Descartes et Arnauld Les quatriemes objections Andre Sarrazin
Descartes and Arnauld: the Fourth Objections by Andre Sarrazin (2015)
C Riquier, PH 401, Metaphysics
January 6, 2015
André Sarrazin,
Descartes and Arnauld: The fourth objections
The Meditations of Prima Philosophia, in quibus Dei existentia et animae humanae immortalitas demonstrantur usually known as Meditations were completed in the first half of 1640, and Descartes, concerned about the reception that would be given to his work, circulated a manuscript through Father Mersenne, to be able to attach the objections that would be made to him and the answers he would have provided. In fact, the first edition completed on August 28, 1641 has only six series of objections and answers. The history of successive editions reveals additions and limits, so during the publication of the French translation of 1647, the fifth objections (those of Gassendi) are placed after the sixth, while the seventh are absent. These variations are, for the study of the fourth objections, unimportant. However, it should be noted that their author, Father Arnauld, also knew the text of the first, which Descartes, via Mersenne, had communicated to him. They are due to J. de Kater, a Dutch Catholic priest, and are based on the positions defended by Suarez and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Descartes responds in particular to the problem posed by the proposal to consider God as a cause of himself, because any cause can be considered as a limitation. The second objections are probably due to Mersenne himself and the third are from Hobbes. The two did not strongly attract Descartes' attention. It is only with those of Arnauld that he "then thinks he can present everything to the doctors of Sorbonne" (MM, p 15), after introducing in his text some changes relating to theology. The current editions, respecting the chronological order, first present the text of the objections and then that of the answers. We have the possibility, probably more didactic, to analyze separately each of the objections and the corresponding answer(s), even if in conclusion it means drawing a common thread of the whole and highlighting the coherence of the thinking of the two interlocutors. Arnauld himself ordered his objections according to his role as a philosopher or theologian, it is this presentation that we will keep.
I. Philosophical objections.
The commentary on a text is better for those who can consult it, there will be a wide call for quotations. Arnauld's objections begin with a reference to Saint Augustine who had already noticed in "the second book of free will chap 3" that, even if there is a je ne sais quoi that always deceives you, "it is probably that I am, if he deceives me", thus anticipating the discovery of the certainty of the Cartesian cogito. Arnauld does not explain any more before "let's continue" he writes to reach the first objection: "How from this principle we can conclude that our mind is distinct and separated from the body". Pascal, later, in a geometric spirit, will emphasize that "I think so I am" is not the same in the spirit of Saint Augustine and Descartes, this being "a word for adventure" for one, and a "firm and sustained principle for the other" carrying "an admirable sequence of consequences".
I.1 Exclude the body from the essence of the thing that thinks.
Objections:
Arnauld uses the terms of the second meditation, He agrees that we can doubt the existence of bodies and even his own and yet convince ourselves to be something: "this truth always remains: I am something, and therefore I am not a body" (MM, p323), indeed if I were one I would doubt myself. He agrees that this does not prove that there is no body, but reaches a first difficulty: Descartes by looking for who he is thinks that "this notion and knowledge of myself, thus precisely taken, does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to me" (MM, p322). It is certain, but it is only a reason to exclude 'these things' according to the march of reasoning, not yet according to the "truth of the thing" (MM, p323).
Arnauld then used the Discourse of the Method, published four years earlier, to mount that Descartes was already reasoning in this way and that "the dispute is still in the same terms". How, from the fact that Descartes does not know anything else that belongs to his essence, "it follows that there is also nothing else that indeed belongs to him" (MM, p 324). He explains that he did not find in the second meditation an answer to his question because "he has a heavy and rude mind", but he thinks he found it in the sixth where the notion of a clear and distinct idea appears. He quotes, for example, "we must always get back to this, that there are only the things that I conceive clearly and distinctly (clear and distinct percipio) that have the strength to persuade me entirely" (MM, p 165). Arnauld shows that Descartes' thought is built according to the following syllogism:
I have a clear and distinct idea of what I am a thing that thinks and not extended
I have a clear and distinct idea of what the body is an extended thing and that does not think
Ergo, my soul is entirely and truly distinct from the body and it can exist without it.
However, the majority of the syllogism can be revoked, the knowledge must not only be clear and distinct but still full and complete, "that is, which includes everything that must be known about the thing" (MM, p 325). Arnauld goes on to show that when Descartes, later in his text, presents his knowledge of the body and mind as full and complete, these assertions can also be revoked in doubt. He specifies by showing that it is not necessary to go so far as to think that "every body was spirit" (MM, p 325), the genre that can be heard without the species. He concludes his first objection with; "it only results (from meditations) that I can acquire some knowledge of myself without knowledge of the body, but that this knowledge is complete and complete, so that I am assured that I am not mistaken, when I exclude the body from my essence, it is not yet manifest to me." (p 326).
Arnauld will continue his demonstration with a geometric argument. Anyone who thinks that the triangle inscribed in a circle and whose base is a diameter of the circle necessarily has a right angle, will say that he has a clear and distinct vision of this triangle, but he could deny that the square of its base is equal to the sum of the squares on its sides by calling on the omnipotence of God to make such a rectangular triangle. This one would make the same mistake as Descartes by considering that a clear and distinct idea implies full and complete knowledge.
Arnauld continuing the analysis of the triangle inscribed in the semicircle poses the problem of knowing what makes it possible to consider as different substances two substances that can only be conceived clearly and distinctly existing one without the other. It is indeed possible to distinguish the rectangular triangle and theorem of Pythagoras by refusing the latter to be in the essence of the first, but nevertheless having a clear and precise idea of the two objects. How can we say that we know the nature of the mind better than that of the triangle? Sticking to the clear and precise vision seems too much to prove and lead to the body being presented only as the vehicle of the mind, man becoming "a living spirit or using the body". (p328)
Arnauld then warns a response to the objection that would say that the body is not absolutely excluded from the essence of being, but only as it is a thing that thinks, because it would lead to presenting "the idea I have of myself as incomplete and imperfectly conceived"
Arnauld illustrates his thinking with a geometric example of rather complex use: The line for surveyors is a length without width, although there is no length without width. Some might think that the thing that thinks has the common properties of extended things plus the particular property of thinking, which means that by abstraction we could only retain this last property, (as we have removed by abstraction the width of the line).
In addition, thought always seems attached to a body and there are variations in the way of thinking combined with variations in the body, asleep in children, extinguished in fools.
Answers and analysis:
The first response to Arnaud's objection is simple, "none of the things without which a thing can be, is understood in its essence" (MM, p 345), and to make a real distinction between two things it is enough that "each of them is conceived without the other fully, or as a complete thing" (MM, p346). Full and complete knowledge is not possible, because this knowledge belongs only to God, and even if we had it on an object, we would have no way of knowing that our knowledge is complete if God did not reveal it to us.
To make a distinction between two things, it is simply necessary for a knowledge that is such that "we do not make it imperfect and criminal" (MM, p 347).
Descartes specifies that, when he said that it was necessary to fully conceive a thing, he heard a knowledge distinct enough to conceive this thing as complete.
The complete thing is defined as a substance, "covered with forms or attributes that are enough to let me know that it is a substance" (MM, p347). If we strip the substance of the attributes that make it known to us, we destroy all the knowledge we have of it, Descartes then conducts a distinction between complete and incomplete substance according to whether or not it can survive without being supported by anything else or whether it is a whole or a part of a whole. In the first sense there is only God who is complete substance, for the second he gives the example of the hand which alone is complete substance, but which reported to the body is incomplete substance.
The attributes by which we know the substance called the body make it possible to consider it as a complete substance.
Arnauld's proposal, "the body is to the mind what the genus is to the species", is fought because the mind can be thought without the body and the species cannot be thought without the genus.
The example of the triangle inscribed in a semi-circle is not relevant for three reasons;
The Pythagoras theorem is not a substance or even a thing
We obviously go from the relationship between the square of the sides and the fact that the triangle is rectangular, more difficult from the existence of a right angle to the relationship, so it is enough to clearly distinguish the mind without the body so that the reciprocal is true
We may have no idea of the Pythagoras theorem but we cannot a priori deny that this relationship exists, because we conceive that there must be a certain proportion, however "in the concept of the mind nothing is understood of what belongs to the body" (MM, p 350)
Descartes refutes the idea that his argument would prove too much. He recalls the sixth meditation where he had taken care to mention that "I am not only housed in my body, as well as a pilot in his ship, but in addition to that, that I am very closely partner with him... that I compose as one whole with him" (MM p 191). Arnaud's concern here was probably also theological because he did not want to see Descartes' arguments used to support dualistic heresies.
The geometric image of the line seems to him to differ too much from the problem. As for fools and children, the ability to think is prevented by the organs of the body, and it does not follow that it is produced by them, but the close connection of mind and body, "which we experience every day" (MM, p 353) can cause confusion.
Descartes' answer may seem insufficient in the face of Arnaud's requirement of full and complete knowledge. But the latter is impossible by definition. If we had by chance a full and complete knowledge of a thing, we would not know that we have this knowledge, which is only possible to God. We must be satisfied, as Saint Thomas says, with 'evening' knowledge, the 'morning' knowledge being reserved for the creator. Descartes does not specify in his answer that his definition of the body as a substance appeared only in the sixth meditation, he uses an ambiguous formulation: "As I think I have demonstrated enough in the second meditation" (MM, p349) which can be applied in context to the mind conceived as a distinct and complete thing and to the body conceived as a substance, but also to apply only to the mind. Yet he had to go through the demonstration of God's existence to "be sure that one (of the two things) is distinct or different from the other, because they can be posed separately at least by the omnipotence of God" (MM, p185).
Descartes also defends here his physics based on clear and distinct ideas. When he says that by stripping the substance of his attributes we would move away from knowledge, he seems to go against his analysis of the piece of wax in the second meditation and the stone in Article XI of the principles of philosophy. In these two moments he strips a substance of its accidental attributes to discover the substantial attributes, those that make the thing what it is, in the case of the body, figure and extent. The resulting certainty "is only obtained by abstraction, which leaves of the thing only what the intuitus can assume for its object". The clear and distinct vision combined with methodical reasoning is enough to build a physics. Arnauld's requirement would make it impossible.
Can we then be satisfied with the Cartesian response? Judging it in the light of the objections that Husserl and Ryle will bring to cite two modern critics would be inappropriate here. We will focus on Leibniz's thought, which refutes the Cartesian assimilation of the body to the extent simply by the obligation of the Cartesians to give movement to matter, which shows "that they tacitly admit that scope is not enough". In this case, the incompleteness of the clear and distinct notion becomes flagrant and reopens the field of properties that can be attributed to the body.
I.2 Some problems of the union of substances.
Objections:
Arnauld indicates that he found in a summary of Descartes' six meditations the reasoning he thought he should produce to demonstrate the immortality of the soul in the case of the real distinction of mind and body. However, he adds that the Cartesian theory of the absence of soul in animals will come up against, for example, the observation of the flight of sheep who see a wolf, difficult to explain by animal spirits alone. He concludes this part by recalling the agreement of Saint Augustine and Descartes on the proposal that the things we see through the mind are more certain than those we see through the eyes.
Answers and analysis:
Bodies have in them everything that is necessary for movements. Our soul provokes them by "determining the course of this very subtle liquor called animal spirits" (MM, p354). For animals, a shaking such that the reflected light of the wolf's body in the sheep's eyes can have the same strength.
We will not analyze at length either the objection or the answer. The real objections will come later, from Princess Elisabeth's requests for clarification. From her first letter of May 16, 1643, she questioned him by asking him to say "how the soul of man can determine the spirits of the body to do voluntary actions, being only a thinking substance". He will have to answer that it is indeed "the question...that I can be asked with more reason then of the writings I have published" and after trying an analogy with gravity he will conclude that "it is by using only life and ordinary conversations... and by refraining from meditating... that we learn to conceive the union of soul and body"
II. Theological objections.
As they will focus on the third meditation whose title is "From God, that he exists", let us briefly recall the Cartesian approach. It begins with the consideration of ideas. Properly these are like the "images of things" (MM, p99), if we consider them in themselves they cannot be false. It is only "in judgments that true and formal falsity can be encountered" (MM, p113). But appears immediately after the notion of material falsity for certain ideas, "namely that they represent what is nothing as if it were something". The ideas we have of the cold are so unclear and so indistinct that we do not know if the cold is a deprivation of heat or a real quality. If the cold is a deprivation of heat and if I have an idea of the cold as a real quality, then it is a misconception, that is to say, insists Descartes, that it represents things that are not. If they are still in me, it is because something is missing from my nature that is imperfect. As for the clear and distinct ideas of bodily things, it seems that they can be contained in me, formally or eminently despite this imperfection.
Descartes then approaches a first proof of God's existence: The more we consider his idea, he argues, the more we are convinced that the idea we have of it cannot come from us. We can have in us the idea of substance, not that of an infinite substance, so it was put in us by an infinite being.
Descartes rejects three objections at this stage:
- Infinity could be perceived as a negation of the finite, but it is impossible because I "obviously see that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite substance" (MM, p117)
- The idea of God could be materially false, impossible also because it is very clear and very distinct and contains more objective reality than any other. The idea of a sovereignly perfect being cannot represent something unreal like the idea of the cold that was neither clear nor distinct, so it is true. However, my finite and limited nature forbids me to understand infinity, so its knowledge may not be clear and distinct. To this we can answer that it is enough to conceive this impossibility well and to judge that the things in which there is some perfection "are in God, formally or eminently" (MM, p119).
- But perhaps all the perfections I lend to God are in me, at least in power and that they will develop in such a way that I cannot "acquire... all the other perfections of divine nature" (MM P 119). However, I can see that my knowledge is increasing by degree, while there is nothing to add to divine perfection where everything is in action.
Descartes admits that all this reasoning can be easily forgotten, he then builds a second proof that will allow him to validate the previous one.
If there were no God, who would I have my existence? If I am the author of my being, I will have given myself all the perfections, which is easier than coming out of nothingness, I do not possess them, so I am not God. In addition, my being is in time and all the time can be divided into infinity of independent parts, so some cause must keep me. By going up the causal chain, we must reach a primary cause that owes its existence to itself. Progression to infinity is impossible because this first cause must also serve our maintenance in existence. There is a "last cause that will be God" (MM, p 127).
But there must be as much reality in the cause as in its effect, in the effect that I am there is the idea of God so it was in my cause. This consideration allows us to return to the previous reasoning, and since I have the idea of "a sovereignly perfect being, in me" (MM, p127) the existence of God is obviously demonstrated, the second proof confirming the first.
II.1The materially false idea.
Objections:
Arnauld recalls the parts of the proof of God's existence contained in the third meditation. The first is "that God exists, because his idea is in me; and the second, that I, who have such an idea, can only come from God" (MM, p330). In the first part the only thing he cannot approve is that there are ideas that can, "not to the truth formally, but materially be false" (MM, p330). He still quotes Descartes by taking his example of the cold. "If he says the cold is only a deprivation of heat, the idea that represents it to me as a positive thing will be materially false" (MM, p331).
Arnauld thinks that such an expression confuses idea and judgment, the idea of cold is the cold even in "as long as it is objectively in the understanding" If the cold is a deprivation there will never be a positive idea of the cold.
The same is true of an infinite being, we can "pretend that he does not exist", however, we cannot pretend that his idea does not represent something real.
But we can object that the idea that we have of the cold is false in that it is not the idea of the cold. It is the judgment we make of this idea that is false, the idea it "it is certain that it is very true" (MM, p331). This is very important because the same applies to the idea of God, it must not be materially able to be called false, although that of idolaters can relate to something that is not God. There is another vice in Descartes' demonstration, the positive objective being of some idea can come from nothingness, which is contrary to the foundations highlighted by Descartes
Answers and analysis:
Descartes' answer is quite long and presents difficulties. Ideas are not composed of matter, and "how many times they are considered as representing something, they are not taken materially, but formally" (MM p 357). To say that an idea is materially false is an idea that "gives material or opportunity for error" (MM, p 357). This can happen for ideas that are not clear and distinct, this cannot be the case with the idea of God. Idolaters have confused ideas that can be called materially false "as long as they serve as material for their false judgments" (MM, p 358).
But there are ideas that give great opportunities for error to judgment, for example the idea of thirst in a hydropic.
Descartes agrees with the correctness of Arnauld's reasoning on the idea of cold which is not an idea of cold if it represents it as a positive being when it is a deprivation. However, Descartes persists in calling it false because it is confused and obscure. It does not come from nothingness but from the imperfection of our nature. Descartes finally appeals to the authority of Suarez for whom the same word, "materially", has the same meaning (MM, p 359).
In his answer Descartes does not expressly take up his theory of the third meditation, he reverses the vocabulary as noted by Ms. Scribano, she recalls the notion of simplex apprehensio in Suarez, the falsity of a representation is a meaningless notion and the opportunity for error given by an idea is the only case where the idea could be said to be false. It is in agreement with the answer but this is not what is in meditation where the falsity of the idea is in the representation of a false object. In meditations "darkness prevented us from establishing whether an idea was true or false" while in answers darkness is born from the falsity of the idea. However, there is in Suarez, about the entia rationis a material falsity of the idea, it is limited to ideas that represent pure nothingness, negations or deprivation, "as the object of the understanding is the ens, what is nothing is necessarily represented as something". The idea of the cold is well regarded by Suarez as a misconception. But this theory has two disadvantages, that of risking placing the idea of God among the false ideas, a pitfall pointed out by Descartes who has already affirmed its veracity because it is clear and distinct, and that of placing error "in the nature of ideas", which would have directly contradicted the fourth meditation, because the "power to conceive" given by God is such that "everything I conceive, I conceive it properly, and it is not possible that in this I am wrong" (MM, p 145). However, the conclusions of this meditation are necessary to base the truth of all things on the obvious, therefore to be able to base one's physics. Descartes' subsequent abandonment of the theory of the materially false idea of the third meditation therefore has theological and physical reasons. Arnauld did not weigh on the tension that resulted from the two affirmations of the third meditation, "the idea (of God), that I have is the truest, clearest and most distinct of all those that are in my mind" and "there is an infinity of things in God that I cannot understand". The clear and distinct idea is therefore that of the existence of an incomprehensible God who we only know contains all the perfections. But how can we then judge the ideas of idolaters as false? Especially since the fourth meditation will show that the cause of the error comes from the fact that "the will being much broader and more extensive than understanding, I do not contain within the same limits, but that I also extend it to things I do not hear. (MM, p 145), As soon as the will will turn to the knowledge of God, is not the understanding likely to make the same mistakes as idolaters? The theologian only objected to a notion that does not call into question the demonstration of God's existence.