Ep24*. Is jazz fundamentally untranslatable

Discussion

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Introduction

Is jazz fundamentally untranslatable? Quincy Jones Professor of African American Music at Harvard, Ingrid Monson (b. 1950), makes such a claim.

“As Ingrid Monson points out, "Translating musical experience and insight into written or spoken words is one of the most fundamental frustrations of musical scholarship. Charles Seeger called this dilemma the linguocentric predicament—no matter how elegantly an author writes, there is something fundamentally untranslatable about musical experience."”, (bold not in original)

What does fundamentally untranslatable mean here? If it only means that using language—no matter how detailed a description—will not give a listener the same experience one would have from listening to the music described in language, then no one would dispute this. Talking about Miles Davis's trumpet sound does not create the same sonic event as the trumpet sound itself. That is why no listeners can get identical experiences from the two presentations.

Is this what Monson believes is true, that no language needs to sound the same as what that piece of the language describes? This doesn't seem likely to be Monson's point since it is obviously true. So, Monson must be making a different claim. What is this other claim? It must be that no language can ever fully describe using only words, phrases, and sentences, what it is to experience a jazz performance.

It seems then that Monson's claim to the fundamental untranslatability of a musical experience is comparable to that of a blind from birth person never able to fully experience or comprehend what it is like to experience seeing colors.

We should then go ahead and investigate whether blind from birth people can learn anything about what it is like to know about colors from having learned through their own past experiences and learning about the world through language use.

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Color perception and blindness

It turns out that congenitally blind individuals can speak meaningfully and appropriately about what colors are and even what it is like to have color experiences.

Many people hold many false beliefs about blindness and color perception. These false narratives (myths) include:

(BM1): "A blind person has never seen color."

(BM2): "A blind person doesn't know what color is."

(BM3): "Color is meaningless to people who are blind."

Each of the three myths is false for various related reasons. (BM1) is incorrect because many currently blind people were previously sighted, so they are fully acquainted with color experiences. Furthermore, blindness comes in degrees, so some legally blind people can still see light and dark contrasts, or some bright colors, although lacking sufficient visual acuity to see well.

Closed captioner and supervisor for Described Media at the National Captioning Institute Joyce Adams explains why (BM2) and (BM3) are wrong:

“Like sighted people, those who are totally blind learn about color in many ways—in the classroom, through the context of everyday conversation, through reading' and through experiencing other media, including television, radio, and films. In other words, references to color appear everywhere in our daily experiences and daily language. One does not have to see color with [their] eyes . . . to know what color is.

Color is meaningless to people who are blind [is false] because color often possesses intrinsic or symbolic meaning. What person—whether sighted or non-sighted—would not understand the differing meanings of "a bright blue sky" versus "a sky filled with dark gray clouds"?” (bold and bold italic not in original)

Summarizing the results, we find that blindness comes in degrees from people born congenitally blind from birth (only 18%) to those who previously had sensory experiences of color or even can see some intense colors while legally blind. Color comprehension, which includes understanding the properties and features of colors, is achieved by blind persons at all levels of blindness because this knowledge can happen independently of one's ability to sense or have visual color experiences. Captioner Joyce Adams informs us that one learns about color in numerous ways, including some that do not involve one's visual sensory experiences of color. She includes experiences and knowledge of color discussed in classroom teaching and ordinary conversations about color, such as knowing that in nature, some roses 🌹 are red.

Blind people at all levels of blindness can learn to read. Reading presents descriptions of things using color vocabulary making it possible for blind persons to learn about color concepts and how they apply to types of objects. Blind people can listen to color talk from various forms of media, including television, movies, radio, or even plays on the stage. Most significantly, Joyce Adams asserts the valid claim that "One does not have to see color with their eyes to know what color is." Her proof, besides the reasons given already, is that color terms possess symbolic meanings that blind people can learn and use appropriately, and this counts as (partial) knowledge of colors.

Next, because blind people are still humans, they have a human brain capable of generating color experiences with the proper inputs. Human brains can produce experiences in dreams. Do blind people dream when asleep? Do congenitally blind dreamers have visual experiences? This article on the web reviews some of the scientific literature and answers in the affirmative.

Synesthesia may possibly occur in blind people, so their hearing might produce color experiences.

➢ What does the knowledge of color available to blind people have to do with jazz and its possible untranslatability?

Someone might have thought that because congenitally blind people have never experienced visual colors, colors would be ineffable to them, meaning literally indescribable to the blind. Someone might think that without prior sensory experiences of color, color experiences would be ineffable and untranslatable to the blind. Such conjectures are now proven false by what we learned above about blind people's access to knowledge of color. Color and understanding of color experiences are neither ineffable to the blind nor are such things untranslatable.

That the congenitally blind can learn and know about color and color experiences has implications for the claim that jazz is untranslatable. One of the implications is that a person can learn things from multiple sources. Can one learn what it is like to drive a race car on a track without actually doing it? Yes, you can. Here's how. Suppose Mohammedette has never driven a race car 🏎. Would this make race car driving untranslatable or ineffable to her? No, it would not because we can describe what racing on a track is like with understandable words and concepts, thereby proving it is not literally ineffable. We are translating the race car experience into words proving it is translatable. One intuitive idea is that translatable means understandable in a different medium, as in switching from French to English, or in this race car case, from one medium of the experiences had when driving a race car versus describing these race car experiences using the medium of language. The descriptions translate the experience to a non-experiencer.

CONCLUSION: In the same way that the congenital blind can learn about colors, the color of objects, and what it is like to have sensory color experiences, so too can one learn about what jazz sounds like and what sensory experiences one can have when listening to jazz through descriptions. Therefore, the experience of jazz music is not untranslatable, contrary to Ingrid Monson's assertion.

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What is the linguo-centric predicament?

• "Reviewed Work: Primera Conferencia Interamericana de Etnomusicología as reviewed by Gilbert Chase, Ethnomusicology, Vol. 10, No. 1, Latin American Issue. In his review, Gilbert outlines the presentation given by Charles Seeger, including some discussion on the linguo-centric predicament. See below.

The linguo-centric predicament is the situation of using language to try to communicate the non-linguistic, such as talking about music using language.

Senior ML research engineer at Bose Research Shuo Zhang with a Ph.D. from Georgetown University that focused on computational linguistics reviews four of Charles Seeger's early papers Review: "Charles Seeger, “Music in the American University”, “On the principles of Musicology”, “Music and Musicology”, “Systematic and Historic Orientations of Musicology” relating to the linguo-centric predicament.

“It seems to me (Shuo Zhang) that there are at least two levels of linguo-centric predicament (or two interpretations of it) in Seeger’s writings: the first one being that language is ultimately and inherently insufficient to fully convey what is in music, because of some of the fundamental differences of the two systems; this is discussed in the first article [“Music in the American University”]. The second one, more particular to that historical period of his time, is concerned with the “non-musical point of view” versus the “musical point of view”. This becomes clear when Seeger fully elaborated in the second article [“On the Principles of Musicology”] the situation of philosophers without much music knowledge and musicians without the good technique in logic and language were talking about music in a unsatisfying manner.” (bold not in original)

This alleged linguocentric predicament possibly holds confusions. In his review, Gilbert Chase, never defines it explicitly, but more refers to it and some of its alleged characteristics leading to the predicament. For example,

“The main ideas developed in this section will be familiar to those acquainted with Seeger's theoretical writings. He rejects the current conception of musical criticism as a "base or surrogate for a critique of music." The task is that of "building a critique for musicology that will comprehend all substantial aspects of the association of the concepts of music and value, textual as well as contextual." Most musicologists and music critics, as Seeger observes, take for granted a theory of value; but to come to grips with it conceptually is another matter. Seeger's role is to unite theory and practice, the factual and the valual, in holistic wedlock. The crux of the difficulty is that "in the critique of any field the specialist finds himself face to face with all the problems of philosophy." This is discouraging: faced with a choice between studying Plato or the Papago, Kant or the Nohkan, the ethnomusicologist will probably choose the second in each case. All the more reason, then, for profiting by the home-work that Seeger has undertaken to do in the realm of theory.”

“Seeger views the problem in terms of a fundamental predicament, which he calls "the linguo-centric predicament." This throws us upon the horns of a dilemma—a position in which there is little comfort or safety; at best one can only try to avoid leaning too heavily on either horn of the dilemma. This is the only alternative to permanent impalement or ignominious retreat. In such a situation, it is helpful to begin by examining "all musical theory based upon one horn of a basic dilemma to the exclusion of the other, as, for example, intellect vs. emotion, practical vs. theoretical, old vs. new." In so doing, one has to keep in mind the unique situation of musicology: that in using the art of speech to deal with the art of music it employs the same medium as the object of its study—sound. This carries with it a whole set of intrinsic problems of perception and communication, leading up to the crucial pair of questions: "Are there two kinds of music content, one sensed and perceived, another conceived and understood; or is the content one homogeneous Gestalt?" At this point the matter of performance style must be considered. Seeger questions the validity of the case for a duality of music-content (e.g., aesthetic and intellectual). Musicology cannot afford the limitations inherent in such distinctions, for "it is concerned as much with the quantitative as with the qualitative functions of the world-wide musicality of man." Factual and valual aspects are both important, and for musicology nothing is more imperatively required than to know how the distinction of the one from the other can be made, but also when it cannot be made." As an attempt to adjust for musicology the dilemma of fact vs. value, Seeger proposes a 9th solution, in addition to the eight historical ways previously cited: "Acceptance of the problem of fact vs. value as a dilemma of the linguo-centric predicament inescapable in speech-communication, but denial of it as a necessary factor in music-communication." As a consequence, he is led to ask whether it may not be that "the typical or normal act of producing music is at once factual and valual?" This in turn leads to an axiomatic statement: "The prime critic of music is the producing musician." Whatever the case may be, it is important "that we should understand the nature of the linguo-centric predicament as thoroughly as possible." This job of understanding—at once musical and linguistic—he conceives to be the main task of musicology. Seeger has adopted the term "musicological juncture" to designate the essence of the problematical situation in musicology.” (bold not in original)

Addie Clark Harding Professor of Music and the Humanities at the University of Chicago and the chair of the Department of Music. Lawrence M. Zbikowski (b. 1956) (see his publications) in discussing Charles Seeger's attempt at a unified field theory for musicology quotes Seeger as claiming the linguo-centric predicament is insoluble!

“The principal barrier to realizing the fruits of the unitary field theory lay in the sterility of reference to the objective world. The seeming inviolability of the link between language and the real world mitigates against assigning priority to any other conceptual realm, for to do so would sever our connections to reality: the dominance of speech is, for Seeger, inescapable. In an epilogue to the unitary field theory he writes, "speech alone poses the conditions of our lives in terms of problems, while 'its domination of us and our affairs is possibly the biggest problem of all. How can we expect to solve all problems in terms of the biggest problem of all—that of the linguocentric predicament—is quite a problem. As a problem, I believe it is insoluble." (1977c:i33)” (bold and bold italic not in original)

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What does untranslatable mean here?

One reading for the meaning of "untranslatable" is the seemingly straightforward replacement "not translatable." Once we figure out what it means to be translatable we can get a better handle on when it does not occur and we should then know better what "untranslatable" means.

• Dictionary.com definition for the verb "translate":

verb (used with object)

to turn from one language into another or from a foreign language into one's own: to translate Spanish.

to change the form, condition, nature, etc., of; transform; convert: to translate wishes into deeds.

to explain in terms that can be more easily understood; interpret.

to bear, carry, or move from one place, position, etc., to another; transfer.

verb (used without object)

to provide or make a translation; act as translator.

to admit of translation:

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• Dictionary.com definition for the noun "translation":

noun:

the rendering of something into another language or into one's own from another language.

a version of such a rendering: a new translation of Plato.

change or conversion to another form, appearance, etc.; transformation: a swift translation of thought into action.

the act or process of translating.

the state of being translated.

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15 Untranslatable Words To Help Describe Those Indescribable Moments Published September 24, 2021

There's a word for that?

“By many estimates, there are more than 300,000 words in the English language. At least, unabridged dictionaries tend to include this number of entries, depending on how they define a word. (Are both run and running included? Are phrases, like pre-main sequence stars, words?) While 300,000 is a big number, there's a vastly larger number of experiences, emotions, and social interactions than that. Which is to say that some things in the human experience simply don't have an English word to describe it. That's when knowledge of another language or two (or at least a limited vocabulary from another language) can prove most useful. These words may not have a direct translation (hence why they're often called "untranslatable"), but they can be invaluable for getting your point across. The next time you're at a loss for words, maybe one of these can help you out.” (bold not in original)

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Is jazz untranslatable?

What we already know is true is that a description of a musical event using a natural language, such as English, does not causally produce comparable sensory, emotional, and even cognitive experiences as happens when one has perceptual acquaintance with the same musical event. This is a good thing. We want to be able to talk about and describe pain without having to experience it to talk about it.

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Is there anything truly ineffable?

The grammar of ineffable

"Ineffable" has at least three grammatical categorical differences or derived forms for "ineffable," namely as a noun, adverb, or adjective.

As a NOUN: "ineffability" or "ineffableness."

As an ADVERB: "ineffably."

But it is mostly used as an adjective where "ineffable" is defined at Dictionary.com as:

🎓 College Level ADJECTIVE:

(C1) incapable of being expressed or described in words; inexpressible, as in "ineffable joy."

(C2) not to be spoken because of its sacredness; unutterable, as in "the ineffable name of the deity."

Or, the COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY - COMPLETE & UNABRIDGED 2012 DIGITAL EDITION as reported at Dictionary.com for "ineffable" has:

ADJECTIVE:

(B1) too great or intense to be expressed in words; unutterable

(B2) too sacred to be uttered

(B3) indescribable; indefinable

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ORIGIN OF INEFFABLE: First recorded in 1400–1450; late Middle English word from Latin word ineffābilis. From Latin ineffābilis meaning unutterable, from in- 1 + effābilis, from effārī meaning to utter, from fārī meaning to speak.

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The definition of ineffable

Keith Yandell (1938–2020) gives a straightforward characterization of the literally ineffable.

“An item is literally ineffable only if it cannot be described. No concept applies to such a being. Any description of it is as good, or as bad, as any other. Such an item, if there is any, is equidistant from all possible descriptions.”

(bold and bold italic not in original)

Since concepts applied to a subject matter entails that they are supplying descriptions of the item in question, any successful concept application whereby the item in question falls under that concept, cannot by definition be literally ineffable.

A question regarding the subject of ineffable proclamations regards whether ineffability concerns the experience, the alleged object of the experience, or both.

“3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience, 3.1 Ineffability:

William James, (James, 1958, 292–93) deemed “ineffability” or indescribability an essential mark of the mystical. It is not always clear, however, whether it is the experience or its alleged object, or both, that are to be ineffable. A logical problem with ineffability was noted long ago by Augustine [(354–430)], “God should not be said to be ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which is called ineffable” (Augustine, 1958, pp. 10–11). To say that X is ineffable is to say something about X, which contravenes ineffability. This problem has been raised anew by Alvin Plantinga [(b. 1932)] (Plantinga, 1980, 23–25) and Keith Yandell [(1938–2020)] (Yandell, 1975).” (bold and bold italic not in original)

How might defenders of the ineffable reply to the alleged paradoxical nature of ineffable utterances?

“Several responses to this problem are possible for the mystic. One is to avoid speech altogether and remain silent about what is revealed in experience. Mystics, however, have not been very good at this. A second possibility is to distinguish first-order from second-order attributions, where “ineffability” both is a second-order term and refers solely to first-order terms. To say, then, that something is “ineffable” would be to assert that it could not be described by any first-order terms, “ineffability” not being one of them. A third possibility is to say, for example, that “X is ineffable” is really a statement about the term ‘X,’ saying about it that it fails to refer to any describable entity. A fourth possibility lies in the ongoing negation of whatever is said about X, ad infinitum, in what Michael Sells has called an infinite “unsaying” or taking back of what has been said (See Sells, 1994, Chapter 1).” (bold not in original)

"The Paradox of Ineffability"

Sebastian Gäb (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Philosophy Faculty, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies)

"ABSTRACT: Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical—either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable—or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston's version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick's proposal and develop a different account based on some passages from Pseudo-Dionysius' "Mystica Theologia." 'God is ineffable' is a meta-linguistic statement concerning propositions about God: not all propositions about God are expressible in a human language.

Mystics and mystically minded philosophers have often claimed that God, the Godhead, nirvana, the Dao or some other object of mystical experience is ineffable, that it cannot be described or put into words. This claim is so deeply connected to virtually all kinds of mysticism that William James declared ineffability to be 'the first of four essential properties of mystical experience.' But there is a severe problem about the statement that God or any other object of mystical experience is ineffable: how can I meaningfully say about some-thing that it is ineffable? For if it were ineffable, I could not say anything about it, not even that it is ineffable. And vice versa, if I can say about it that it is ineffable, there is at least one thing I can say about it—namely, that it is ineffable—and then it cannot be ineffable. It seems as if any proposition of the form 'X is ineffable' (I shall call this the ineffability thesis) is paradoxical or self-defeating. But if nothing can meaningfully be said to be ineffable, then the ineffable would not be very interesting—because nothing can be said about it. And even worse: All mystical claims about God's ineffability, all theories of God's nature and of mystical experience based on this claim will become pointless, since anything follows from a contradictory statement. So, if mysticism is supposed to have any philosophical meaning, we ought to find a way to resolve this paradox. Is it possible to say that something is ineffable without contradicting oneself? Or is any such utterance self-defeating and analytically false, simply because of the meaning of the term ineffable?

“1. Alston: ineffability. Some of the most important objections to the ineffability thesis can be found in William Alston's classic paper "Ineffability." Alston begins with a definition of ineffability: 'To say that God is ineffable is to say that no concepts apply to Him, and that He is without qualities. And this implies that any statement of the form "God is x" is false'. So, claiming that God is ineffable means two things: First, that no predicates apply to God (which is the basic meaning), and second, that all statements, in which something is predicated of God, are false (which is the consequence). From this definition, Alston derives two arguments against the ineffability thesis. His first argument is actually more of an explanation of the paradox of ineffability based on his definition of the term. If we say that God is ineffable, then we predicate something of God (since we apply the predicate 'ineffable' to him), which is impossible according to the definition of ineffability. More precisely, we could put the argument like this:

(1) If an object o is ineffable, then no predicate F can be applied to o.

(2) In the statement 'o is ineffable' a predicate is applied to o.

(3) Therefore, o is not ineffable.

Alston's second argument is a little more subtle. Let us assume it were possible to consistently say that something is ineffable. Then, Alston claims, we are still not saying that some unknown X is ineffable, but rather that some conceptually describable thing is, namely God. And since we are using a specific proper name for the ineffable object, we should be able to justify our use of this name by identifying the object in question. Otherwise, there would be no reason to call the object 'God.' Now, identifying some-thing as God is possible by ascribing certain properties to the object in question, which differentiate God from other objects, like being perfectly good or incorporeal or omniscient. Alston is obviously following Frege's principle 'sense determines reference' here: the properties we use to identify God are the sense of the term 'God' and this sense determines its reference and correct usage. But if God is ineffable and it is, therefore, impossible to predicate something of him, we cannot identify him, either, because the name cannot have a sense which determines its reference. And if we cannot identify him, we cannot even understand the name 'God.' But we do understand and use this name (and the mystic will probably not want to deny that), so God cannot be ineffable.

(4) A speaker s uses a proper name n for an object o correctly iff ["if and only if"] s is able to name at least one property F of o, which identifies o as reference o of n.

(5) If s can name F, s can predicate F of o.

(6) Therefore: s is using n correctly, iff s can predicate F of o.

(7) Therefore: If s is using n correctly, o cannot be ineffable.

These two arguments are Alston's reasons for rejecting the ineffability thesis. In addition, he derives two minimal conditions from them, which any adequate interpretation of the ineffability thesis must fulfil: (1) the sentence interpreting the thesis must not itself be a member of the class of sentences which the thesis declares to be ineffable, and (2) a speaker must still be able to identify the object which is said to be ineffable.” (bold not in original)

Wikipedia: Ineffability expands on what might fall under the definition of ineffable items.

“Ineffability is the quality of something that surpasses the capacity of language to express it, often being in the form of a taboo or incomprehensible term. This property is commonly associated with philosophy, aspects of existence, and similar concepts that are inherently "too great," complex or abstract to be communicated adequately. Illogical statements, principles, reasons and arguments may be considered intrinsically ineffable along with impossibilities, contradictions and paradoxes.” (bold not in original)

Consider the list of possible ineffable items:

(INE1) something that surpasses the capacity of language to express it.

(INE2) a taboo subject matter not to be discussed.

(INE3) an incomprehensible term.

(INE4) something too complex or abstract to communicate adequately.

An excellent distinction has been given by philosopher of religion Keith Yandell (1938–2020) who in his book The Epistemology of Religious Experience, makes a distinction between what Yandelll terms literal ineffability versus metaphorical ineffability. The latter has no special philosophical problems since metaphorical ineffability is not self-contradictory because it does not require that no descriptions are possible for a metaphorically ineffable thing. From the list of four conceptions of the ineffable found in linguistic use listed above, the first one (INE1) entails strict or literal ineffability while the remaining three (INE2–INE4) only require metaphorical ineffability.

Yandell supplies two examples of the metaphorically ineffable as when someone might claim that something was either "indescribably delicious" or "inexpressibly painful."

“The term "ineffably sublime" is similar to such terms as "indescribably delicious" and "inexpressibly painful." A wound that is inexpressibly painful is painful, more painful than most, so painful that one would pass out if it were any worse. An indescribably delicious pie is delicious, more delicious than most, so delicious that no pie could surpass it. To say such things, of course, is to describe the wound and the pie, just as to say that God is ineffably sublime is to describe God. Metaphorical ineffability raises no philosophical problems. In that respect, literal ineffability contrasts with metaphorical ineffability. The simplest and most basic problem with the claim that God is (literally) ineffable is that the claim is self-contradictory. Being ineffable is a concept. Nothing that falls under a concept—nothing to which a concept applies—is ineffable. So if God is ineffable, then God is not ineffable. Further, of course, if God is not ineffable, then God is not ineffable. So whether God is ineffable or not, God is not ineffable.” (bold and bold italic not in original)

Now that is a great dilemma with a crushing argument. God is either ineffable or not ineffable. Ineffable is a concept that describes God, in this case. Anything truly literally ineffable cannot be described with the concept of ineffability or it is not an object that is indescribable. Hence, Yandell's conclusion that God cannot be literally ineffable. Furthermore, as Yandell points out later, the Judaeo-Christian God has the properties of being omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent and these descriptions make anything with descriptions ruled out from being 'indescribable' since the subject under question is being described, therefore not ineffable.

It is more than likely that omniscience by itself is the same property as the other two omni-properties of knowledge and benevolence. This is established by arguing that without omniscience one would not be omnipotent. God cannot be omnipotent but ignorant because then the power could not be applied. God can never be thought to be in any position where God could do something, but only if he knows what to do. If ignorant, having unlimited power is worthless.

The argument that omnipotence entails omnibenevolence is a harder argument to make. One line of thinking is that evil, the lack of benevolence, is only caused through ignorance. Since God's omnipotence entails his lack of ignorance, God can do no evil, hence he is omnibenevolent. One can continue to flesh out this line of thinking to make it more and more plausible.

In any event, God has been successfully described and so cannot literally be an ineffably undescribable entity since human's can describe God. Yandell goes even further and argues that God's ineffability is necessarily false.

“Nonetheless, the claim that God is literally ineffable is not obviously true. In fact, it is necessarily false. Claims that something is ineffable often are not to be taken literally. A familiar hymn says that God is ineffably sublime. The same hymn, however, ascribes other properties to God, and perhaps even grounds the claim that God is ineffably sublime in the fact that God has these other properties. If God has these properties, then God is not ineffable. To be ineffably sublime presumably is to be as sublime as you can get, and thus to be omnipotent and omniscient, immutable and immortal, and the like. But then the concepts being omnipotent, being omniscient, being immortal, and being immutable apply to God, and God is not ineffable.” (bold not in original)

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Why the numerically infinite is not literally ineffable

Keith Yandell (1938–2020) in his 1975 article "Some Varieties of Ineffability"' quotes R. C. Zaehner on ineffability.

“The doctrine that religious experience is ineffable enjoys a persistence and pervasiveness that far outruns its slender rational credentials. In what follows, I propose to examine a variety of doctrines of ineffability. Since these are rarely explicitly formulated by their devotees, I will be forced to provide my own explicit (and hopefully not unfair) formulations of the doctrine. In his Gifford Lectures, "Concordant Discord," R. C. Zaehner writes:

Religion . . . is concerned with Infinite Being: it is concerned, in fact, with what by definition cannot be measured or defined. This gives us what we might call definitional ineffability which holds that since the "object" of religion (and presumably of religious experience) is infinite—else what one is concerned with just is not religious after all—and since what is infinite is not definable, nothing can be said about this "object." Not surprisingly, Zaehner draws certain conclusions from his claim about religion: There can be, then, no science of religion in the sense that there is a science of astronomy or chemistry, because what is infinite must necessarily surpass the human understanding. If we could understand God, he would thereby cease to be God. There is much that is altogether reasonable in Zaehner's remarks.” (bold and bold italic not in original)

To say that being infinite makes something entirely indescribable (or, that "what is infinite must necessarily surpass the human understanding") is false. While it is true that finite minds cannot hold in their mind an infinite number of distinct thoughts or ideas, this doesn't prevent finite minds from being able to comprehend, properly conceptually use, and be able to correctly understand and define the concept and properties of the numerically infinity. Humans can correctly describe what makes something be of an infinite numerical quantity.

How do we know the above is true regarding proper definitions and descriptions of the numerically infinite? The answer is that Georg Cantor (1845–1918] in developing set theory correctly defined and described what it means for a set to have an infinite number of items. A set has an infinite number of elements or members when no proper subset of that set defined as a subset that does not contain every member of the set in question of which this is a proper subset (if a subset DOES contain every member of a chosen set, then it is termed an improper subset), then when that proper subset can still be established to be in a one-to-one correspondence with EVERY member of the set, then that proves the set from which the subset has been taken has an infinite number of elements or members.

An example should make these points clearer. Start with any finite membered set, say this one labelled FS={1, 2, 3, 4}, and take a proper subset PS (that does not contain every member of FS) from this four member set, say we choose PS={2, 4}. We know intuitively that if a finite set FS has four members, then any set that contains only members from FS but not all of them MUST have fewer than four members in its proper subset, so that any proper subset PS of a finite set such as FS, will always be a numerically smaller size set having fewer members than FS. When we try to put the two sets of FS and PS into a one-to-one correspondence the smaller proper subset PS can have all of its members in a one-to-one correspondence with some members from FS like this:

FS = {1, 2, 3, 4}           |   |           PS =   {2, 4}          

Notice that while every member of PS (proper subset of FS) has been put into a one-to-one correspondence with a unique member of FS (the original finite set), but it still leaves some members of FS without any corresponding element paired with a unique member from PS.

We can use the above information about finite sets to define when a set is non-empty yet does not contain only a finite number of members, hence it contains an infinite number of elements where infinite means not finite.

DEFINITION OF INFINITE SIZE SIZE: A set Si contains an infinite number of elements or members if and only if a proper subset (PSi) of set Si that does not contain every element of Si can be put into one-to-one correspondence with every member of Si. Here is an example:

    (Si) = {1, 2, 3, 4,   5,   6, . . . } containing all positive whole integers.                 | , | , | , | ,   | ,   |                                                                         (PSi) = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 . . . } containing all positive even numbers.

The two sets of Si and PSi can be seen to be in a one-to-one correspondence with each other following the formula Si(n) is in a one-to-one correspondence with PSi(2n). Because for any element of Si it can be known what unique member of PSi it has been paired up with it proves EVERY element of both sets with none left out is in a one-to-one correspondence. This cannot happen with any initially given finite set because we saw that any proper subset of a finite set can never be put into one-to-one correspondence with all of the elements from both sets, therefore proving that the set of all natural numbers is non-finite, or infinite in size. It also proves that the numerically infinite CAN be something that DOES NOT necessarily surpass human understanding so it is not literally ineffable.

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Describability and the ineffable

Some examples given above of the 'intrinsically ineffable' are illogical statements, impossibilities, contradictions, or paradoxes.

Take the examples for the intrinsically ineffable. An illogical statement, or an impossibility, statement of contradiction, or linguistic presentation of a paradox can all have been written in a natural language like English. Therefore, each of the alleged intrinsically ineffable items are expressed in words of a language. It follows that any of the allegedly intrinsically ineffable items can be presented and described in language, so are not literally ineffable in the indescribable sense.

Taking the definitions for ineffable as an adjective we have (C1) "incapable of being expressed or described in words; inexpressible." It will be crucially important that we try to clarify what is required for something to be described in order to determine if there is any phenomena that cannot be described using words. Words are very powerful when it comes to picking out and characterizing the properties and features of objects, events, states of affairs, or even things in general.

In the next section below at "What is a description? we find these characterization for what could qualify as one:

(DD1): A description could be a statement, an account, or a linguistic representation.

(DD2) Descriptions may result from the activity of producing such descriptions, or

(DD3) Descriptions can result from categorizing something into a type of thing, or what sort or kind or variety of a thing.

Perhaps curiously, negative predication ("not an X") can count as providing a description for something since negative predications can be used to form a statement, and statements using words are acceptable for producing descriptions, or accounts, or linguistic representations. Words in statements can classify something into a sort, or a kind, or type, or a variety of some category.

So, imagine that a philosopher discovers an object that is not someone's experiences that is truly ineffable so that it is indescribable. Since it exists, it can be referred to using the features language users utilize to make extensional reference to something. Human language users often use indexical expressions such as "I," or "here," or "now," or "this."

When two different people use the same word/concept in a statement such as "I am here now" the context determines the references of the relevant expressions. If Fred makes this statement on noon on Friday in Paris, Maine, then the "I" picks out Fred, the "here" picks out his location in Paris, Maine and the "now" picks out noon time. When a second occurrence of the same sentence occurs all three references could be different with a different context.

If Fred is the one to have discovered the ineffable thing that allegedly cannot be described in words, it can still be described in words as "The ineffable thing that Fred discovered." If one says "the ineffable thing cannot be described in words" one has just described the ineffable thing's properties, namely, its indescribability using words.

There are no ineffable things that cannot be described in words because negative predications can count as statements and statements can count as descriptions. Stating "The ineffable thing is not a duck" is to succeed in describing the ineffable thing. We even know the claim is true since duck's 🦆 are describable as the "common name for numerous species of waterfowl in the family Anatidae" proving ducks are not ineffable.

The entire concept of something existing that is unutterable is incoherent too. One utters if one makes a vocal expression, or produces a "speech sequence consisting of one or more words and preceded and followed by silence: it may be coextensive with a sentence."

Suppose Fred has an ineffable experience. He is asked how he knows it was ineffable. Fred replies that "it was too intense to be expressed in words." We ask Fred "Did you just use words to describe your ineffable experience?" When Fred agrees that he just used words it would follow that it could not have been an ineffable experience.

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Ineffable candidates

Because there are non-identical meanings for what one can mean by labeling something ineffable, candidates for being an ineffable something must first specify under which definition or conception of ineffable it presumes as the standard or criteria for ineffability. For ease of reference and clarity, names for each distinct definitional form of ineffability are needed.

Untranslatable ineffability is when what can be said in one language or communication system cannot be successfully translated into another language or communication system.

Definitional ineffability

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is the theory that the language you speak determines how you think. According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis first advanced by Edward Sapir (1884–1939) in 1929 and subsequently developed by Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941), the structure of a language determines a native speaker's perceptions and categorizations of experience. On this view, because different languages determine different thoughts these specific linguistically determined thoughts are inherently untranslatable to a different language. However, many scholars of a more universalist linguistic persuasion, including Noam Chomsky (b. 1928), held that one could have successful translations between any two languages. This inter-translatability claim may be false when mathematics is considered as a language; some of the ways of expressing concepts in mathematics and its formulas can be thought untranslatable into a natural language, like English, as suggested by Bertrand Russell below at Not translatable from one language to another. By the early 1950s, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis had been argued by intellectuals to be false or problematic in various ways, as found below, even though it was taught in college classrooms up to the 1970s.

“In 1953, Eric Lenneberg criticized Whorf's examples from an objectivist view of language holding that languages are principally meant to represent events in the real world and that even though languages express these ideas in various ways, the meanings of such expressions and therefore the thoughts of the speaker are equivalent. He argued that Whorf's English descriptions of a Hopi speaker's view of time were in fact translations of the Hopi concept into English, therefore disproving linguistic relativity. However Whorf was concerned with how the habitual use of language influences habitual behavior, rather than translatability. Whorf's point was that while English speakers may be able to understand how a Hopi speaker thinks, they do not think in that way.

Lenneberg's main criticism of Whorf's works was that he never showed the connection between a linguistic phenomenon and a mental phenomenon. With Brown, Lenneberg proposed that proving such a connection required directly matching linguistic phenomena with behavior. They assessed linguistic relativity experimentally and published their findings in 1954.

Since neither Sapir nor Whorf had ever stated a formal hypothesis, Brown and Lenneberg formulated their own. Their two tenets were (i) "the world is differently experienced and conceived in different linguistic communities" and (ii) "language causes a particular cognitive structure". Brown later developed them into the so-called "weak" and "strong" formulations.

Structural differences between language systems will, in general, be paralleled by nonlinguistic cognitive differences, of an unspecified sort, in the native speakers of the language.

The structure of anyone's native language strongly influences or fully determines the worldview he will acquire as he learns the language. Brown's formulations became widely known and were retrospectively attributed to Whorf and Sapir although the second formulation, verging on linguistic determinism, was never advanced by either of them.” (bold not in original)

In reviewing the history of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Dr. Richard Nordquist, professor emeritus of rhetoric and English at Georgia Southern University, informs us at ThoughtCo.com that the hypothesis was thought to be refuted by the 1990s, but has made a comeback in a weaker form whereby language merely 'influences' how people think. He also points out one of the flaws in the original proposal that if it entailed that when there was no particular word, or phrase, in a specific language it does not follow that native speakers cannot learn the concept(s) involved. Furthermore, language does not end up restricting native speaker's ability to reason or have an emotional response to something.

“The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was taught in courses through the early 1970s and had become widely accepted as truth, but then it fell out of favor. By the 1990s, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was left for dead, author Steven Pinker wrote. "The cognitive revolution in psychology, which made the study of pure thought possible, and a number of studies showing meager effects of language on concepts, appeared to kill the concept in the 1990s . . . . But recently it has been resurrected, and 'neo-Whorfianism' is now an active research topic in psycholinguistics." ("The Stuff of Thought." Viking, 2007).

Neo-Whorfianism is essentially a weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and says that language influences a speaker's view of the world but does not inescapably determine it.

The Theory's Flaws

One big problem with the original Sapir-Whorf hypothesis stems from the idea that if a person's language has no word for a particular concept, then that person would not be able to understand that concept, which is untrue. Language doesn't necessarily control humans' ability to reason or have an emotional response to something or some idea.” (bold not in original)

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Not translatable from one language to another

Philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) in his 1925 article "Bertrand Russell on Relativity" in the Encyclopædia Britannica claims an impossibility of explaining the mathematics of tensors in 'non-mathematical terms.' One might take this unexplainability to mean that tensor talk in mathematics cannot be translated into English. Read Russell's quotation, then see a critique below.

“By taking into account not only human observers, who all share the motion of the earth, but also possible “observers” in very rapid motion relatively to the earth, it is found that much more depends upon the point of view of the observer than was formerly thought. But there is found to be a residue which is not so dependent; this is the part which can be expressed by the method of “tensors.” The importance of this method can hardly be exaggerated; it is, however, quite impossible to explain it in non-mathematical terms.” (bold and bold italic not in original)

But is it impossible to explain tensors using words? No it is not since math professors use English words to explain the mathematics of tensors to their students. See the extensive description in English of the mathematical features of tensors at Wikipedia: Tensor. When talking about tensors one uses a natural language. Therefore, tensor talk can be explained and translated into English in mathematical terms and thus is not untranslatable into a natural language. Furthermore the mathematics of tensors can be explained in non-mathematical terms using metaphors or analogies.

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What is a description?

Dictionary.com definition of description:

NOUN

(DD1) a statement, picture in words, or account that describes; descriptive representation.

(DD2) the act or method of describing.

(DD3) sort; kind; variety, as in, "dogs of every description."

Or, the COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY - COMPLETE & UNABRIDGED 2012 DIGITAL EDITION as reported at Dictionary.com for "description" has:

NOUN

(CED1) a statement or account that describes; representation in words.

(CED2) the act, process, or technique of describing.

(CED3) sort, kind, or variety, as in "reptiles of every description."

(CED4) In geometry, the act of drawing a line or figure, such as an arc.

(CED5) In philosophy, a noun phrase containing a predicate that may replace a name as the subject of a sentence.

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Ineffability Bibliography

Alston, William (1956). "Ineffability." Philosophical Review 65, 506–522.

Alston, William (1989). Divine Nature and Human Language. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

Alston, William (2005). "Two cheers for mystery!." In: Dole, Andrew & Chignell, Andrew (ed.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 99–114.

Hick, John (2000). "Ineffability." Religious Studies 36, 35–46.

Ho, Chien-Hsing (2006). "Saying the Unsayable." Philosophy East and West 56, 409–427.

Ho, Chien-Hsing (2017). "Resolving the ineffability paradox." In: Chakrabarti A., Weber R. (ed.), Comparative Philosophy Without Borders. London: Bloomsbury, 69–82.

Hofweber, Thomas (2005). "Inexpressible properties and propositions." Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2, 155–206.

Jacobs, Jonathan (2015). "The ineffable, inconceivable, and incomprehensible God: fundamentality and apophatic theology." Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6, 158–176.

Keller, Lorraine Juliano (2018). "Divine ineffability and Franciscan knowledge." Res Philosophica 95, 347–370

Lebens, Samuel (2014). "Why so negative about negative theology? The search for a plantinga-proof apophaticism." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76, 259–275.

Plantinga, Alvin (1980). Does God have a nature? Milwaukee: Marquette Univ Press.

Plantinga, Alvin (2000). Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Pouivet, Roger (2013). "Bocheński on divine ineffability." Studies in East European Thought 65, 43–51 .

Scott, Michael & Citron, Gabriel (2016). "What is apophaticism? Ways of talking about an ineffable God." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8, 23–49.

Stace, Walter (1961). Mysticism and Philosophy, London: Macmillan.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Yandell, Keith. “Some Varieties of Ineffability.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1975): 167–179.

Yandell, Keith (1993). The Epistemology of Religious Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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NOTES