Gottlob Frege et la distinction entre conceptus formalis et conceptus obiectivus
NOTE: Translated from French to English by Google Translate. Everything in bold and bold italic not in original. There are also slight inconsequential formatting changes.
Gottlob Frege and the distinction between conceptus formalis and conceptus obiectivus by Florin CRÎŞMĂREANU[edit]
Abstract: The intention which animated us in writing the present study is reduced to arguing the following thesis: the semantics of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) appears as very close to that of the scholastics, which means that the Fregean distinction between meaning (Sinn) and denotation (Bedeutung)1 is nothing other than an “extension” of the scholastic distinction between formal concept and objective concept .
In a first stage of our essay we will present the German logician's conception of meaning and denotation (reference); secondly, we will summarize what the scholastics understood by the distinction: formal concept – objectual concept. In the third section of the section, by way of conclusion, we will try to highlight both the similarities and the differences that exist between the conception of G. Frege and that of certain scholastics.
Keywords: G. Frege, Semantics, Meaning, Denotation, Scholasticism, Conceptus Formalis, Conceptus Obiectivus.
I. In 1892, G. Frege published the article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”2 which, in the opinion of specialists, represents a major contribution to the development of logical semantics. In this regard, our interest relates exclusively to what G. Frege understands, firstly, by the denotation and meaning of a proper name; and, secondly, by the denotation and meaning of a complex statement.
- Researcher in the Field of Socio-Human Sciences at Al.I University. Cuza d'Iaşi, email: fcrismareanu@gmail.com.
1 According to some exegetes, the translation into Romanian of the German term Bedeutung by meaning leads to a tautological situation: the statements have a meaning because they... mean. This is why we prefer the term denotation, which represents a semantic property, among others, which determines the meaning of an expression. The translator Claude Imbert chooses to equate the term Bedeutung in French by denotation (see below).
2 Cf. Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100 (1892), pp. 22-50 (fr. trans. by Claude Imbert: “Sens et denotation”, in EcritsLogiques et Philosophiques, Paris, Seuil, 1971, pp. 102-126; Roman trad.: “Sens şi semnificaţie”, in M. Tîrnoveanu and Gh. Enescu (coord.), Logică şi filosofie. Orientări în logica modernă şi fundamentele matematicii, București, Editura Politică, 1966, pp. 54-79). At this point, a mention is necessary: prior to the writing of the article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, the writings of G. Frege only attest to the distinction between sign (Zeichen) and content (Inhalt).
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In the article cited, the German logician associates with a sign (name, compound word, written sign) not only a designate which he calls its denotation, but also what he understands by the meaning of the sign, namely the way the object is given. By sign (name), G. Frege understands any designator replacing a proper name which has the denotation of a specific object. To be more precise, it will call anything similar designating a proper noun. Between the sign, its meaning and its denotation such a connection is established that to the sign it corresponds a determined meaning and to the latter, in turn, a determined denotation, while to a denotation (to an object) it corresponds more than a sign. While the relation of signification between the name and the object is of exteriority, the relation of expression between the name and the meaning is of inherence.
The denotation of a proper name therefore consists of the object to which it refers, or that the name designates – also called the referent of the name. What G. Frege understands by the meaning of a proper name is still less precise. In accordance with the Fregean text, this can be defined as what a (proper) name expresses and which includes a given way of being of the designated (die Art des Gegebenseins des Bezeichneten). Since it is non-linguistic in nature, meaning takes on the material cover of language. And given that the meaning contains a given way of being of the designated object, it is only natural that in relation to the same object there are several meanings (and as many names), that is to say several perspectives whose denotation can be considered.3
Therefore, in addition to denotation, the meaning of an expression (in this case, the proper name) is also determined by another semantic property, which G. Frege calls sinn (meaning). . Which means that a name has a referent (the object it designates), but also a meaning, which is the property determining the referent.
Meaning as a way of presenting denotation has an objective character, it is not a representation (Vorstellung) of an individual consciousness. In this sense, G. Frege states: “If the denotation of an object is
3 The meaning, asserts G. Frege, partially clarifies the denotation. We return here to the examples he gives: the denotation of the compound words “Evening Star” and “Morning Star” is the same (the planet Venus), but the meaning is different. The same is true for a proper name as such, such as "Aristotle", where opinions about the meaning may not coincide. We can accept as meaning: the disciple of Plato and the master of Alexander the Great. As long as the denotation remains the same, oscillations of meaning are admissible; although the meaning does not offer any knowledge strictly speaking about the denotation, nor the certainty of its existence, it is sufficient to specify the identity of the denotation. See also the analysis by Călin Candiescu, "Predicaţie şi cunoaştere la Gottlob Frege (kantianism şi platonism)," in Revista de filosofie, 12 (1973), 1521–35.
an object that can be perceived by the senses, then my representation of it is an internal image”4. G. Frege is not content with analyzing the meaning and denotation of expressions, words and signs that he called proper names, but he is also interested in the meaning and denotation of an assertoric considered as a whole. As a whole, a proposition expresses something, and this is why we must differentiate between propositional expression and propositional content, and if we take into account the fact that the proposition has a truth value, we can distinguish between its denotation (true or false) and its meaning which is a thought (Gedanke) 5. Which means that the meaning of a statement is the content of the thought that the statement formulates. In accordance with G. Frege's theory, truth values are (abstract) objects, and propositions are proper names of them, so that the thoughts expressed are so many given ways of being true or false 6; that is to say, thought is the truth condition of a statement. The denotation of a statement will therefore be, precisely, one of the truth values (true or false), because a compound statement depends, from the point of view of the truth value, on the true or false of the component expressions. '. According to the same structure, the meaning of a compound expression is determined by the meanings of the expressions that compose it.
4 According to G. Frege, the denotation of a proper name is the very object that we designate through it; the representation we have on denotation is absolutely subjective; it is halfway between them (denotation — representation) that the meaning is found. This, it is true, is not subjective like representation, but neither is it the object itself.
5 By thought, G. Frege does not understand the subjective activity of thought, but its objective content, which can be a property common to several individuals. Unlike his precursors, whether scholastic or modern (John Locke), G. Frege affirms that meaning must be conceived as being objective and non-psychological. Against this objectivity of meaning, desired by Frege, we can formulate two objections: 1. if the meaning is given by an associated description - in the case of proper names - then we cannot know all the possible descriptions; 2. the notion of meaning proposed by G. Frege does not manage to avoid the skepticism deriving from our inability to know the mental states of others.
6 According to the opinion of Câlin Candiescu, Gottlob Frege si filosofia analiticà' a limbajului (doctoral thesis), Bucure5ti, 1980, G. Frege's terminology is deficient for having confused the property of being true or false with its value of truth, and the oddity of his thesis also consists in the fact that propositions neither designate nor can designate their properties (like something external). The property of being chalk or false is a semantic metaproperty (A. Tarski) and it expresses the fact that a propositional thought determines a thing true or false.
7 G. Frege designed an entire theory of meaning according to the model of the relation of reference: “every assertoric statement [...] must be considered as a proper name, and its denotation, if it has one, is either the True or the False.
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As a very general conclusion to G. Frege's conception we could say that we can never be interested only in the denotation of a proposition (identifying the meaning with the denotation alone would lead to the impossibility of explaining situations often encountered in common language: for example, nouns without a referent) or only in the sense (thought) alone, which in isolation would not be knowledge, but both (the sense and its denotation), considered together, as an act unique, would constitute knowledge'. We undoubtedly encounter, in frequent situations in common language, nouns without a referent (for example, the unicorn), which have no truth value but which have a meaning. This is possible insofar as we can associate it with a descriptive condition which could be fulfilled in a unique way by an object, without being fulfilled by the fact. This aspect qualifies the implications of the meaning-denotation “couple” seen as a single act, which, for reasons of economy of the text, we will no longer develop here.
II. The scholastic distinction between the formal concept and the object concept was imposed by the Dominican Jean Capréolus (1380-1444)10, in order to counter the Scotist univocity, which affirmed that to the univocity of the concept of being there
8 We can glimpse here another distinction made by G. Frege, namely that between thought and judgment. The latter can be seen as “that which evolves” (fortsehreiten) from thought to truth value.
9 The phrase conceptu objectali was translated from Latin by exegetes as objective concept (Ion Tânâsescu (coord.), Conceptul de intentionalitate la Breatano: origini ri interpretdri, Bucure5ti, Paideia, 2002). We still consider the translation of the syntagm objectali prin objectual concept (although it is an unfortunate expression) closer to the scholastic meaning. The scholastics often used the expression "objective" (which can also be seen as an extension of the Stoic lekton) as a synonym for the word "intentio". The first documented use of the term "objective" is to be found in Henry of Ghent, who relates the concept to the status of the thing known (res cognita ut objective existents in cognoscente) [GT: "the thing known as objectively existing in the knower."]. This tradition is continued by Petrus Aureolus, Durand de Saint-Porçain, Duns Scotus, F. Suàrez, and in modernity we meet it in R. Descartes and Franz Brentano. The syntagm objectual concept already appears in Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, d. 2, sect. 9, C, no. 48, p. 483: the concept “potest accipi vel pro actu intellectus realiter intellectui inhaerente, vel pro conceptu objectali”. With him, however, the formal concept is an act, and not, as with Capréolus, a representative form (Serge-Thomas Bonino, “Conceptul de fiire si cunoa5terea lui Dumnezeu la Capréolus”, in Bogdan Tâtaru-Cazaban (coord.), Pluralitatea metaft#cii medievale. Istorie ri structuri, Ia5i, Polirom, 2005, pp. 267-300, especially pp. 276-278). For all scholastics, even for those who have adopted scholastic terminology, and an example is F. Brentano, the objective expression must not be understood in the modern meaning of the term, and this is why we have avoided to translate it by “objectifi".
10 Cf. Jean Capréolus, Defensiones theologicae divi Thomae Aquinatis, C. Paban and T. Pegues (eds.), Tours, 1900-1908, Def. I, dist. VIII, qu. 2, a. 2 B (t.1, 362 a).
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corresponds to the unity of a real entity, common to beings". Before explaining what he understands by formal concept and objectual concept, Capréolus defines what he understands by concept or ratio or intentio, terms appearing in his works as synonyms. To this end, he cites two texts of Saint Thomas — Contra Gentiles I, c. 53, and In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 — from which it follows that "we understand by concept the intelligible form that the intellect, actualized and informed by the presentative form (species)12 of the object, conceives in itself. For Capréolus, "the formal concept is an intramental noetic reality, a form produced by the intellect in the act of intellection. From the subjective point of view, the formal concept is an accident, a form — a quality subjectified in the intellect. From the objective point of view, it represents and expresses in a manner intelligible the known object. The term - too versatile - ratio can express this last aspect of the formal concept. As for the objectual concept - obviously poorly chosen expression, because given that this concept has nothing of a concept in the usual sense of the term - it is none other than the intelligible located before the intellect which forms the (formal) concept. For example, human nature is the objective concept of intellection by which we understand man as such. In this perspective, it is the foundation of the truth of the formal concept”13. Through the criticism he addresses to Scotism, Capréolus wants to highlight the fact that the problem of the unity of a concept - that of being in this case - requires a different response depending on whether it is the formal concept (in its objective dimension, of course) or the objective concept. By this fundamental distinction, which prohibits dealing with the question of the unity of being on the level
11 Mr. Forlivesi considers that “this distinction plays a decisive role in the history of philosophy; it constitutes in particular the crux of the transition and continuity between scholasticism and modern philosophy” (Marco Forlivesi, “The Distinction between formal concept and oective concept. S Pasqualigo, Mastri”, in Philosophical studies, 60 (2002), pp . 3-30).
12 The species plays a major role in scholastic noetics. It is not what is (directly) known, but that something through which the extra-mental object is known. The species represents “the vehicle” which transports the reference towards the extra-mental object. Thomas Aquinas calls it, in De Veritate, IV, 1, verbum interius, namely what the external object forms inside. For the scholastics, species is considered to be a representation of the object which implies a reference to an object. The dimension of intentionality is very obvious here, because to represent always means to represent something. A representation is without fail a representation of an object by a subject (Ausonio Marras, “Originile scholastice ale conceptiei lui Brentano despre intentionalitate”, in I. Tânâsescu (coord.), op. cit., pp. 121-142). It is not improper to assimilate the species of scholasticism, which, ultimately, is nothing other than the intermediary between the object and the subject, that is to say the formal concept, to the noemata of E. Husserl (who, in Ideen, introduces the noematic term for intentional and the noetic term for reeli), and, by analogical extension, with the term sinn proposed by G. Frege. We will nevertheless see above in what way G. Frege moves away from this representational dimension of the species.
13 Cf Jean Capréolus, op. cit., 375a; see also S.-T. Bonino, art. cit., p. 277.
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Noetic, Capreolus "transfers the discussion to the metaphysical field specific to Saint Thomas"14.
The same terminology (and the very examples) of Jean Capréolus are at
Also found in Francisco Suârez's Disputationes Metaphysicae
(1548-1617)15. At the end of the 16th century, F. Suârez presents the distinction between
Formal concept and objective concept as a distinctive vulgaris16. Just like
Capreolus, the Jesuit rejects, at a first step, Scotist univocity, in
Using the same distinction between the formal concept and the objective concept.
For him, the formal concept is the act of the intellect by which it gets to know a common thing or ratio; the objective concept is the common thing or ratio, which is perceived (in)directly through the concept of form. F. Suârez is so "scolastic" that he even takes over
The example given by Capréolus: the concept of man (D.M., II, §1). The act of
Representation of man by our intellect, identifies with the formal concept,
While the man known and conceived by means of this act correlates with the objective concept.
F. Suârez introduces, for the first time in Disputationes Metaphysicae, the notion conceptus objectivus entis when he analyzes a thesis attributed, cautiously, to Buridan, who considered the substance as the adequate object
And proper of metaphysics (D.M., I, § 21: "sexta opinio, quae Buridani esse
Dicitur, est objectum adaequatum hujus scientiae esse substantiam"). In the
Design of F. Suârez, the adequate object of metaphysics is ens inquantum ens reale, which identifies itself neither with being in the abstract sense, nor with being as a whole, but with: the objective concept of being, the most general element that can be thought of as being in things, namely, according to a
Well-known formula in S chulmetaphysik: the objectity of things (D.M., I, 1, § 26; I, 5, §15).
14 Cf Bernard Montagnes, The doctrine of the analogy of being according to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Louvain-Paris, Nauwelaerts, 1963, p. 125.
15 Cf Mr. Forlivesi, art. cit., and in particular the section of the article: "The thought of Francisco Su. give an overview".
16 Cf F. Suârez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (D.M.), II, sec. 1, § 1: "Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et obictivi".
17 Cf Ibid., II, § 1; see also J.-P. Coujou, Suàrq and the refoundation of metaphysics as an ontology. Study and translation of the Detailed Index of Metaphysics of Aristotle of F. Suârez, Louvain- Paris, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1999, pp. 14-15.
18 In fact, the distant origin of the distinction between the formal concept and the objective concept of concepts (F. Suârez) or ideas (R. Descartes), is in the averroist theory of the two subjects of intentio intellecta, one that makes it "worldly thing/of this world" or "real existing", the other that makes it a "real" being. At F. Suârez, the formal concept is the act of intellection, the objective concept, the object known and represented by this act (Alain de Libera, Cearta universaliilor, trad. roum. by Ilie Gyurcsik and Margareta Gyurcsik, Timi5oara, Amarcord, 1998, pp. 214-215).
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For most of the exegetes of the scholastic period, the objectual concept is not for F. Suârez, as it is neither for the other scholastics, a subjective esse, but it is neither the thing as such, individual and concrete, because it does not necessarily refer to something external. The objectual concept allows something to be objectified by thought, a kind of intentional object'. Although this distinction, between the formal concept and the objectual concept, is noetic, 2° F. Suârez nevertheless leaves the impression (D.M., II, 1, § 1), that this objectual concept is able to be identified, occasionally, it is true, with the singular and individual thing. J.-F. Courtine seems to have grasped this aspect when he states: "the objectual concept is not only the substitute for individual and concrete things, but what constitutes their very essence"21. Therefore, we can affirm: the objectual concept is identified with the object. It is necessary to mention here a nuance (often avoided) which relates to the subjective or objective dimension of this type of concept. In this context,
19 The term intellectual intention (D.M., II, 1, §2) invoked by F. Suârez, borrowed from Averroès, is identified with the objectual concept, and it formulates, precisely, the problem of the unity of the subject and the object in the act of knowing J.-P. Coujou, op. cit., pp. 15-16).
20 In European culture, noetic metaphysics seems to be inaugurated by Al-Farabi, in his work De intellectu. He distinguishes between forms intelligible in themselves (the primary intellect, separate intelligences) and forms intelligible by abstraction (forms which exist in matter) B. Tàtaru-Cazaban (coord.), op. cit., p. 26). In our opinion, F. Suârez does not develop such a metaphysics, as É. Gilson. We see the metaphysics of F. Suarez as based on a moderate realism, similar to that adopted by Saint Thomas. Those who find in F. Suârez a noetic metaphysics have as their starting point the theory of the representation of the object which abstracts the object (J.-P. Coujou, op. dt., p. 67). We are, undoubtedly, dealing in Disputationes with an intellectual (noetic) construction carried out by the Jesuit, who is thus seen as a precursor of modern noetic ontologies. An example in this sense is, in our opinion, G. Frege himself. “If Frege's logic, understood as ontology, is incomplete and schematic, these characteristics precisely respond to its noetic function” (G. Frege, Scrieri logico-filosofice I, Introductory study carried out by Sorin Vieru, Bucure5ti, Editura Stiintificâ Enciclopedicà, 1977, p. XLII). In the opinion of S. Vieru, “Însem-nâri despre ontologia lui Frege”, in Revista de filosofie, 1 (1968), pp. 55-67, G. Frege's conception relating to the object of study of formal logic acquires a philosophical, ontological character for the following reason: the theory on functions and objects is understood as a theory which refers to the entire reality, and not to a particular domain of reality. But this ontology that G. Frege proposes has the meaning of a “formal ontology”, similar to that of Husserl (which does not represent, ultimately, anything other than Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis) because it is founded by the presupposition that “ there are only objects and functions in the universe. M. Dummett (The Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Paris, Gallimard, 1991), authorized interpreter of the Fregean conception, affirms that there does not exist a metaphysics, see ontology, in G. Frege, his thought being, essentially, a combination of philosophy of language and mathematics. For other exegetes, such as for example R Grossmann (1968), G. Bergmann (1968), Kluge (1980), on the contrary, not only does there exist a metaphysics in G. Frege, but it has primacy over to the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics F. Nef, The arbitrary object. Research on the ontology of the object, Paris, J. Vrin, 1998, pp. 117-127: “Formal ontology from Bolzano to Husserb>).
21 cf. J.-F. Courtine, Sucirqet the system of metaphysics, Paris, Puf, 1990, p. 193.
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It is fair to say that F. Suârez "subit" the influence of Capréolus here also: "the unity of the objective concept can be of two types. A first form of unity is obtained by the participation of the various realities subsumed by the concept in an undivided form or nature. This is unambiguous of the genus or species. The second form of unit is the unit of attribution: several that relate to something unique are called one per attribution. This unit, likes to specify Capréolus, is much weaker than the previous one. However, it may be sufficient to base the truth of a unitary formal concept at the noetic level"22.
A general conclusion valid for scholastics with regard to the distinction objective concept - formal concept could be as follows: in the act of knowledge it is impossible for the emphasis to fall on a single dimension, whether objective or conceptual, because it is the two, together, that form the act of knowledge.
III. In our opinion, and in accordance with what has been presented above, G. Frege superimposes on the scholastic distinction between formal and objective concept, the distinction between meaning and denotation. This means that, for Frege, the objective concept would be the denoted, which must not necessarily have a concrete existence; and the formal concept would be the meaning, which can be multiple, just like the acts by which we grasp objects. For a better understanding, let's compare two examples: the one given by F. Suàrez and the one given by G. Frege. For the first, the act of representation of man by our intellect is identified with the formal concept, while the man known through these acts can be correlated with the objective concept. For the German logician, the Moon represents the object of the observation, namely the referent, which is averaged by the real image that originates with the help of the lens inside the binocular and with the help of the observer's retina. One (the image of the Moon seen by the binocular), G. Frege compares it with his meaning, the other, he compares it with the representation or the image. Up to a certain point, the two examples seem to go hand in hand: the object of the observation is identified, for one as well as for the other, with the referent. Regarding the meaning (or its scholastic equivalent: the formal concept), G. Frege introduces a nuance: it is also not limited to the act of representation', as did the
22 LI:••""
S.-T. Bonino, art. cit., pp. 278-279.
23 Let us mention again, on this occasion, that for scholastics, "objective" means "in accordance with representation", i.e. subjective, and not "in accordance with the thing", i.e. objective, as in the case, for example, of G. Frege. Scholastics and those who have resumed their conceptions (we are talking here about F. Brentano and, through it, E. Husserl), made the distinction between something that is extra-mental and object that is itself present in consciousness: it is an entity constituted in the mind, by the spirit. This distinction seems to no longer work at G. Frege. The internal, representational dimension of the object is totally absent from the conception of the German logician.
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Scholastics, which involves a subjective dimension, but at its objective dimension: the meaning (Gedanke) which is the same for several observers'.
At G. Frege, unlike scholastics, the domain distinction between material objects, which have a reality and ideal objects, such as numbers, geometric points, truth values, extensions of concepts, does not work. They belong to the same domain. The character of the object is to be "complete", "saturated"; unlike the "unsaturated" character of the concept'. In this respect, the Platonism of G. Frege differs clearly from the Aristotelianism of scholastics.
Another difference between G. Frege and the scholastics is as follows: while scholastics seem to limit the formal concept-objective concept distinction to proper names, the German logician goes further by also applying it to assertive propositions considered in their entirety (which, ultimately, works according to the same structure as proper names).
24 It is in the same category that we could also include F. Brentano, who in his 1874 book: Pechologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, affirms that the psychic phenomenon consists of two moments that cannot be conceived separately: the object of the psychic act and the relationship or orientation of the act towards that object. In our opinion, this pair of intentional correlates represents nothing other than the scholastic pair: objective concept - formal concept. Frege reacts against this psychological current, which emphasized only the subjective dimension, by instituting the distinction between meaning and denotation, which wants to be an objective distinction. One of the roots of this psychological current is also to be found in Thomas, De Veritate I, 9, where he distinguishes between the knowing subject, the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge. This distinction appears in G. Frege also in the very example given above, with the difference that it no longer focuses on the knowing subject, which only "produces" representations, but only on the act and object, that is, on meaning and denotation. Through this "abandonment" of the subject we arrive at an impersonal dimension of the act of knowledge, typically logical. Explainable thing, because for G. Frege, logic represents par excellence an investigation of the objective, while psychology is interested in the subjective side. To this distinction corresponds to another, between the concept and the object on the one hand, and the representation on the other.
25 The Platonic implications of the Fregean conception are obvious here. According to Câlin Candiescu, Gottlob Frege fi filosofia analiticd a limbajului (doctoral thesis), Bucure5ti, 1980, chapter "Platonism Si obiectivitate", G. Frege is not a Platonist, as is often said, but a conceptualist. His Platonism manifests itself mainly in his late writings and does not only target abstract objects (numbers, classes, etc.). In the sense of the author mentioned above, Platonism represents only a secondary aspect of Frege's conception, being considered an extension of his antipsychologism. Frege's concern was to save the objectivity of logical-mathematical entities: "while someone can only feel his own pain, his own pleasure or his own hunger... numbers can be common objects for many, namely they are the same for all" (G. Frege, Fundamentele aritmeticii, § 93, in Scrieri..., p. 141). This objectivity of which G. Frege has two meanings: 1. independent of human consciousness (esse extra animam) and 2. to have an intersubjective validity (generic consciousness). Platonism means to attribute to abstract ideas or entities o
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From our point of view, by summarizing the above ideas, the conception of G. Frege relative to meaning and denotation only eliminates the psychological element, that is, the representation, of the conception of scholastics who distinguish between the formal concept and the objective concept27. The difference between scholastics and contemporary logicians ultimately consists in a language problem: while the former deal with logic in everyday language, 20th century logicians build an artificial language, culminating in the metalanguage proposed by A. Tarski. This means that we can deal with the same problem, and that only the terminology differs.
Finally, we consider that the attack of G. Frege could aim, in addition to the theory of the subjectivity of meaning proposed by John Locke in his book An Esse Concerning Human Understanding (1690), at the scholastic roots of this subjective dimension of meaning.
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