them) and not even the overall sound effects are exactly those of the record. He is perhaps performing the song by De André; however, if the work is the recorded artifact, he is offering a version or a cover, but not an execution. The structure that defines the work in this case is such a purpose, that it cannot be re-executed, but only reproduced in playback

One might wonder. peri, what would happen if sl managed and perfectly imitate the music of the singer-songwriter and reproduce the sound effects used in the regishation of his phonographic work. Would we have a second ammemnra of the work here, A sort of done? Pii. avanti /tap I.51 I will discuss mo case shnik in relation to jazz. ln in any case I believe that. a. end of the cond, if the coma or the ocmione apply to mena as a reproduction of the opera and vice versa in what sense a reproduction pomo valere as a version or cover dipendo from valm In hindsight, different musical genres also differ from each other with respect to which types of structures are in each individual case the most important from the

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Artistic and aesthetic point of view. In a symphony, the correct appreciation of the work requires some understanding of the large-scale structures of its movements, as well as its overall harmonious development. In a jazz standard the structure of the accordal progression can be very simple and trivial, but this does not mean that the piece is simple and trivial: the artistically relevant thing can be here the melodic and rhythmic organization of the solos, the qualities of the timbre and swing, the interplay between the musicians during the performance. In short, the idea that the historical context of the musical practice in which the work is composed and performed, as well as the instruments that must be played to produce the sounds of a certain musical opera are not relevant to determine the musical object seems to be in contrast to the way in which we normally consider music. In this regard, Stefano Predelli (PREDELLI 2011: 281) rightly noted that "even in the case of a particular work, the decision on what properties are required for its correct executions may depend not only on what kind of object the work is, but also ‘from the context'.' he has other terms, "it would be a mistake to assume that the constraints [ I share the criticism of Predetti against the platonrkmo muskale. also because I present interesting aspects p, reimpoalare the ontology of music in the sense of rama einam/m opero and ...mani num.. com. la sui i 'within, rittmgo che. ia ftioniant and separate nenamen. fra anial It will discuss bom. orn point in the last part of the chapter e. more extensively, in the capp. 5-, See also PREMI, 2Ittil. To solve these problems, alternative proposals to Platonism have been made by denying (B) (musical works are abstract objects) or (C) (astract objects cannot be created). THOMASSON 2005 and 2006 and LEVINSON 1990, adhering to the composer's intuition of the creation of the work, attenuated (C) and argued that some abstract object (works of art, including musical works) can be created. In particular, starting from the implicit idea that the needs of art "make a high on the needs of metaphysics" (KANIA 20086: 429) and welcoming an Aristotelian version of the typeltoken distinction, Levrnson argued that musical works are initiated types, which do not exist before the composer invents them (LEVINSON 1990: 215-263). Musical works would not be only sound structures, ‘indicated’ sound structures, that is, characterized by a process of ‘indication’, exemplarily consisting in the production of a score by a composer, who, in the historical-cultural context of an artistic practice, specifies the conditions that the correct occurrences of the mouse must meet (including, starting from about the second half of the ' This contextualist or pragmatist solution allows you to respect the intuition (actually also questionable) that the works have artistic properties connected to a cultural and historical practice, so a work is in relation to other works and can be original, sui generis, epigonal, etc. the term 5Inaturalism. applies to Platonism, but also to positions dm, Mien.re that raristolellsmo, while conceiving type ...amen. .0 Maionimia, not ...me the assumption Mila duality 9494olsco. ciré la ... Mid greenhouse ordita of idendrà. that I do not return is not necessarily valid in all musical practices, but contradicts the tired dynamism of identity from the opera that you cosmi.ce anrawrso k its executions, ingeoretations and versions (dt: capp. 5-7). However, Levinson's proposal was criticised by DODD 2000 and 2007, which raised two objections in particular. On the one hand, Dodd argued against Levinson the thesis known as sonicity': all that is needed for the work to be correctly instigated is the sound appearance produced by the performance, regardless of the instruments used (the performance of Beethoven's Third Symphony by means of a synthesizer that perfectly reproduced the sounds that Beethoven intended to make the orchestra play would therefore run. On the other hand, against the Aristotelian assumption of the existence of the type in king, Dodd argued that types are eternal and therefore the types ‘indicated (or ‘started’), if they are types, can only be timeless (see also KIVY 2007: 267-269). However, compared to the sonicist thesis (cf. DAVIES 2011a: 32-33; GIOMBINI 2015: 73-74), it can be observed that, while flying over its lack of empirical plausibility (can really a synthesizer be confused with an orchestra?), it does not seem convincing, since it is not consistent with the reference musical practice, which involves the use of traditional instruments (this position has been precisely bapt This does not take away, in ogní case. nte the use of a synthesizer can be aesthetically effective: but as we will see in chapter 6 this, (long from the dintostrure plausibility of the mode. planornotonleinn emporio the questioning of the undisputed assumption of the entire analytical anthology of music: the repeatability of the Distinct from those concrete events that are their executions (LEVINSON 2011: 129). That of the social constructability of musical works is a thesis defended in the analytical field especially by Stephen Davies (DAVIES 2001; 2003: 30-46). With greater decision from Levinson, Davies pointed out that "the ontological possibilities of musical works are malleable" (DAVIES 2003: 35), because not all musical works are executable through a performance. Works built by recording, as we know, can be reproduced by playback, or, in the case of crank organelles, by operating the crank which in turn makes the specially prepared perforated cards sound. Moreover, not all works contain the means of reproduction among their identification conditions, but they can be performed in different ways and with different instruments, as is often the case with works of the popular repertoire: which means that the validity of sonicism and instrumentalism also depends on the specific context of the musical practice taken into account. It is questionable whether it is not then convenient to make a more radical turn, developing some of the fruitful reasons present in the phenomenological conception of the musical work, elaborated by Ingarden (INGARDEN 1989), as a "purely intentional object, which has [...] in certain real objects [= executions, recordings, scores] both the origin of one's own rise and Rejecting from the outset the assumptions of the Ope/token anthology, Ingarden had understood the musical work, and precisely the musical work of the classical-romantic tradition, as an "intersubjective aesthetic object", that is, as a "social object", "which somehow lasts in historical time and [...] transforms slowly" (INGARDEN 1989: 207, 209, FERRARIS 2009). We will see later (capp. 5-7) that these theoretical suggestions from Ingarden can be profitably taken up in the light of a ‘broad’ notion of improvisation. This allows us to develop a theoretical proposal capable of overcoming the reductionism of Levinson's contextualism and Davies' constructivism, which, while freeing themselves from the hard platonism of Kivy and Dodd, assume as an undisputed axiom the repeatability of the work in the perfeunuaco without loss of identity and assume that the composer's intentions

3.3. Conti... and perdurentlsono

The question of the duration of the work over time has also recently been enhanced by some continuisrt and perennial theories that have proposed a nominalist solution to the problem of the ontology of musical work and in the triad of mutually inconsistent propositions mentioned above considered it appropriate to deny B, that is, the thesis that musical works are abstract objects. This is the proposal, among others, of NUSSBAUM 2003,

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ROHRBAUGH 2003 and CAPLAN-MATHESON 2006, which mean musical works not as Platonic types, but as particular concrete temporal objects, which can be born and perish, and which last in time: they are therefore continuous (endurants) or persistent (perdura.), depending on whether such objects are considered to be entirely present at every moment of their existence or as objects GIOMBINI 2015: 31-35). Without going into an examination, here superfluous, of the technical complications of these conceptions, I will limit myself to a quick examination of the continuous/perdurantist model. In short, it argues that if musical works were abstract types they could not enter into causal relationships, and therefore we could not create them, nor refer to them. However, works are not even classes of conformity between performances and scores: in fact, when we refer to works, we do not necessarily have to refer to their performances. The nominalism embraced by the continuist/perduramist model is therefore different from the goodmanian one. Musical works would be temporally and modally flexible historical objects, which begin to exist, can change (because they can be sung and played differently) and can disappear. They have temporal parts (their executions), which are their occurrences and which, in the context of a certain historical practice, can be correct or incorrect. Therefore, the identity criteria of the musical work are normative and depend on the practice in which the work is placed. The reason why we are used to and think of works in terms of more or less unchangeable entities is that in our cultural practice musical works are often annotated in a score and the score ‘freezes’, so to speak, possible temporal transformations. Although it has not ousted the structuralist model, which remains the most widespread, the continuistafferdurantista model is in my opinion the theoretically most intuitively plausible hypothesis among those presemes in the analytical area. Making the existence of the musical work dependent on its occurrences (and in particular from its performances) it manages, in fact, to account for the pmformative character of music better than goodmanian nominalism and structuralism: its notion of musical work is more anchored in the artistic and aesthetic practices of music. However, even if we neglect the somewhat cloying technicalities of the criticisms made by tough platonists (such as DODD 2004), it cannot be ignored that this model conceives music too exclusively in terms of individual objects, where it should certainly be understood in terms of social and intersubjective objects subject to transformation (according to the theses of INGARDEN 1989), but Moreover, the metaphysical hypothesis that we continue/perdurantism defends not only concemes music, but has a more general application. Similar to structuralist and nominalist fundamental ontological theories, the validity of continuism and perdurantism in the musical field stands and falls with the validity of continuiamo and perdurantism as general metaphysical conceptions. Since the latter is controversial (e.g. it is really plausible to claim that objects have different and successive time parts or that the object is all present in each of its time parts?), it does not seem fruitful to procrastinate into complex technical disquisitions to show the validity of continuiamo/perdurantism in relation to music. The thesis that the works muvicali sian to fictions that are realized or in the I and peli-annua and and in ew made that mgomeMere caPhoh,-,. eomPatil.l and dogs... that the musical works are historical individuals that, like biological species. 'or... modify. To deepen the question, however, I should ... like In one area, that of fundamental ontology applied to music, of which here I want to emphasize rather the limits that the advantages for a philosophy of multo and art aware of the prtmat of aesthetics and I and practices on ontology. Pearl de-elation of this position 'lavi o percià at POIRBAUG111003 AtIGNUS 20I2.

4. The anthology of music to the test of practice (of improvisation)

Ideal types, classes of continuity, ‘perdurant’...: the debate about the ontological status of musical works, whose main orientations I have just finished summarizing (for a broader and more detailed discussion. cf. now GIOMBINI 2015, capp. I and 2), uses concepts elaborated within the framework of fundamental ontology and seems to have little to do with evil musical practices and experiences. As Lydia Goehr (GOEHR 1992) noted, the risk that the different competing theories will remain unrelated to the practices evils they should explain is very high. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why it is worth elaborating complex conceptual systems to answer the ontological question ‘What is such a musical work?’, since normally —except for any inconsistencies in the score or discrepancies between scores, which however in most cases can be corrected through a philological examination—the identification of a da. execution E as an execution of a da. It certainly seems more interesting and useful to introduce the aesthetic reasons that can clarify why, to what extent and for what aspects a given execution is good, bad, ccita., innovative, moving, bland etc., that is why, given two executions both correct, but different, of O (E and F), E is preferable to F (or they are both good or bad, I agree, in general, with this position. However, as I said at the beginning (§ 1), several philosophers argue that this is not the point in question. The ontology of music, they say, is not at the service of either artistic criticism or aesthetic practices. Instead, it would be a philosophical theme that can and must be cultivated independently. In fact, one can think, and this is precisely the most widespread argument among the defenders of the primacy of ontology over aesthetics, that evaluative issues can only be dealt with effectively on the basis of a convincing ontology. Nevertheless, it is not clear how an ontological base can be not only in itself convincing, but also capable of adequately supporting aesthetic and evaluative questions, if the ontological investigation is not connected to the concrete musical practices in which its concepts arise and operate (opera, song, track, performance, interpretation ...; cf. RIDLEY 2003: 210). Only by paying attention to practices can it be understood that the concept of musical work independent of performances and repeatable in performances, which contemporary analytical ontologies explain through metaphysical categories in themselves problematic, has a historical origin: it is dependent on artistic practices which are in turn possible thanks to specific historical-cultural processes (the modern nationalization of the musical system), the establishment of new spaces for social As an entity released from enforcement cf. GOEHR 1992; SMALL 1998; BORIO-GENTILI 2007: 235-353; GARDA 2007: 87-127). It has been precisely considerations of this kind that have led some scholars in recent years to reflect on the methodology of musical anthology (cf. KANIA 2008a and STECKER 2009), as well as examining the relationships (1) between musical anthology and musical practices, sometimes founding, rightly, the first on the second (DAVIES 2009), (2) between fundamental musical ontology and more specific musical anthologies, such as the oncology of jazz and rock, perhaps doubting their usefulness (BROWN 20116) and (3) between ontology I don't think the musical anthology itself is a pseudo-problem. Instead, I consider it a philosophical exercise that can be fruitful for both philosophy and aesthetics as well as for music. Moreover, in the course of this book, exploring the properties of musical improvisation, I will dedicate myself to the ontological investigation (see chapter 2 and 3).

However, I believe that, in so as not to irretrievably detach itself from the realities it should explain, reducing itself precisely to "pear distraction", the method of ontology must first consist in the examination of the concrete aesthetic and artistic practices to which it refers and in reflection on the values (aesthetic, social, historical, political, religious, etc.) that anima That is, it is a question of discerning what is the outcome of historically developed ideologies (such as the ideal of ‘fidelity to the work’ and the very concept of ‘musical opera’) and what instead constitutes the condition for the exercise and experience of a practice (such as the performative character of music), to highlight the aesthetic assumptions that inform decisions about the ontological It is thus shown that the normative criteria for the judgment of a musical phenomenon are not connatured to a supposed static essence of a certain artifact (e.g. a work for execution or a phonographic work), but are dynamic, in the sense that they change according to the practices in which they concretely operate: as with any other artistic phenomenon, the essence of a musical phenomenon is It is not the set of properties that a musical artifact must necessarily have and cannot be raised in abstract as a guarantee

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Indisputable of the validity of aesthetic judgments, because it is also the result of aesthetic negotiations (both at the level of production and that of fruition and criticism, which also influence each other). It is therefore misleading to resort to revisionist metaphysics, which previously assume as valid a fundamental anthology under which to bend the concrete reality of artistic practice, I also to rely on descriptive metaphysics, which claim to rely on intuitions of common sense, without giving account of the historical and constructed character of the same. I agree, in short, with what Paolo D'Angelo (D'ANGELO 2011: 159 a.) claims: categorical definitions of music and art, which, like those offered by the analytical positions examined so far, ignore, neglect or in any case underestimate the evaluative dimension, are able to "define, at most, the artifacts in general and not the The determinations of ontology "are aimed at characters that are proper [...1 of all products of human activity". It is therefore necessary not only to address the specific character of the practices in which artifacts take on meaning and value, but to understand how it is only thanks to the particular evaluation experience that we make that a certain artifact acquires the value of a certificate. As D'Angelo observes, cases such as plagiarism and restoration exhibit precisely that the artifact is a work of art if we experience it aesthetic. The same can be said of the improvisation that, as I will argue in the course of the book, is particularly adequate to make it understood that "the important [...] that the ontology remains linked to experiences lives of our relationship with art: otherwise it continually risks transforming into a theoretical mess that ends only to itself" (D'ANGELO 2011: 161).

At first glance, this consideration seems to evade the problem that in an ontological investigation in the artistic field still preliminarily clarify what the relevant artistic and aesthetic practices are and what their characteristics are. In short, one could argue that what you need is still an anthology of artistic practices. An ontology of this kind, however, is quite different from fundamental (metaphysical) ontology and is by no means at odds with the conviction defended in this book that, in order to connect to real aesthetic and artistic practices, the musical anthology must be welcomed by those who produce and listen to music.

In this framework, without reducing and the succession of complicated and often idle disquisitions about philosophical artifacts of a conceptual nature - ideal types, classes, continuous, etc. - without relevance to our experience of music, musical ontology would do well to remember that music is first and foremost a performative art that, while taking different forms and using different techniques and materials, is mainly as the art of sounds it is the activity that consists of organizing the temporal articulation of sounds and silences in order to produce aesthetic experiences, that is, to enrich or intensify the experience and by engaging in listening and dancing (cf. LEVINSON 1990: 272 and BERT1NETTO 2012c: 17-32).

It is therefore time to wonder how the musical anthology can be effective and legitimate, remaining connected to the living practices of musical experience. To answer and this question I will argue that musical objects are the 'deposits, subjected to ever new (trans)formations in practice, of the musical training that manifests itself in activities of invention, composition and arrangement, in processes of transmission, education and cultural exchange and in performances, and that musical works, understood as immutable constructions and identical to themselves, are cultural fiction 5-7). I insist that this position also contrasts with the thesis that, while abandoning the unstoppable path of the classification of musical works in reference to the fundamental anthology, the anthology still remains the prerequisite of aesthetics, since, to judge an aesthetically a work, it is necessary to be able to identify it, or know how to recognize it, to understand which my properties are artistically (ARBO 2014a).

Although the question of identification is independent of that of classification and knowing what is understood as a work in a certain practice and what properties it has (or must have) is a condition for an informed and justified aesthetic judgment, what is meant by work in a certain practice and what is the value we attribute to it depends in turn on aesthetic and artistic assumptions (as well as historical, economic, social, Only on this basis, for example, can we appreciate a version of a song as a valuable artistic artifact (like a work of art, if you want) continuing to consider the song a song, not very rich in aesthetic and artistic merits (I will discuss cases like this in particular in Ch. 6).

To argue my position, I will discuss the assumptions of the musical anthology by investigating the ontological peculiarities of improvisation: a practice that offers a different perspective, and in my opinion more fruitful, on the entire musical ontology, starting from the idea of music as an activity. On the one hand, it will be a matter of examining the ontology of musical improvisation (Chs. 2–4) and, on the other hand, arguing the thesis that improvisation can teach us something important about musical ontology tout court (Chs. 5–7).

But why give so much relevance to improvisation? As a premise of the topic that I will articulate in the rest of the book, and flying over the etymological history of the term ‘improvisation’ and its semantic reference sphere (in this regard see e.g. acute 1998, NETTL 1998 and CAPORALETTI 2005: 116 ss. ; ALTERHAUG 2010), the following can be said in this regard. As evidenced by the musical negotiations from the fifteenth century, before the modern concept of opera and the social practices linked to it were developed, improvisation was a common practice also in Western cultured music: it found fertile ground in Gregorian Singing, in the polyphonic counterpoint, in organ music (XVII century), in the accompaniment of concerta chamber music. (XVII/XVIII seno.), in performances with continuous bass and in general in baroque music, e.g. in the practice of embellishments (cf. FERAND 1938; BAILEY 2010: 45 ss. ; NUNN 1998: vol. I, 10 ss. ; CAPORALETTI 2005; BERKOWITZ 2010); but also the music of the great masters of the classical-romantic tradition —on all Mozart and Beethoven— owes much to improvisation (cf. TARUSKIN 1995: 273-291; KINDERMAN 2009), a practice that well accommodates, at least in some respects, in the Kantian-Romantic aesthetics of the genius (cf. SANCHO-VELÀZQUEZ 2001; LANDGRAF 2011). More radically, the idea that music, as a performative activity, is born just as a practice of improvisation (it is the central thesis of FERAND 1938, a text still exemplary for the history of improvisation and its meaning for the whole musical thought; see also BAILEY 2010). However, when, during the eighteenth century, music becomes part of the sphere of fine highs, a notion of musical work analogous to the notion of work of art in force for a long time in the field of the figurative arts is imposed (cf. BERTINETTO 20120: 5-17). Improvisation is then marginalized by music, because, due to the absence of planning and discipline that would seem to characterize it, it is a practice that can hardly be reconciled with the discipline of art (NETTL 1998: 7) and, due to its ephemeral character, it can only succumb to the lasting solidity of the works, apparently unchangeable.

In the Western musical tradition, there is a drastic decline in improvisation (cf. MOORE 1992; SANCHO-VELAZQUEZ 2001), which is relegated to reserves such as the cadences of concerts for solo instrument and orchestra, where the soloist can play free from the constraint of the score (cf. PESTELLI 2007). As some have observed (cf. GLOBOKAR 1979: 28-29), the space reserved for improvisation in concert cadences does not seem to be a tpatemalistic' concession to the performer by the composer, commonly regarded as the authentic artis. creator. Before the age of the opera, when the division of the moles between composer and performer was not yet institutionalized socially and economically, the performer claimed to exhibit his technical and instrumental skills through the free exercise of improvisation, even violating the instructions of the composer (which in any case did not have that prescriff character that they will acquire only later). At the end of the age of the opera, on the other hand, when with the avant-gardes and random, experimental and indeterminate music the works become more and more ‘open’ and less fixed at a structural level by the composer, to the point of seeming to no longer want to be works (in the classical sense that this concept acquires in the culture of BERT1NETTO 2012c: 36), it may be I myself instrumentalist who considers it unfair that the composer should charge him with the task, which, by contract, would not be required to perform, to invent music (cf. SMALL 1998). So, certainly even with little consideration of the performers themselves, until recent years improvisation has been neglected by both musicology and the philosophy of music.

90% of the sample

Today, however, improvisation is regaining attention both in music played (in the most diverse musical practices and genres) and disseminated by the media, and in different fields of musical studies -in reference to jazz, to music of oral tradition, but also to the experiments of the Euro-cultured avant-garde, of electronics, etc. -, and in this change of trend Italy has a CAPORALETTI 2005 and 2014; SPARTI 2005, 2007b; SANTI 2010; GUACCERO 2013; SBORDONI 2014; BERTINETTO-IVALDO-SBORDONI 2015). However, the current theoretical models of musical ontology —nominality, structuralism of rype-taken ontology and even continuism/perdurantism (at least to the extent that it is understood as an ontological position independent of aesthetic and hermeneutic considerations), which, as has been seen, struggle to capture even the traditional practice of performing musical works— are My hypothesis, I repeat, is that instead, improvisation can offer philosophical reflection a privileged way to account for some eminent properties of the musical experience. The hope of the writer is that the rebirth of interest in improvisation in the most diverse musical practices can generate a cultural climate conducive to accepting a theoretical use of improvisation as a conceptual instrument capable of reforming the omology of music in the sense of the primacy of the aesthetic and performative dimension of the same. At the end of the book, however, the reader will be to assess whether this thesis, apparently eccentric, is plausible and fruitful both from a practical and a theoretical point of view.

98% of the sample

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