Descartes et les fausses idees Emanuela Scribano 2001
"Descartes on False Ideas" by Emanuela Scribano 2001
- Translated from the original French into English by Google translate.
It is in the Third Meditation (TM) that Descartes introduces the notion of true and misconceptions. This last category of ideas attracted the attention of the interpreters, mainly because of the difficulty of identifying a coherence between the theory of misconceptions set out in the TM and that of the responses to the objections that Arnauld addressed to Descartes in this regard. This will be the subject of this discussion, which will therefore also focus on the doctrine of "material falsehood" of ideas.
2 The TM divides ideas into two categories: on the one hand, those that represent something, and to which the idea name fits "cleanly"; on the other hand, those that represent nothing and are only modifications of thought, and to which, obviously, the idea name fits "improperly":
3 Quadem ex his (cogitationibus) tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen: ut cum hominem, vel Chimeram, vel Coelum, vel Angelum, vel Deum cogito. Aliae vero alias quasdam praeterea formas habent: ut, cum volo, cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatione complector; et ex his aliae voluntates, sive affectus, aliae autem judicia appellantur.
Google translate: Some of these (thoughts) are like images of things, to which only the name of an idea properly fits: as when I think of a man, or a Chimera, or Heaven, or an Angel, or God. Others, on the other hand, have other forms in addition: when I want, when I fear, when I affirm, when I deny, I always indeed grasp some thing as the subject of my thought, but I embrace something even more than the likeness of that thing in thought; and of these other wills, or affections, and others are called judgments. [1]
[1] AT VII, 37, 3–12. The references to Descartes's text are . . . [see Notes: below for continuation]
4 Descartes then states that ideas, considered independently of any judgment, cannot be false: "Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsae proprie esse non possunt; nam sive capram, sive chimeram imaginer, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quam alteram.... Ac proinde sola supersunt judicia, in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar. " [2]
[2] AT VII, 37, 13–22.
5 The ideas themselves are a premise of the first demonstration of God's existence. These ideas have two sides: their "formal" reality, which makes them changes in thought capable of representing something, and their realitas objectiva, namely what they actually represent [3]
[3] AT VII, 40–41. Descartes develops proof of the existence of God through the search for a cause outside the thought of the objective reality of the ideas themselves, and in particular the idea of God. It is within this proof that Descartes distinguishes the ideas themselves into two categories: true ideas and misconceptions, depending on whether they represent beings who can exist or beings who cannot exist outside thought. Misconceptions are an exception to the initial declaration of the impossibility for an idea to be false:
6 Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis posset reperiri paulo ante notaverim, est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis, cum non rem tanquam rem repraesentant: ita, exempli causa, ideae quas habeo caloris et frigoris, tam parum clarae et distinctae sunt, ut ab iis discere non possim, an frigus sit tantum privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum. Et quia nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt, siquidem verum sit frigus nihil aliud esse quam privationem caloris, idea quae mihi illud tanquam reale quid et positivum representat, non immerito falsa dicetur, et sic de caeteris.
Google translate: For although I noted a little before that falsity properly so called, or formal, could only be found in judgments, yet there is certainly a certain other material falsity in ideas, when they do not represent a thing as a thing: thus, for example, the ideas I have of heat and cold, so little clear and they are distinct, so that I cannot learn from them whether cold is only the deprivation of heat, or heat the deprivation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or neither. And since no ideas can exist except as things, if indeed it is true that cold is nothing else than the deprivation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive, will not undeservedly be called false, and so on the rest. [4]
[4] AT VII, 43, 26–44, 8.
7 The falsehood of ideas is called "material", insofar as it opposes the properly or "formally" falsehood called, which is only found in judgment; material falsehood therefore indicates falsehood without judgment.
8 Arnauld interpreted this doctrine as referring to a case of misrepresentation: what is nothing is represented as something. Material falsehood should concern the representation of false objects, in the metaphysical sense of falsehood, namely objects that cannot exist outside thought, and which are represented as if they were true objects, in the metaphysical sense of truth, namely as if they were objects that have a true nature and to which, therefore, a possible existence is suitable. [5]
[5] The metaphysical sense of truth is used by Descartes... However, in his objections, Arnauld radically refused the notion of material falsehood. There is no sense to say of an idea that it is false, and the false representation is always impossible: if the idea represents the cold as it is, then it is the idea of the cold, but if the idea represents the cold as it is not, then it is not the idea of the cold. In other words, if cold is something negative, the idea of cold must represent something negative; if it represents something positive, this idea is not the idea of cold, and if we judge that it represents cold, it is, precisely, an error of judgment, and not an error of the idea: "Denique, illa frigoris idea, quam dicis materialiter falsam esse, quid menti tuae exhibet? Privationem? Ergo vera is. Ens positivum? Ergo non est frigoris idea." [6]
[6] AT VII, 207, 17–19.
9 In his answer, Descartes excludes that the material falsehood of an idea may have any relationship with the truth or metaphysical falsehood of the object represented. The "materiality" in question refers to the "material" side of the idea, namely to the capacity for representation it possesses as a modification of thought, and not to the content of the idea, to what it represents, namely to its "formal" side. Descartes here renames what, in the TM, constituted the two sides of the idea: its "formal" side is called "material", and the realitas objectiva becomes its "formal" side:
10 . . . cum ipsae ideae sint formae quaedam, nec ex materia ulla componantur, quoties considerantur quatenus aliquid repraesentant, non materialiter, sed formaliter sumuntur; si vero spectarentur, non prout hoc vel illud repraesentant, sed tantummodo prout sunt operationes intellectus, dici quidem posset materialiter illas sumi, sed tunc nullo modo veritatem vel falsitatem objectorum respicerent.
Google translate: since the ideas themselves are a kind of form, and are not composed of any matter, whenever they are considered in so far as they represent something, they are not taken materially, but formally; but if they were looked upon, not as they represent this or that, but only as they are the operations of the intellect, it might indeed be said that they should be taken materially, but then they would in no way reflect the truth or falsity of the objects. [7]
[7] AT VII, 232,12–19.
11 Therefore, material falsehood does not constitute a case of misrepresentation, but a defect in the ability to represent the idea, a defect that is verified when the idea, being obscure and confused, does not make it possible to discern whether the object represented is an object (metaphysically) true or (metaphysically) false, which makes it an occasion for a false judgment:
12 Nec ideo mihi videtur illas alio sensu materialiter falsa dici posse, quam eo quem jam explicui: nempe sive frigus sit res positiva, sive privatio, non aliam idcirco de ipso habeo ideam, sed manet in me eadem illa quem semper habui; quamque ipsam dico mihi praebere materiam erroris, si verum sit frigus esse privationem et non habere tantum realitatis quam calor; quia, utramque ideam caloris et frigoris considerando prout ambas a sensibus accepi, non possum advertere plus realitatis per unam quam per alteram exhiberi.
Google translate: Nor does it seem to me that they can be called materially false in any other sense than that which I have already explained: namely, whether cold is a positive thing or a privation, I do not therefore have a different idea of it, but the same remains in me which I have always had; and which I say provides me with the material of error, if it be true that cold is a privation and has not so much reality as heat; for, considering both the ideas of heat and cold, as I received both from the senses, I cannot observe that more reality is presented by the one than by the other. [8]
[8] AT VII, 232, 19–33, 2.
13 By denouncing the ambiguity into which Arnauld would have fallen, Descartes, as we can see, maintains that he has never spoken of a false representation and that he has always used the notion of material falsehood in the sense that the answers make more explicit: Nec ideo mihi videtur illa alio sensu materialiter falsas dici posse, quam eo quem jam explicui . . . ”
Recent interpretations of the Cartesian theory of the falsehood of ideas are shared: some see between the version of the material falsehood of the TM and that of the answers to Arnauld an insurmountable inconsistency [9]
[9] A. KENNY, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, NewYork,..., others, more and more numerous, are trying to show the deep coherence of the two versions of this theory. [10]
[10] N. J. WELLS, Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and . . .
15 Among the interpreters who take sides for Descartes' coherence, Norman J. Wells has introduced a new perspective. As I am convinced that Wells' interpretation has brought very important elements for the understanding of Descartes' doctrine, I want to discuss it here in its fundamental lines. Wells tried to show that the scholastic tradition, and in particular Suarézian, of simplex apprehensio, makes it possible to defend, without resorting to the false representation rejected by Arnauld, the thesis of a falsehood and a truth of ideas independent of any judgment. It also makes it possible to defend the consistency between the TM and the responses to objections. [11]
[11] N. J. WELLS, Material Falsity, op. cit. The doctrine of simplex apprehensio provides as an analytical truth that each idea represents what it represents, and therefore that the falsehood of a representation is a meaningless notion: "simplex apprehensio, seu cognitio non potest habere difformitatem cum rem, quae est obiectum eius, esto possit esse difformis aliis rebus: ergo non potest in illa esse falsitas." [12]
[12] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, I, XIV. Descartes would have taken this doctrine to the letter in the theory of ideas of the TM: " quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsae proprie esse non possunt; nam sive capram, sive chimeram imaginer, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quam alteram. The false representation is an analytically impossible case: either the idea represents a certain object, or it does not represent it, and therefore becomes the idea of another object: "... in simplici actu... simpliciter res aliqua repraesentatur: ergo vel repraesentatur sicut est, vel non est illa, quae repraesentatur, et consequenter repugnat, esse obiectum, and not repraesentari sicut est." [13]
[13] Ibid.. IX, I, XV. Falsehood is only possible in judgment that establishes a relationship between representation and an object external to thought, affirming or denying its conformity with representation itself. A representation therefore has, strictly speaking, two objects: an internal object that simply constitutes representation in itself, and the other, external to thought, to which a judgment attaches representation. The internal object of the representation may not correspond to the external object to which the representation refers, but, of course, it is always in accordance with itself. Because of the intentionality of the idea towards the outside world, the external object is said to be the object of the idea. However, this expression is equivocal and liable to false consequences. One could, for example, believe that an idea is false when the external object is represented in a different way than it is. While the idea is not, in this case, the idea of this object, but represents something else, and this other thing, in fact, is its real object. Strictly speaking, we can say that an idea represents an object external to thought in the only case where there is an identity between representation and external object.
16 Descartes would always have spoken of the falsity of the idea in relation to this doctrine. The falsity of the idea does not consist in the fact that it falsely represents its object—which for Descartes, as for Suarez, is impossible—but in the fact that it does not make it possible to distinguish what it represents. In this case, the idea fails in its nature, that is, in its function of representation, which makes it materially false. Within the doctrine of simplex apprehensio, the only possible meaning of the falsity of an idea is that of a defect in its function of representation, namely precisely the interpretation of the falsity that Descartes makes explicit in his answers to Arnauld's objections, by linking the falsity to the darkness of the idea. An idea is said to be false when its darkness does not make it clear whether the object represented is true or false, which can cause a false judgment: "... propter hoc tantum illam materialiter falsam appello, quod, cum sit obscura et confusa, non possim dijudicare an mihi quid exibeat quod extra sensum meum sit positivum, necne; ideoque occasionem habeo judicandi esse quid positivum, quamvis forte sit tantum privatio. [14]
[14] AT VII, 234,13–18. In addition, the opportunity for error given by an idea was, for Suarez too, the only case where an idea could be said to be (improperly) false: "... etiam Aristoteles... non intelligit, falsitatem proprie sumptam in ipsa simplici apprehensione reperiri, sed esse in his apprehensionibus occasionem erroris et deceptionis, et inde falsas nominari." [15]
[15] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, I, XVI.
17 However, Wells' interpretation gives a good account of the TM's thesis, according to which ideas cannot be false, as well as the interpretation of the material falsity of the answers to Arnauld. However, it fails in the face of the presentation of the material falsehood of the TM. This is obvious from the definition of the idea from which the material falsehood is deduced: " nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt". [16]
[16] AT VII, 44, 4. The field of res, at Descartes, does not include true objects and false objects. It only includes true objects, namely, objects that can exist outside thought, and which, unlike false objects, are "something," are, precisely, res. [17]
[17] Cf. AT VII, 64, 6-9-65, 3-4: ".. invenio apud me innumeras . . . It may be said that res here should not be interpreted in the restricted and technical sense of what can exist, but, generically, as any of the contents of a representation. On this point, however, the presentation of material falsehood itself is decisive. In TM, the materially false idea is the one that represents a non res tanquam res. We can only understand the negative expression—non res—if Descartes aims at an object that cannot exist outside thought, a false object, as Descartes immediately repeats it: "... si quidem sint falsae, hoc est nulla s res repraesentent. [18]
[18] Precisely R.W. FIELD, op. cit., p. 316, emphasizes this point as... Arnauld had therefore well understood what the material falsehood of the TM was: a false representation, namely that of a false object, which is represented as if it were a true object; precisely the case that the doctrine of simplex apprehensio—a doctrine that Arnauld shares and that Descartes here consciously violates—considered analytically impossible.
18More over, if the doctrine of material falsehood had from the beginning been compatible with simplex apprehensio, why would Arnauld, who shares the same theory about ideas, refuse to accept Descartes' doctrine as presented in the TM? In fact, it is Arnauld's position that reflects the doctrine of simplex apprehensio in its purity. Just compare Arnauld's words: "Denique, illa frigoris idea, quam dicis materialiter falsam esse, quid menti tuae exhibet? Privationem? Ergo vera is. Ens positivum? Ergo non est frigoris idea" with those of Suarez: " . . . vel (res) repraesentatur sicut est, vel non est illa, quae repraesentatur, et consequenter repugnat, esse obiectum, et non repraesentari sicut est." [19]
[19] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, I, XV.
19 Wells's interpretation therefore results in placing Descartes's position of the answers and that of Arnauld on the same level. But as, according to Wells, Descartes never changed his mind, because the doctrine of the material falsity of the TM was already framed in the theory of simplex apprehensio, it becomes difficult to understand Arnauld's controversy, unless you admit that he fell into a misunderstanding about the Cartesian thesis. But the unequivocal meaning of the elements on which Arnauld's interpretation is based excludes this hypothesis: ideas always represent something, material falsehood consists in the representation of a non res as if it were a res.
20 On the other hand, there is no doubt that Descartes, with his theory of ideas that cannot be false, sides with the doctrine of simplex apprehensio, or, more precisely, with the doctrine of Aristotelian origin, which is the source of simplex apprehensio, according to which falsehood can only be found in the composition of the simple and never in the simple themselves. [20]
[20] Cf. ARISTOTE, De anima, T. 6, 430a 10-430 a 29. This thesis is... and it is also certain that the interpretation of the material falsity of the answers to Arnauld is framed in this doctrine. In short, Wells demonstrates very well that Descartes reasons within the framework of the doctrine of simplex apprehensio, but he cannot demonstrate the coherence of the theory of material falsehood, because only the version of the material falsehood present in the answers to Arnauld is compatible with this doctrine.
In fact, the version of the material falsity of the TM is irreducible to that of the answers to Arnauld on several points:
In the TM the falsity of the idea consisted in the false representation of a false object ("... est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis, cum non rem tanquam rem repraesentant"). [21]
[21] AT VII, 43, 28–30. While in the answers it consists in a defect in the ability to represent an idea, which always remains the same, whether its object is a true object or a false object ("... sive frigus sit res positiva, sive privatio, non aliam idcirco de ipso habeo ideam, sed manet in me eadem illa quam semper habui... »). [22]
[22] AT VII, 232, 21–23.
Therefore, the material falsehood that, in the TM, consisted in a distortion of the realitas objectiva of the idea (... non rem tanquam rem repraesentant...) moves, in the answers to Arnauld, in the capacity to represent the idea, namely in what, in the TM, was the "formal" side of the idea and that Descartes names here his "material" side ("... siaren vero (ideae) specttur, non prout hoc vel illud repraesentant, sed tantummodo prout sunt operationes intellectus, dici quidem posset materialiter illas sumi, sed tunc nullo modo veritatem vel falsitatem objectorum respicerent.) [23]
[23] AT VII, 232,15–19.
In the TM, darkness prevented establishing whether an idea was true or false ("... nonnisi valde confuse et obscure a me cogitantur, adeo ut etiam ignorem an sint verae, vel falsae, hoc est, an ideae, quas de illis abeo, sint rerum quarundam ideae, an non rerum"). [24]
[24] AT VII, 43, 23–26. While in the answers the darkness coincides with the falsity of the idea ("... propter hoc tantum illam materialiter falsam appello, quod, cum sit obscura et confusa, non possim dijudicare an mihi quid exhibeat quod extra sensum meum sit positivum, necne. . . . ). [25]
[25] AT VII, 234,13–17.
In TM, falsehood concerned only sensitive qualities which, like privations, are an absolute nothingness ("... ab iis (ideis) discere non possim, an frigus sit tantum privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum. »). [26]
[26] AT VII, 44,1–3. While, in the answers, falsehood generally concerns all ideas that can be the occasion for a false judgment, including false ideas and desires. Therefore, in the answers, falsehood knows gradations, depending on whether the idea gives rise to a greater or lesser opportunity for error ("... illae (ideae) quae vel nullam vel perexiguam judicio dant occasionem erroris, non tam merito materialiter falsae dici videntur, quam quae magnam: unas autem majorem quam alteras erroris occasionem praebere, facile est exemplis declarare. Neque enim tanta est in confusis ideis ad arbitrium mentis effictis (quales sunt ideae falsorum Deorum), quanta est in iis quae a sensibus confuse adveniunt... Omnium autem maxima est in ideis quae ab appetito sensitivo oriuntur: ut idea sitis in hydropico... »). [27]
[27] AT VII, 233, 22-234, 7.
In the TM material falsehood is really inherent in the idea ("Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis reperiri paulo ante notaverim, est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis... »), [28]
[28] AT VII, 43, 26-29. While in the answers the idea is said to be materially false only because it is the occasion for a false judgment ("... dico mihi praebere materiam erroris") [29]
[29] AT VII, 232, 23-24.
22 However, all these changes respond to a precise logic: they result from the elimination of the false representation, which consisted of the material falsehood of the TM. In the answers, the false representation became impossible for Descartes as for Arnauld. Therefore, the material falsity of the answers no longer has anything to do with the material falsity of the TM.
23 The keywords "material" and "confused" of the TM, skillfully included in the answers, allow Descartes to maintain that he has not changed his mind. But it is an attempt that is not difficult to unmask. When it came to misrepresenting, falsehood was in the objective reality of the idea. However, having left the possibility of a false representation, but wanting to keep the notion of material falsehood, Descartes has at his disposal only the other side of the idea, namely the idea as a modality of thought, which Descartes, for the first time, calls the "material" side of the idea, thus building an opposition as new as it is sagacious between the "formal" side of the idea (what the idea represents) and its "material" side (the modality of thought). The words themselves now suggest the place where material falsehood should be placed: "... cum ipsae ideae sint formae quaedam, nec ex materia ulla componantur, quoties considerantur quatenus aliquid repraesentant, non materialiter, sed formaliter sumuntur; si vero spectarentur, non prout sunt operationes intellectus, dici quidem posset materialiter illas sumi, sed tunc nullo modo veritatem veltate falsim objectorum respicerent." [30]
[30] AT VII, 232, 12–19. Let us notice Descartes's shift from what is taken "materially": the formal/material couple previously referred only to truth and falsehood. The formally said falsehood, that of judgment, was opposed to the materially said falsehood, that of ideas, namely to a falsehood without judgment: Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis posset reperiri... est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis... Now, on the contrary, the falsity of an idea lies in its material side, hence its name material falsehood. The question has moved, it is no longer simply: is there a material falsehood of ideas, but rather: can ideas taken materially be (materially) false? Masked by the homonymy of the "material", a decisive shift doubles the opposition between falsehood without judgment (material) and falsehood in (formal) judgment into an opposition between the material side of the idea (which can be the occasion of an error), and the formal side of the idea (which now, and against the TM, can never be false). Having been attached to the so-called "material" side of the idea, material falsehood cannot, by definition, refer to the falsity of the object represented, but only to the function of representation of the idea. The preface to the Meditations will record the semantic change that occurred in the answers to Arnauld, calling precisely "material" the side of the idea that was previously called "formal". [31]
[31] AT VII, 8, 20–23: "(idea) sumi potest vel materialiter, pro...
24 As for the darkness of the idea, the slippage found in the answers to Arnauld is even more obvious. In the TM, the confusion of the idea did not make it possible to distinguish whether it was a true idea or a false idea; in the answers to Arnauld, falsehood consists in its darkness, which makes it impossible to decipher whether what is represented is a true object or a false object.
25 It is perhaps necessary to take Descartes seriously, when he says, in the answers to Arnauld, that he leafed through the scholastics to check if he was mistaken about the notion of material falsehood. [32]
[32] Vererer autem ne forte, quia in legendis Philosophorum libris . . . It was not simply a question of verifying the scholastic meaning of material falsity, but rather and above all of identifying in scholastos a notion of falsity of the idea compatible with the doctrine of simplex apprehensio. In fact, if Suarez had used a notion of falsehood of the idea within the simplex apprehensio, Descartes could have taken it as a legitimate interpretation of his own material falsehood, thus demonstrating the coherence of his material falsehood of the idea with the simplex apprehensio.
26 However, Descartes could well find in Suarez the notion of material falsehood understood as Descartes had interpreted it, namely as a falsehood independent of judgment. But Suarez did not relate this falsehood to the idea. On the other hand, Suarez admitted only one eventuality in which to speak, although improperly, of falsehood about the idea, namely when an idea is the cause of error. [33]
[33] In Disputatio IX, Suarez speaks of an independent falsehood... Sometimes ideas partially represent what is their object outside of thought. However, they do not become properly false, as the simplex apprehensio teaches it, because the real object of the idea is the object actually represented; and yet, as knowledge targets the object outside the thought, it can be said that the lack of correspondence between the represented object and the external object is the occasion of the false judgment that attributes to the external object the characteristics represented in the idea: " . . . quando (imaginatio) apprehendit rem, quae re vera non est, vel non eo modo quo est, falli dicitur, quia discrepat ab illa re, quam pro obiecto habere videtur, quamvis re vera ad illam, vel ad talem modum Eius non terminetur eius apprehensio: et ideo non sit in eo propria falsitas, sed imperfectio quaedam, quae est occasio falsitatis. [34]
[34] Ivi, Disp. IX, I, XVI.
27 Faced with Suarez's text, Descartes' operation is twofold. On the one hand, in the answers to Arnauld, Descartes reproduces the Suarezian relationship between idea and false judgment as the only correct interpretation of the falsity of the idea of the TM: falsehood remains properly in the judgment, but the obscure and confused idea is the occasion of false judgment. On the other hand, he relies on Suarez's authority to name "material falsehood" the opportunity for error that the idea can offer to judgment, since such an opportunity is necessarily before the judgment.
28 And since the defect that leads to the error is found in the so-called material side of the idea, the false judgment that follows testifies more to a material falsehood of the idea itself. In the answers to Arnauld, and with the help of Suarez, material falsehood became compatible with simplex apprehensio. [35]
[35] Descartes therefore assumed, in the answers to Arnauld, the notion...
29 So what should we think of TM? Can we think that Descartes presented two incompatible doctrines—the simplex apprehensio, when he declared that ideas cannot be false, and the false representation where the material falseness of ideas resides—and that Arnauld's objections forced him to consistency? Before accepting this hypothesis, it is necessary to check the level of incompatibility between the version of the material falsity of the TM and the doctrine of simplex apprehensio.
30 However, Francisco Suarez also supports the doctrine that Descartes will present under the name of "material falsity of the idea", about the formation of entia rationis. Following this thesis, which Suarez exposes in a text very far from the one that contains the theory of simplex apprehensio, [36]
[36] This is the Disputatio LIV. what is pure nothingness, like negations and deprivations, cannot be represented as it is, namely as nothingness. As the object of understanding is the ens, what is nothing is necessarily represented as if it were something:
31 Prima (occasio fingendi ... entia rationis) is cognitio, qua intellectus noster consequi conatur de ipsis etiam negationibus et privationibus, quae nihil sunt. Cum enim obiectum adaequatum intellectus sit ens, nihil potest concipere, nisi ad modum entis, et ideo dum privationes aut negationes concipere conatur, eas concipit ad modum entium, et ita format entia rationis. [37]
[37] Disputatio LIV, I, VIII.
32 Taking into account the doctrine of the formation of beings of reason, the doctrine of the apprehensio simplex of Suarez must be formulated with at least one exception. The case of a distortion in the perception of the object represented is analytically impossible, except in the case of ideas of what is nothing. In this case, what, outside of thought, is nothing, is always represented as if it were something, but the idea does not become an idea of something else; it remains an idea of this nothing, because what is nothing can only be represented as if it were something. In the case of the representation of nothingness, one of the possibilities that representation has before it—to represent the object as it is or to represent something else—is deleted: it is not possible to represent the object as it is; therefore the representation of something else is the only possible representation of this object. It is therefore not true that the idea can never falsely represent its object, without becoming an idea of something else, as the doctrine of the simplex apprehensio seemed to claim. [38]
[38] Wells also, perhaps aware of the inadequacy of the theory...
33 The Suarézian doctrine of the formation of entia rationis is a radical exception to the doctrine of simplex apprehensio. And yet, she explains very well the thesis of a falsehood of ideas, as relative to the falsity of their objects. Descartes' misconceptions, like the ideas of the entia rationis, represent an object that is nothing (a non res) as if it were something, and yet they do not become ideas of other things, because what is nothing cannot be represented otherwise. Therefore, these ideas are false—that is, falsely represent their object—regardless of any judgment. Descartes, moreover, deduces the material falsehood from the fact that the natural object of the idea is always a res, a something, exactly as Suarez had deduced the formation of entia rationis from the fact that the natural object of understanding is always the ens: . . . nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt . . . ; Cum enim objectum adaequatum intellectus sit ens . . . .
34 However, the doctrine of the formation of entia rationis does not call into question simplex apprehensio, in Suarez, as the doctrine of material falsehood does not oblige Descartes to deny the thesis that falsehood lies in judgment and not in the idea, because of their extremely limited field. In fact, the case of entia rationis as the case of the falsity of the idea concerns only what is absolutely nothing, such as negations and privations, and not metaphysically false objects in general, such as imaginary beings. This point deserves to be clarified. To repel the Arnauldian interpretation of material falsehood, Wells drew attention to the fact that, when Descartes, in the TM, talks about ideas that cannot be false, and ideas [as] "images of things," he quotes the case of the representation of a chimera, therefore of a metaphysically false object: " . . . sive capram, sive chimaeram imagine, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quam alteram. [39]
[39] AT VII, 37,15–17. Therefore, Descartes could not have assumed a doctrine according to which it would be impossible to give a true representation of what is not a true object. But we could address the same objection to Suarez, who speaks of a true representation of false objects such as imaginary entities, but admits false representation in the case of negations and privations: "Imo nullum potest esse obiectum ita fictum, et impossibile, quin conceptus illius, ut sic verus sit, ut conceptus chymerae, vel hippocentauri, etamsi dici possit falsus conceptus veri, aut possibilis animalis, tamen respectu chymerae, aut hippocentauri est verus conceptus eius. [40]
[40] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. VIII, s. III, III. ... The representation of imaginary beings, which are still metaphysically false objects, does not lead to a false representation, which nevertheless takes place in the case of negations and privations.
In the TM, Descartes exactly repeats the Suarez doctrine of simplex apprehensio with its narrowly limited exception: we can have a true representation of anything, except negations and privations, namely what is absolutely a nothingness. In fact, Descartes does not limit himself to storing sensations, which do not represent in any possible sense something that can exist outside thought, among false objects. He gives them a specific place among deprivations: "Et quia nulla ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt, siquidem verum sit frigus nihil aliud esse quam privationem caloris, idea quae mihi illud tanquam reale quid et positivum repraesentat, non immerito falsa dicetur . . . ; " . . . an frigus sit tantum privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum.." [41]
[41] AT VII, 44, 4–8; 44, 1–3. I'm the one who emphasizes. Descartes distinguishes the case of imaginary entities from the case of pure nothingness. Dummy entities, in fact, can have properties of which one has a distinct idea, and to which, therefore, a true nature belongs. It follows that it cannot be said of fictitious entities that they are simply, and unreservedly, a nothingness like deprivation and feelings. [42]
[42] Cf. The Interview with Burman, ed. J.-M. Beyssade, Paris, PUF... Therefore, artificial entities do not ask to be distorted to be represented. On the contrary, misrepresenting is the only possibility that we have to imagine what is an absolute nothingness. By the narrowness of its domain, the false representation of nothingness does not upset the theory of simplex apprehensio, in Descartes as in Suarez, but is only an exception, and is presented as such by Descartes: "Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem; nonnisi in judiciis posset reperiri paulo ante notaverim, est tamen profecto quaedam falsitas materialis in i aliais . . . " [43]
[43] AT VII, 43, 26–29. I'm the one who emphasizes. The problem of the . . .
36 We must therefore correct Wells's thesis, according to which it would not be possible to support at the same time the theory of simplex apprehensio and the theory of material falsehood that Arnauld believes he reads in the TM. On the contrary, Arnauld—and Wells—are wrong to believe that simplex apprehensio does not support any exceptions. When simplex apprehensio is in conflict with another doctrine concerning the limits of representation, and which excludes the possibility of representing nothingness as such, we are obliged to limit its extent. There is therefore no difficulty in attributing to the Descartes of the TM both simplex apprehensio and false representation.
37 But Wells's correction also has difficulties. In fact, if Wells had trouble explaining Arnauld's criticism, it has now become difficult to explain Descartes' change. Descartes could well have defended the false representation of nothingness within the conceptual framework of the simplex apprehensio from which Arnauld objected. Why then modify the doctrine of material falsehood and leave the false representation of nothingness?
38 My hypothesis is that the theory of material falsehood represents a provisional stage in the path towards the prohibition of inferring from ideas of sensitive qualities their possible existence outside thought. Or better, that the theory of material falsehood is a justification for this impossibility, which is still built with scholastic and "pre-cartesian" materials, in accordance with the logic of meditation, which provides that the initial conceptual material is still largely drawn from the reader's prejudices. [44]
[44] For an example of reading the Meditations that takes into account... But the doctrine of material falsehood, in the terms where it is expressed in the TM, proves to have consequences that are too dangerous for the Cartesian system to be able to accept it even temporarily. The changes that this doctrine undergoes in the answers to Arnauld would therefore testify to a desire to eliminate its unwanted consequences; on the other hand, the fact that this doctrine has no place in the whole of Descartes' work would testify to its value as a tool, intended only for the path of meditation.
39 By means of the theory of material falsehood, Descartes intends precisely to avoid the danger of passing from the idea of sensitive qualities to their existence and their resemblance outside thought, this is what is revealed by an allusion to what could be inferred from the possession of the idea of cold and heat: "discere non possim, an frigus sit tantum privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum. " [45]
[45] AT VII, 44,1–3. It is not because I have the idea of cold and heat that I can legitimately infer the reality of cold and heat. To justify the prohibition of passing from having an idea to the reality of the quality it represents, Descartes decides, at the TM, to use a traditional instrument, scholastic, familiar to the one who meditates and who has not yet arrived at the Cartesian truth, namely the doctrine of Suarez's beings of reason. The idea that represents in my mind the cold as "a thing" does not exclude that the cold is a deprivation and that, therefore, it cannot exist outside the mind. Indeed, in the case of ideas of sensitive qualities as in that of entia rationis, the tendency to give them a reality is inscribed in the nature of thought, but this trend does not testify in favor of their actual reality; indeed, it would also operate in the case where sensitive qualities are non-things.
40 But the doctrine of material falsehood, if it initially makes it possible to defend oneself against the spontaneous tendency to give reality to sensitive qualities, has, in turn, two undesirable consequences: the first, noticed by Arnauld, to throw a suspicion on true ideas, and in particular on the idea of God, which could be false. But this eventuality does not concern Descartes, who has already prevented this objection in the TM, thanks to the clarity of the idea of God: sensitive ideas are so obscure that they do not allow us to understand whether they are true or false, while the idea of God is so clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted that it is true. [46]
[46] AT VII, 46, 5–11. The second consequence, much more formidable, leads to placing error within thought, in the very nature of ideas, which is quite contrary to the Cartesian program of freeing nature, of divine origin, from any inclination to evil and error, to base science on the veracity of God. This consequence is never clearly expressed, but we will see that there are clues to guess its presence.
41 Following the doctrine of the material falsehood of ideas, we cannot eliminate the appearance of reality from the representation of nothingness; it is judgment that must contrast this natural appearance and become an antidote against the traps of the nature of ideas. On the other hand, following the fourth Meditation, where Descartes had developed his theory of the origin of error, the proper use of reason should consist in limiting the freedom of judgment, the true source of error, to find the irresistible coaction to the assent given by nature, a certain mark of truth. Only a small number of cases, studied in the Sixth Meditation, reverse the relationship between freedom of judgment, the possible origin of error, and the necessity of nature, a source of truth: these are errors in the practical teachings of nature, the exemplary case of which is that of hydropic thirst, in which nature itself gives a misleading message, pushing to desire what is harmful to health. In these cases, the correction of the error is entrusted to judgment and experience, against the misleading nature. [47]
[47] AT VII, 89,11–17: " . . . cum sciam omnes sensus circa ea, quae . . .
42 However, material misconceptions risk enormously expanding the field of natural falsehood. In fact, the similarities between the material falsehood of TM ideas and the thirst for hydrops are obvious: in both cases it is not the judgment that deceives, but the nature (of the idea or desire) that is misleading, and the judgment must contrast with natural deception. But, in the Sixth Meditation, the deception of nature was limited to practical errors; in addition, Descartes had stressed the extreme rarity of these cases, and, thanks to some physiological remarks on the machine of the human body, had justified them by the impossibility, for God, of preventing these regrettable eventualities. On the contrary, in the case of the material falsehood of ideas, the tendency to speculative error would be found in the nature of thought itself, and it would concern the entire field of knowledge of the nature of bodies, namely science itself. The price to pay to counteract, even at first instance and even temporarily, the tendency to give reality to sensitive qualities, is very high.
43 The confirmation that in the material falsity of the idea there is the question of error of nature, with its dangerous consequences for the divine truthfulness and the foundation of science, is hidden in the answers to Arnauld themselves. Descartes, defending a legitimate sense of the falsity of the idea, identifies the most serious case of falsity in the thirst of hydrops, namely in one of the rare cases that, in the Sixth Meditation, had been judged as real errors of nature: "Omnium autem maxima [occasio erroris] est in ideis quae ab appetitu sensitivo oriuntur: ut idea sitis in hydropico, nunquid revera ipsi materiam praebet erroris, cum dat occasionem judicandi potum sibi esse profuturum, qui tamen sit nociturus? » [48]
[48] AT VII, 234, 5–9. What interests us more here is the rapprochement between the material falsehood of ideas and the case of hydropics, which testifies to their theoretical neighborhood. But as, in this passage, falsehood moves from idea to judgment, the thirst of the hydropics also benefits from this displacement, and is presented as one of the cases, although the most serious, in which a perception favors the error of judgment.
44 But when we can not mention the falsehood of ideas, as in the case of second objections, the thirst for the hydropic remains the only case of falsehood, but of true falsehood of nature. And Descartes does not hesitate to warn against the temptations to expand beyond these cases the attacks on divine veracity brought by the falsity of nature:
45 . . . etiam . . . ab ipso naturali instinctu, qui nobis a Deo tributus est, interdum nos realiter falli videmus, ut cum hydropicus sitit; tunc enim impellitur positive ad potum a natura . . . ; sed qua ratione id cum Dei bonitate vel veracitate non pugnet, in sexta Meditatione explicui. In iis autem quae sic non possunt explicari . . . plane affirmo nos falli non posse. Cum enim Deus sit summum ens, non potest non esse etiam summum bonum et verum, atque idcirco repugnat, ut quid ab eo sit, quod positive tendat in falsum. [49]
[49] AT VII, 143, 18–144, 6. I'm the one who emphasizes.
46 Descartes had to seize the opportunity of Arnauld's objections to abandon a path that, even temporary, risked being too expensive for the foundation of physics, insofar as it dangerously expanded the casuistry of the errors of nature [50]
[50] To explain to Burman the passage of the TM according to which the . . . Indeed, after the answers to Arnauld, the notion of material falsehood will disappear completely from Descartes' work, and, a fortiori, from the explanation of the spontaneous tendency to confer a reality to sensitive qualities.
47 Compared to the disappearance of the notion of material falsehood, the responses to Arnauld represent an intermediate state, dominated as they are by the concern not to deny the text of the TM, and therefore to keep a legitimate, but less dangerous, meaning to the 'falsehood of the idea'. Sensitive ideas are obscure and confused, regardless of any judgment, but they do not falsely represent their object; it is their darkness that can lead to error, an error that remains in the judgment. To reinforce this reading, as we have seen, Descartes later intervenes by renaming as 'material' what in the TM was the 'formal' side of the idea. But when the concern for consistency with the text of the TM has completely disappeared, ideas as such will not share the responsibility for the error at any level. This is what happens in paragraph 71 of the first part of the Principia, devoted to the origin of the false belief in the nature of bodies.
48 Before asking himself the question of whether things exist outside of thought, the child made a distinction between feelings to which no possible existence in the world corresponds, and the mathematical properties of objects, which he felt could exist outside thought. When you judge things only by what ideas really represent, ideas never lead to error. The doctrine of simplex apprehensio knows no exception here, and the material misconceptions have disappeared:
49 . . . in prima aetate, mens nostra tam arcte corpori erat alligata, ut non aliis cogitationibus vacaret, quam iis solis, per quas ea sentiebat quae corpus afficiebat: necdum ipsas ad quidquam extra se positum referebat, sed tantum ubi quid corpori incommodum occurrebat, sentiebat dolorem; ubi quid commodum, sentiebat voluptatem; et ubi sine magno commodo vel incommodo corpus afficiebatur, pro diversitate partium in quibus et modorum quibus afficiebatur, habebat diversos quosdam sensus, illos scilicet quosmus sensus saporum, calorum, sonorum, odorrum, vocais, frigoris, luminis, colorum, et similium, quae nihil extra Simulque etiam percipiebat magnitudines, figuras, motus, et talia; quae illi non ut sensus, sed ut res quaedam, vel rerum modi, extra cogitationem existentes, aut saltem existendi capaces, exhibebantur, etsi hanc inter ista differentiam nondum notaret.
50 In the first days of life, what cannot exist outside thought—what is in itself a nothingness—is represented as it is, as a simple mental state, a feeling, while only the true natures of things appear endowed with a possible existence. Finally, the tendency to error no longer nests within the idea, and therefore of nature—nature does not deceive—but only in judgment, in the "interpretive context" of the idea. [51]
[51] Following the happy expression of A. Gewirth, "Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes." The tendency to attribute a reality independent of thought to all ideas, including those of sensations, then arises, as a result of the practical use of the senses:
51 Ac deinde, cum corporis machinamentum, quod sic a natura fabricatum est ut propria sua vi variis modis moveri possit, hinc inde temere se contorquens, casu commodum quid assequebatur aut fugiebat incommodum, mens illi adhaerens incipiebat advertere id, quod ita assequebatur aut fugiebat, extra se esse; nec tantum illi tribuebat magnitudines, figuras, motus, et talia, quae ut res aut rerum modos percipiebat, sed etiam sapores, odores, et reliqua, quorum in se sensum ab ipsoci effi advertebat.. [52]
[52] AT VIII-1, 35–36. I'm the one who emphasizes.
52Error is always and only in the false judgments that accompany ideas and never in the idea. In fact, the transition from an obscure and confused idea to a clear and distinct idea, consists, following the teaching of the Principia, but also of the examples of the Meditations, in the separation of the judgment of perception, to find the simplex apprehensio that can never be false, at the speculative level, at least. [53]
[53] Cf. Principia Philosophiae, I, § 45 and 46. Judgment must not fight against the deceptions of nature, and therefore of God, but only against other judgments, free, and therefore human.
53 The "Cartesian" explanation of the error now provides for a doctrine of simplex apprehensio without exceptions, as Arnauld wanted: it is enough to return to the original perception of sensitive qualities, that of early childhood, where the judgments induced by practical necessities have not yet been embedded, to exclude the reality of sensitive qualities, without invoking a fallacious tendency to their ontologization inherent in thought. Thus, if the false representation has disappeared, it is not for the epistemological reasons recalled by Arnauld, but for theological reasons. With the false representation, in fact, disappears the shadow she cast on the divine truthfulness.
NOTES
[1] AT VII, p. 37, 3-12. The references to Descartes' text are taken from the ADAM-TANNERY edition, Œuvres de Descartes (new presentation by P. Costabel and B. Rochot, Paris, Vrin, 1964-74) abbreviated in AT, following the volume, page and lines.
[2] AT VII, p. 37, 13-22.
[3] AT VII, p. 40-41.
[4] AT VII, p. 43, 26-44, 8.
[5] The metaphysical sense of truth is used by Descartes in the Fifth Meditation. Cf. AT VII, p. 65,4-5: "... patet enim illud omne quod verum est esse aliquid... ”
[6] AT VII, p. 207, 17-19.
[7] AT VII, p. 232,12-19.
[8] AT VII, p. 232,19-33, 2.
[9] A. KENNY, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, NewYork, Random House, 1968, 117-25; M. WILSON, ' Descartes, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, 102-19; J. Cottingham (ed.), Descartes' Conversation with Burman, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1976, 67ff. Ms. Wilson returned to her positions in "Descartes on the Representationality of Sensation", in J. A. Cover and M. Kulstad (ed.), Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, Indianapolis, Hackett Publ. Co., 1990, 1-22. On the darkness of the doctrine of material falsehood cf. J.-M. BEYSSADE, "Descartes on Material Falsity", in P. D.Cummins and G. Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects, Atacadero, CA, Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1992.
[10] N. J. WELLS, "Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suarez," in Journal of the History of Philosophy XC (1984), 25-50; L. ALANEN, "A certain material falsity: Descartes and Arnauld on the origin of error in sensory perception", in J.-M. Beyssade and J.-L. Marion (eds.), Descartes. Objections and Replies, Paris, PUF, 1994, 205–30; M. BEYSSADE, "On material falsehood," ivi, 231–46; R. W. FIELD, "Descartes on the Material Falsity of ideas," The Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), 308–33, and now also P. HOFFMAN, "Descartes on Misrepresentation," Journal of the History of Philosophy, XXXIV (1996), 357–81, and again N. J. WELLS, "Descartes and Suarez on Secondary Qualities. A Tale of Two Readings," The Review of Metaphysics 51 (1998), 565–604.
[11] N. J. WELLS, Material Falsity, op. cit.
[12] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, I, XIV.
[13] Ibid.. IX, I, XV.
[14] AT VII, p. 234,13-18.
[15] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, I, XVI.
[16] AT VII, p. 44, 4.
[17] Cf. AT VII, p. 64, 6-9-65, 3-4: "... invenio apud me innumeras ideas quarundam rerum, quae, etiam si extra me fortasse nullibi existant, non tamen dici possunt nihil esse.....aliquid sunt, non merum nihil... ”
[18] Precisely R.W. FIELD, op. cit., p. 316, highlights this point as irreconcilable with Wells' thesis.
[19] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, I, XV.
[20] Cf. ARISTOTE, De anima, T. 6,430a 10-430 a 29. This thesis is taken up, with an explicit reference to Aristotle, by Saint Thomas, De veritate, 14,1. Moreover, Suarez himself presents it as a communis sententia. Cf. Disp. met., Disp. VIII, III, I: "Communis sententia esse videtur, veritatem cognitionis, proprie et in rigore loquendo, solum esse n compositione, et divisione intellectus, et non in actibus eius simplicibus".
[21] AT VII, p. 43, 28-30.
[22] AT VII, p. 232, 21-23.
[23] AT VII, p. 232, 15-19.
[24] AT VII, p. 43, 23-26.
[25] AT VII, p. 234,13-17.
[26] AT VII, p. 44,1-3.
[27] AT VII, p. 233, 22-234, 7.
[28] AT VII, p. 43, 26-29.
[29] AT VII, p. 232, 23-24.
[30] AT VII, p. 232,12-19.
[31] AT VII, p. 8, 20-23: "(idea) sumi potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus..., vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata... ”
[32] "Vererer autem ne forte, quia in legendis Philosophorum libris nunquam valde multum temporis impendi, non satis ipsorum loquendi modum sequutus sim, cum dixi ideas, quae judicio materiam praebent erroris, materialiter falsas esse, nisi apud primum authorem qui mihi jam incidit in manus, vocem materialiter in eadem significatione sumptam invenirem: nempe apud Fr. Suarez, Metaphysicae disputationes, 9, section 2, numero 4, AT VII, p. 235, 6-14.
[33] In Disputatio IX, Suarez speaks of a falsehood independent of judgment, the one that can be found in the statements of dicto and not of re, for example when the expression 'Deus non est' is neither pronounced nor even thought, but written somewhere. But the opposition, in Suarez, is between the statement, which still includes a composition of the concepts, and the judgment, while Descartes opposes the idea, simple, and the judgment on a statement. Descartes is therefore right when he refers to Suarez for material falsehood, understood as falsehood without judgment, but it is Descartes who applies it to the idea. Cf. Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. IX, II, IV.
[34] Ivi, Disp. IX, I, XVI.
[35] Descartes therefore assumed, in the answers to Arnauld, the notion of falsehood (improperly said) of the idea, which Suarez had formulated within the doctrine of simplex apprehensio. However, as the Suarez doctrine of simplex apprehensio is also found in Arnauld, who makes it the starting point of his criticisms of Descartes, it is understandable that he declared himself satisfied with Descartes's explanations. Cf. Mersenne to Voetius, 13 Dec. 1642, AT III, p. 603.
[36] This is the Disputatio LIV.
[37] Disputatio LIV, I, VIII.
[38] Wells aussi, perhaps aware of the inadequacy of the simplex apprehensio theory to explain the expressions with which Descartes, in the TM, exposed the doctrine of material falsehood, recalled, by the way, the Suarézian interpretation of the entia rationis, as a possible source of the Cartesian thesis of the material falsehood of ideas (Material falsity, op. cit., p. 40-41). But the reference to the thesis of knowledge of the entia rationis, on the part of Wells, is at least surprising, because it attributes the origin of beings of reason precisely to the natural attitude thanks to which we represent ourselves as true beings the beings who cannot exist outside of thought, that is to say exactly the doctrine that, according to Wells, should not be present in the Cartesian theory of material falsehood, and which, on the other hand, would have been falsely attributed to Descartes by Arnauld and by contemporary critics.
[39] AT VII, 37,15–17.
[40] F. SUAREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disp. VIII, s. III, III. I'm the one who emphasizes.
[41] AT VII, p. 44, 4–8; p. 44,1–3. I'm the one who emphasizes.
[42] Cf. The Interview with Burman, ed. J.-M. Beyssade, Paris, PUF 1981, p. 73: Quicquid distincte et clare in chimaera concipi potest, illud est ens verum, nec est fictum... "; Primae responsiones, AT VII, 118,2-8: "... si considerem triangulum quadrato inscriptum, ... ut ea tantum examinem quae ex utriusque conjunctione exurgunt, non minus vera et immutabilis erit ejus natura, quam solius quadrati vel trianguli..."; ivi, AT VII, 119,6-11: "... si attente examinemus an enti summe potenti competat existentia, et qualis, poterimus clare et distinte percipere primo illi saltem competere possibilem existentiam, quemadmodum reliquis omnibus aliis rebus, quarum distincta idea in nobis est, etiam iis quae per figmentum intellectu componuntur.
[43] AT VII, p. 43, 26–29. I'm the one who emphasizes. The problem of the representation of what is nothingness will come back to Spinoza, who, in the spirit of TM, will refuse to consider as ideas the representations of beings of reason. Cf. Cogitata Metaphysica, I, in B. SPINOZA, Opera hrs C. Gebhardt, Heidelberg 1925, I, 234.
[44] For an example of reading the Meditations that takes into account the modification of notions as the meditation process unfolds, I would like to refer to my essay "L'inganno divino nelle "Meditaszioni" di Descartes," Rivista di filosofia XC (1999), 219–51.
[45] AT VII, p. 44,1-3.
[46] AT VII, p. 46, 5-11.
[47] AT VII, p. 89,11-17: ". . . cum sciam omnes sensus circa ea, quae ad corporis commodum spectant, multo frequentius verum indicare quam falsum, possimque uti semper pluribus ex iis ad eandem rem examinandam, et insuper memoria, quae praesentia cum praecedentibus connectit, et intellectu, qui jam omne errandi causas perspexit . . . ”
[48] AT VII, p. 234, 5-9.
[49] AT VII, p. 143, 18-144, 6. I'm the one who emphasizes.
[50] To explain to Burman the passage of the TM according to which the ideas considered as such "vix... ullam errandi materiam dare fossent", Descartes will choose the version of the material falsity given to Arnauld, in which the falsity remains in the Judgment, even if the object of the Judgment may be the idea considered regardless of its relationship with external objects: "... ut si considerem ideam coloris ets et dicam eam esse rem... ", The interview with Burman, p. 37-39.
[51] Following the happy expression of A. Gewirth, "Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes," Philosophy, XVIII (1943), 17–36.
[52]
AT VIII-1, p. 35-36. I'm the one who emphasizes.
[53] Cf. Principia Philosophiae, I, § 45 and 46.
Posted on Cairn.info on 01/06/2008
Https://doi.org/10.3917/aphi.642.0259