Difference between revisions of "Wells on Material Falsity Footnote 1"

""Descartes and the Coimbrans on Material Falsity" Norman J. Wells Footnote 1[edit]

"Descartes and the Coimbrans on Material Falsity" The Modern Schoolman 85, no. 4 (January 2008): 271–316. DOI:10.5840/schoolman200885421 Footnote 1

Part I Untranslated:

1 From the very outset of this discussion the significance of the term “error” in the 17th C. must be set. It is properly judgmental in virtue of formal falsity and must not be confused with any attribution of “falsity” on a prejudgmentallevel of idea (adventitious or otherwise) and concept. This is the case for the Coimbrans and is honored by Descartes himself. For the Coimbrans, see The Conimbricenses Some Questions on Signs, transl. J. P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000) 166-67 (cited hereafter as TC) where a critical distinction between neg­ative and positive difformity is made:

“...notan­dum est duplicem esse difformitatem; alteram negativum, alteram positivam. Negativa est car­entia [in apprehensione] conformitatis cum aliquo objecto....Positiva difformitas est inade­quatio cognitionis cum objecto in quod tendit, et secundum eam partem in quam tendit; qualis est haec, Socrates non est risibilis; dicit enim judici­um habitudinem ad Socratem risibilem, sed dis­sentaneam. At haec secunda difformitas [positiva] est proprie falsitas, appellatur error; quem constat verae cognitioni contrariae opponi: prima dicitur ignorantia….”(Italics mine).

See the same critical distinction between a prejudgmental negative difformity and a judg­mental positive difformity in Suárez in n. 20 below. The basis for this distinction has to do with “the [prejudgmental] representation of some­thing otherwise than it is“ (aliter quam est in re or non sicut est), an issue that Suárez confronts in the context of an authoritative text of St. Augustine as noted in n. 20 below.

Also see DM 9, 1, 16 cited below in n. 20 below where the issue here of “representing something otherwise than it is” on a prejudg­mental level has to do with the prejudgmental apprehension of one object in place of or instead of another (Quo fit ut non tam illam [rem] quam loco illius [rei] apprehendat.).

Cecilia Wee in her Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’ Meditations (London: Routledge, 2006), 24, insists: “The Cartesian idea thus dif­fers from the Suárezian simplex apprehensio in that it can sometimes exhibit ‘difformity’ with what it purports to represent.” See n. 20 and the Coimbran Section below. Such a contention, in overlooking this dis­tinction between prejudgmental negative and positive difformity in Suárez and the Coimbrans as well as in Descartes, fails to do justice to the manifest continuity on this issue between Descartes and the Schoolmen.

See Descartes’ explicit denial of any prejudg­mental proper or formal falsity in Medit. 3:

“Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur,nec ad aliud quid illas referam, proprie falsas esse non possunt....” (AT 7, 37, 13-15).

Descartes observes this same protocol with his famous caveat in Medit. 3:

“Ac proinde sola supersunt judicia, in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar. Praecipuus autem error & frequentis-simus qui possit in illis [judiciis] reperiri, consistit in eo quod ideas, quae in me sunt, judicem rebus quibusdam extra positis similes esse sive conformes; nam profecto, si tantum ideas ipsasut cogitationis meae quosdam modos considerarem, nec ad quidquam aliud referrem, vix mihi ullam errandi materiam dare possent.” (AT 7, 37,20-28);

Medit. 4: “Nam per solum intellectum percipio tantum ideas de quibus judicium ferre possum, nec ullus error proprie dictus in eo prae-cise sic spectato reperitur....” (AT 7, 56, 15-18).

In addition, see Descartes' claims to Gassendi (Resp. 5ae; AT 7, 378, 21-24) and To Hyperaspistes (AT 3, 432, 8-11) that the human intellect cannot apprehend a false object for a true object such that it misapprehends or mis­represents on the prejudgmental level of idea.

For other references to the role of judgment in relation to the prejudgmental level of concept or idea, see n. 12 below.

Care must be taken to understand that this Cartesian caveat about judgmental error above in regard to similarity (similes) and conformity (conformes) has to do with an intramental termi­nal object on a prejudgmental level (ideas, quae in me sunt) in relation to an extramental reality. The issue of similarity here does not have to do with any likeness between an intramental cogni­tive activity and an extramental reality. An intra­mental cognitive activity such as Descartes’ self-styled adventitious sensation is altogether and inevitably unlike any extramental reality. Critical consideration of Descartes’ reference to a prejudgmental “matter for error” (materia errandi/materia erroris) in the text above from Medit. 3, its significance as well as its role in Descartes’ Reply to Arnauld where the famous citation of Suárez on material falsity occurs will appear in n. 21 below. However, let it be noted here that materia errandi/materia erroris is pre­judgmental; error is formally judgmental. It remains to be seen whether there is any “shift” between Descartes’ Medit. 3 and his Reply to Arnauld as Cecilia Wee contends (2006, 6). She seems to imply that the issue of a materia errandi is exclusive to Descartes’ Reply and not to Medit. 3. This is incorrect as Burman’s citation below indicates. In any case, the prejudgmental materia here is technically designated as materia circa quam and/or materia objectiva (DM 45, 2, 5). See Suárez, DM 2, 1, 1, where Suárez characterizes the conceptus objectivus:

“...conceptus objec­tivus...non est forma intrinsece terminans con­ceptionem, sed ut objectum et materia circa quam versatur formalis conceptio, et ad quammentis acies directe tendit....” (Italics mine).

Part I translated:

1 From the very outset of this discussion the significance of the term "error" in the 17th C. must be set. It is properly judgmental in virtue of formal falsity and must not be confused with any attribution of “falsity” on a prejudgmental level of idea (adventitious or otherwise) and concept. This is the case for the Coimbrans and is honored by Descartes himself. For the Coimbrans, see The Conimbricenses Some Questions on Signs, transl. J. P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000) 166-67 (cited hereafter as TC) where a critical distinction between negative and positive difformity is made:

“...it must be noted that there is a double difformity; one negative, the other positive. Negative is the lack [in apprehension] of conformity with some object....Positive difformity is the inadequacy of knowledge with the object towards which it aims, and according to the direction towards which it aims; such as this is, Socrates is not to be laughed at; for the judgment says that the attitude towards Socrates is laughable, but disagreeable. But this second [positive] difformity is properly a falsity, it is called an error; which is opposed to the opposite of true knowledge: the first is called ignorance....” (italics mine)

See the same critical distinction between a prejudgmental negative difformity and a judgmental positive difformity in Suárez in n. 20 below.

The basis for this distinction has to do with "the [prejudgmental] representation of something otherwise than it is", an issue that Suárez confronts in the context of an authoritative text of St. Augustine as noted in n. 20 below. Also see DM 9, 1, 16 cited below in n. 20 below where the issue here of "representing something otherwise than it is" on a prejudgmental level has to do with the prejudgmental apprehension of one object in place of or instead of another Cecilia Wee in her Material Falsity and Error in Descartes' Meditations (London: Routledge, 2006), 24, insists:

"The Cartesian idea thus differs from the Suárezian simple apprehension in that it can sometimes exhibit 'difformity' with what it purports to represent.” See n. 20 and the Coimbran Section below Such a contention, in overlooking this distinction between prejudgmental negative and positive difference in Suárez and the Coimbrans as well as in Descartes, fails to do justice to the manifest continuity on this issue between Descartes and the Schoolmen. See Descartes' explicit denial of any prejudgmental proper or formal falsity in Medit. 3:

"As regards ideas, if they are looked upon alone in themselves, and if I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot properly be false..." (AT 7, 37, 13-15). Descartes observes this same protocol with his famous caveat in Medit. 3:

“And therefore the only judgments remain, in which I must be careful not to be deceived. Now the principal and most frequent error which can be found in those [judgments] consists in the fact that the ideas which are in me are similar or conform to certain judgments placed outside. for indeed, if only the ideas themselves were to consider certain modes of my thought, and not refer to anything else, they could scarcely give me any material to err." (AT 7, 37, 20-28);

It measures. 4: "For through the intellect alone I perceive only the ideas about which I can pass judgment, and no properly so-called error is found in it when viewed in this way..." (AT 7, 56, 15-18).

In addition, see Descartes 'claims to Gassendi (Resp. 5ae; AT 7, 378, 21-24) and To Hyperaspistes (AT 3, 432, 8-11) that the human intellect cannot apprehend a false object for a true object such that it misapprehends or misrepresents on the prejudgmental level of idea. For other references to the role of judgment in relation to the prejudgmental level of concept or idea, see n. 12 below.

Care must be taken to understand that this Cartesian caveat about judgmental error above in regard to similarity (similar) and conformity (conforms) has to do with an intramental terminal object on a prejudgmental level (ideas that are in me) in relation to an extramental reality. The issue of similarity here does not have to do with any likeness between an intramental cognitive activity and an extramental reality. An intramental cognitive activity such as Descartes' self-styled adventitious sensation is altogether and inevitably unlike any extramental reality.

Critical consideration of Descartes' reference to a prejudgmental "matter for error" (materia errandi/materia erroris) in the text above from Medit. 3, its significance as well as its role in Descartes' Reply to Arnauld where the famous citation of Suárez on material falsity occurs will appear in n. 21 below.

However, let it be noted here that the matter of error is prejudgmental; error is formally judgmental. It remains to be seen whether there is any "shift" between Descartes' Medit. 3 and his Reply to Arnauld as C. Wee contends (2006, 6). She seems to imply that the issue of a materia errandi is exclusive to Descartes' Reply and not to Medit. 3. This is incorrect as Burman's quotation below indicates. In any case, the prejudgmental materia here is technically designated as materia circa quam and/or materia objectiveva (DM 45, 2, 5) See Suárez, DM 2, 1, 1, where Suárez characterizes the conceptus objectivevus:

"...conceptus the objective...is not a form intrinsically limiting the conception, but as the object and material around which the formal conception revolves, and to which the line of thought directly tends... (Italics mine).

Part II:

Untranslated:

This materia circa quam must be distin­guished from the materia ex qua that Descartes addresses when he remarks to Arnauld in Resp. 4ae:

“Nam cum ipsae ideae sint formae quaedam, nec ex materia ulla componantur,quoties considerantur quatenus aliquid reprae­sentant, non materialiter, sed formaliter sumuntur....” (AT 7, 232, 12-15).

In the continuance of the above-mentioned texts from Medit. 3, especially when he address­es the two ideas of the sun and their intramental objects (see n. 25 below), Descartes too under­stands idea taken formaliter. There is according­ly no formal falsity on this prejudgmental level as long as one does not judgmentally refer these ideas to something else other than what is already represented by them.

In his Reply to Arnauld, it will become clear that by emphasizing idea taken materialiter, such that it no longer represents “the truth and falsity of objects”, (AT 7, 233, 15-19), Descartes will seem to reject what he has just said in Medit. 3 about an idea as a modus cogitationis not being a materia errandi in relation to judgment. However, modus cogitationis is a Cartesian equivocal. In Medit. 3 it is taken as an idea or concept that is formally representative (for­maliter) of an intramental object. This is akin to Descartes’ equivocal use of materialiter as rep­resentative of an object in his Praefatio ad Lectorem text (AT 7, 8, 16-19). In the Reply to Arnauld, modus cogitationis/modus cogitandi is, as noted, taken materialiter, absent any rep­resentation of an object, true or false, as will be seen in n. 64 and Section III below.

To take idea materialiter, as Descartes does in his Reply to Arnauld, is to consider it as just a modus cogitandi/modus cogitationis in essendo not in repraesentando. On this distinction, see the Scotist, B. Mastri, Disputationes in 12 Arist. Stag. Libros Metaphysicorum (Venetiis, 1646), Disp. 2, q. 1, n. 2; I, 66:

“Item conceptus for-malis semper est res singularis in essendo, licet possit esse universalis in repraesentando cum sit ipsemet intelligendi actus, sed objectivus [conceptus] esse possit universalis et singularis, nam et singularia et universalia intellectui objiciuntur, ut intelligantur.”

For a variation on Descartes’ reference (Medit. 3; AT 7, 37, 20-28, cited above in this note) to a formally false existential judgment of a similarity between an intramental object and an extramental reality, see L’Entretien Avec Burman, edit. J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1981), Texte 9, 36-39 where Burman raises the issue of judgmental formal falsity as well as an occasion for pre­judgmental material falsity if one suspends any existential judgment of similarity. Descartes’ rejoinder expands his position on formal and material falsity to include non-existential, quidditative judgments of intramental objects that constitute a materia errandi on the 58, 369 n. 39.

Part II Translated:

This matter about which must be distinguished from the matter from which Descartes addresses when he remarks to Arnauld in Resp. 4ae: ': "For since the ideas themselves are certain forms, and are not composed of any matter, whenever they are considered in so far as they represent something, they are taken not materially, but formally..." (AT 7, 232, 12-15).

above-mentioned texts from Medit. 3, especially when he addresses the two ideas of the sun and their intramental objects (see n. 25 below), Descartes too understands the idea taken formally. There is accordingly no formal falsity on this prejudgmental level as long as one does not judgementally refer these ideas to something else other than what is already represented by them.

In his Reply to Arnauld, it will become clear that by emphasizing the idea taken materially, such that it no longer represents "the truth and falsity of objects", (AT 7, 233, 15-19), Descartes will seem to reject what he has just said in Medit. 3 about an idea as a mode of thought not being a matter of error in relation to judgment. However, a mode of thought is a Cartesian equivocal. In Medit. 3 it is taken as an idea or concept that is formally representative (formally) of an intramental object. This is akin to Descartes' equivocal use of material as representative of an object in his Preface to the Reader text (AT 7, 8, 16-19).

In the Reply to Arnauld, the mode of thinking is, as noted, taken materially, absent any representation of an object, true or false, as will be seen in n. 64 and Section III below. To take an idea materially, as Descartes does in his Reply to Arnauld, is to consider it as just a mode of thinking/mode of thought in being and not in representing. On this distinction, see the Scotist, B. Mastri, Disputationes in 12 Arist. Stag. Books of Metaphysics (Venice, 1646), Disp. 2, q. 1, no. 2; 1, 66:

"Also, a formal concept is always a singular thing in being, although it can be universal in representing since it is itself an act of understanding, but an objective [concept] can be universal and singular, for both the singular and the universal are objects of the understanding for a variation on Descartes' reference (Medit. 3; AT 7, 37, 20-28, cited above in this note) to a formally false existential judgment of a similarity between an intramental object and an extramental reality , see L'Entretien Avec Burman, edit. J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1981), Texte 9, 36-39 where Burman raises the issue of judgmental formal falsity as well as an occasion for prejudgmental material falsity if one suspends any existential judgment of similarity. Descartes' rejoinder expands his position on formal and material falsity to include non-existent, quidditative judgments of intramental objects that constitute a matter of error on the 58, 369 n. 39.