Difference between revisions of "Wells on Material Falsity Footnote 1"

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Part I Untranslated:

Part I translated:

Part II:

Untranslated:

This materia circa quam must be distin­guished from the materia ex qua that Descartes addresses when he remarks to Arnauld in Resp. 4ae: “Nam cum ipsae ideae sint formae quaedam, nec ex materia ulla componantur,quoties considerantur quatenus aliquid reprae­sentant, non materialiter, sed formaliter sumuntur....” (AT 7, 232, 12-15).In the continuance of the above-mentioned texts from Medit. 3, especially when he address­es the two ideas of the sun and their intramental objects (see n. 25 below), Descartes too under­stands idea taken formaliter. There is according­ly no formal falsity on this prejudgmental level as long as one does not judgmentally refer these ideas to something else other than what is already represented by them. In his Reply to Arnauld, it will become clear that by emphasizing idea taken materialiter,such that it no longer represents “the truth and falsity of objects”, (AT 7, 233, 15-19), Descartes will seem to reject what he has just said in Medit. 3 about an idea as a modus cogitationis not beinga materia errandi in relation to judgment.However, modus cogitationis is a Cartesian equivocal. In Medit. 3 it is taken as an idea or concept that is formally representative (for­maliter) of an intramental object. This is akin to Descartes’ equivocal use of materialiter as rep­resentative of an object in his Praefatio ad Lectorem text (AT 7, 8, 16-19). In the Reply to Arnauld, modus cogitationis/modus cogitandi is, as noted, taken materialiter, absent any rep­resentation of an object, true or false, as will be seen in n. 64 and Section III below. To take idea materialiter, as Descartes does in his Reply to Arnauld, is to consider it as just a modus cogitandi/modus cogitationis in essendo not in repraesentando. On this distinction, see the Scotist, B. Mastri, Disputationes in 12 Arist. Stag. Libros Metaphysicorum (Venetiis, 1646), Disp. 2, q. 1, n. 2; I, 66: “Item conceptus for-malis semper est res singularis in essendo, licet possit esse universalis in repraesentando cum sit ipsemet intelligendi actus, sed objectivus [con-ceptus] esse possit universalis et singularis, nam et singularia et universalia intellectui objiciun-tur, ut intelligantur.”For a variation on Descartes’ reference (Medit. 3; AT 7, 37, 20-28, cited above in this note) to a formally false existential judgment of a similarity between an intramental object and an extramental reality, see L’Entretien Avec Burman, edit. J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1981), Texte 9, 36-39 where Burman raises the issue of judgmentalformal falsity as well as an occasion for pre­judgmental material falsity if one suspends anyexistential judgment of similarity.Descartes’ rejoinder expands his position on formal and material falsity to include non-exis-tential, quidditative judgments of intramental objects that constitute a materia errandi on the 58, 369 n. 39.

Part II Translated:

This matter about which must be distinguished from the matter from which Descartes addresses when he remarks to Arnauld in Resp. 4ae: "For since the ideas themselves are certain forms, and are not composed of any matter, whenever they are considered in so far as they represent something, they are taken not materially, but formally..." (AT 7, 232, 12-15). above-mentioned texts from Medit. 3, especially when he addresses the two ideas of the sun and their intramental objects (see n. 25 below), Descartes too understands the idea taken formally. There is accordingly no formal falsity on this prejudgmental level as long as one does not judgementally refer these ideas to something else other than what is already represented by them. In his Reply to Arnauld, it will become clear that by emphasizing the idea taken materially, such that it no longer represents "the truth and falsity of objects", (AT 7, 233, 15-19), Descartes will seem to reject what he has just said in Medit. 3 about an idea as a mode of thought not being a matter of error in relation to judgment. However, a mode of thought is a Cartesian equivocal. In Medit. 3 it is taken as an idea or concept that is formally representative (formally) of an intramental object. This is akin to Descartes' equivocal use of material as representative of an object in his Preface to the Reader text (AT 7, 8, 16-19). In the Reply to Arnauld, the mode of thinking is, as noted, taken materially, absent any representation of an object, true or false, as will be seen in n. 64 and Section III below. To take an idea materially, as Descartes does in his Reply to Arnauld, is to consider it as just a mode of thinking/mode of thought in being and not in representing. On this distinction, see the Scotist, B. Mastri, Disputationes in 12 Arist. Stag. Books of Metaphysics (Venice, 1646), Disp. 2, q. 1, no. 2; 1, 66: "Also, a formal concept is always a singular thing in being, although it can be universal in representing since it is itself an act of understanding, but an objective [concept] can be universal and singular, for both the singular and the universal are objects of the understanding for a variation on Descartes' reference (Medit. 3; AT 7, 37, 20-28, cited above in this note) to a formally false existential judgment of a similarity between an intramental object and an extramental reality , see L'Entretien Avec Burman, edit. J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1981), Texte 9, 36-39 where Burman raises the issue of judgmentalformal falsity as well as an occasion for prejudgmental material falsity if one suspends any existential judgment of similarity. Descartes' rejoinder expands his position on formal and material falsity to include non-existent, quidditative judgments of intramental objects that constitute a matter of errand on the 58, 369 n. 39.