Meditationes de Prima Philosophia
De Deo, quòd existat.
1. Claudam nunc oculos, aures obturabo, avocabo omnes sensus, imagines etiam rerum corporalium omnes vel ex cogitatione meâ delebo, vel certe, quia hoc fieri vix potest, illas ut inanes & falsas nihili pendam, meque solum alloquendo & penitius inspiciendo, meipsum paulatim mihi magis notum & familiarem reddere conabor. Ego sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, pauca intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, imaginans etiam & sentiens; ut enim ante animadverti, quamvis illa quae sentio vel imaginor extra me fortasse nihil sint, illos tamen cogitandi modos, quos sensus & imaginationes  appello, quatenus cogitandi quidam modi tantùm sunt, in me esse sum certus.
2. Atque his paucis omnia recensui quae vere scio, vel saltem quae me scire hactenus animadverti. Nunc circumspiciam diligentiùs an forte adhuc apud me alia sint ad quae nondum respexi. Sum certus me esse rem cogitantem. Nunquid ergo etiam scio quid requiratur ut de aliquâ re sim certus? Nempe in hac primâ cognitione nihil aliud est, quàm clara quaedam & distincta perceptio ejus quòd affirmo; quae sane non sufficeret ad me certum de rei veritate reddendum, si posset unquam contingere, ut aliquid, quòd ita clare & distincte perciperem, falsum esset; ac proinde jam videor pro regulâ generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quòd valde clare & distincte percipio.
3. Verumtamen multa prius ut omnino certa & manifesta admisi, quae tamen postea dubia esse deprehendi. Qualia ergo ista fuere? Nempe terra, coelum, sydera & caetera omnia quae sensibus usurpabam. Quid autem de illis clare percipiebam? Nempe ipsas talium rerum ideas, sive cogitationes, menti meae obversari. Sed ne nunc quidem illas ideas in me esse inficior. Aliud autem quiddam erat quòd affirmabam, quòdque etiam ob consuetudinem credendi clare me percipere arbitrabar, quòd tamen revera non percipiebam: nempe res quasdam extra me esse, a quibus ideae istae procedebant, & quibus omnino similes erant. Atque hoc erat, in quo vel fallebar, vel certe, si verum judicabam, id non ex vi meae perceptionis contingebat.
4. Quid verò? Cùm circa res Arithmeticas vel Geometricas aliquid valde simplex & facile considerabam, ut quòd duo & tria simul juncta sint quinque, vel similia, nunquid saltem illa satis perspicue intuebar, ut vera esse affirmarem? Equidem non aliam ob causam de iis dubitandum esse postea judicavi, quàm quia veniebat in mentem forte aliquem Deum talem mihi naturam indere potuisse, ut etiam circa illa deciperer, quae manifestissima viderentur. Sed quoties haec praeconcepta de summâ Dei potentiâ opinio mihi occurrit, non possum non fateri, siquidem velit, facile illi esse efficere ut errem, etiam in iis quae me puto mentis oculis quàm evidentissime intueri. Quoties verò ad ipsas res, quas valde clare percipere arbitror, me converto, tam plane ab illis persuadeor, ut sponte erumpam in has voces: fallat me quisquis potest, nunquam tamen efficiet ut nihil sim, quandiu me aliquid esse cogitabo; vel ut aliquando verum sit me nunquam fuisse, cùm jam verum sit me esse; vel forte etiam ut duo & tria simul juncta plura vel pauciora sint quàm quinque, vel similia, in quibus scilicet repugnantiam agnosco manifestam. Et certe cùm nullam occasionem habeam existimandi aliquem Deum esse deceptorem, nec quidem adhuc satis sciam utrùm sit aliquis Deus, valde tenuis &, ut ita loquar, Metaphysica dubitandi ratio est, quae tantùm ex eâ opinione dependet. Ut autem etiam illa tollatur, quamprimum occurret occasio, examinare debeo an sit Deus, &, si sit, an possit esse deceptor; hac enim re ignoratâ, non videor de ullâ aliâ plane certus esse unquam posse.
5. Nunc autem ordo videtur exigere, ut prius omnes  meas cogitationes in certa genera distribuam, & in quibusnam ex illis veritas aut falsitas proprie consistat, inquiram. Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen: ut cùm hominem, vel Chimaeram, vel Coelum, vel Angelum, vel Deum cogito. Aliae verò alias quasdam practerea formas habent: ut, cùm volo, cùm timeo, cùm affirmo, cùm nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quàm istius rei similitudinem cogitatione complector; & ex his aliae voluntates, sive affectus, aliae autem judicia appellantur.
6. Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsae proprie esse non possunt; nam sive capram, sive chimaeram imaginer, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quàm alteram. Nulla etiam in ipsâ voluntate, vel affectibus, falsitas est timenda; nam, quamvis prava, quamvis etiam ea quae nusquam sunt, possim optare, non tamen ideo non verum est illa me optare. Ac proinde sola supersunt judicia, in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar. Praecipuus autem error & frequentissimus qui possit in illis reperiri, consistit in eo quòd ideas, quae in me sunt, judicem rebus quibusdam extra me positis similes esse sive conformes; nam profecto, si tantùm ideas ipsas ut cogitationis meae quosdam modos considerarem, nec ad quidquam aliud referrem, vix mihi ullam errandi materiam dare possent.
7. Ex his autem ideis aliae innatae, aliae adventitiae,  aliae a me ipso factae mihi videntur: nam quòd intelligam quid sit res, quid sit veritas, quid sit cogitatio, hacc non aliunde habere videor quàm ab ipsâmet meâ naturâ; quòd autem nunc strepitum audiam, solem videam, ignem sentiam, a rebus quibusdam extra me positis procedere hactenus judicavi; ac denique Syrenes, Hippogryphes, & similia, a me ipso finguntur. Vel forte etiam omnes esse adventitias possum putare, vel omnes innatas, vel omnes factas: nondum enim veram illarum originem clare perspexi.
8. Sed hîc praecipue de iis est quaerendum, quas tanquam a rebus extra me existentibus desumptas considero, quaenam me moveat ratio ut illas istis rebus similes esse existimem. Nempe ita videor doctus a naturâ. Et praeterea experior illas non a meâ voluntate nec proinde a me ipso pendere; saepe enim vel invito obversantur: ut jam, sive velim, sive nolim, sentio calorem, & ideo puto sensum illum, sive ideam caloris, a re a me diversâ, nempe ab ignis cui assideo calore, mihi advenire. Nihilque magis obvium est, quàm ut luc judicem istam rem suam similitudinem potius quàm aliud quid in me immittere.
9. Quae rationes, an satis firmae sint, jam videbo. Cùm hîc dico me ita doctum esse a naturâ, intelligo tantùm spontaneo quòdam impetu me ferri ad hoc credendum, non lumine aliquo naturali mihi ostendi esse verum. Quae duo multum discrepant; nam quaecumque lumine naturali mihi ostenduntur, ut quòd ex eo quòd dubitem, sequatur me esse, & similia, nullo modo dubia esse possunt, quia nulla alia facultas esse potest, cui aeque fidam ac lumini isti, quaeque illa  non vera esse possit docere; sed quantum ad impetus naturales, jam saepe olim judicavi me ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse impulsum, cùm de bono eligendo ageretur, nec video cur iisdem in ullâ aliâ re magis fidam.
10. Deinde, quamvis ideae illae a voluntate meâ non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positis necessario procedere. Ut enim impetus illi, de quibus mox loquebar, quamvis in me sint, a voluntate tamen meâ diversi esse videntur, ita forte etiam aliqua alia est in me facultas, nondum mihi satis cognita, istarum idearum effectrix, ut hactenus semper visum est illas, dum somnio, absque ullâ rerum externarum ope, in me formari.
11. Ac denique, quamvis a rebus a me diversis procederent, non inde sequitur illas rebus istis similes esse debere. Quinimo in multis saepe magnum discrimen videor deprehendisse: ut, exempli causâ, duas diversas solis ideas apud me invenio, unam tanquam a sensibus haustam, & quae maxime inter illas quas adventitias existimo est recensenda, per quam mihi valde parvus apparet, aliam verò ex rationibus Astronomiae desumptam, hoc est ex notionibus quibusdam mihi innatis elicitam, vel quocumque alio modo a me factam, per quam aliquoties major quàm terra exhibetur; utraque profecto similis eidem soli extra me existenti esse non potest, & ratio persuadet illam ei maxime esse dissimilem, quae quàm proxime ab ipso videtur emanasse .
12. Quae omnia satis demonstrant me non hactenus ex  certo judicio, sed tantùm ex caeco aliquo impulsu, credidisse res quasdam a me diversas existere, quae ideas sive imagines suas per organa sensuum, vel quolibet alio pacto, mihi immittant.
13. Sed alia quaedam adhuc via mihi occurrit ad inquirendum an res aliquae, ex iis quarum ideae in me sunt, extra me existant. Nempe, quatenus ideae istae cogitandi quidam modi tantùm sunt, non agnosco ullam inter ipsas inaequalitatem, & omnes a me eodem modo procedere videntur; sed, quatenus una unam rem, alia aliam repraesentat, patet easdem esse ab invicem valde diversas. Nam proculdubio illae quae substantias mihi exhibent, majus aliquid sunt, atque, ut ita loquar, plus realitatis objectivae in se continent, quàm illae quae tantùm modos, sive accidentia, repraesentant; & rursus illa per quam summum aliquem Deum, aeternum, infinitum, omniscium, omnipotentem, rerumque omnium, quae praeter ipsum sunt, creatorem intelligo, plus profecto realitatis objectivae in se habet, quàm illae per quas finitae substantiae exhibentur.
14. Jam verò lumine naturali manifestum est tantumdem ad minimum esse debere in causâ efficiente & totali, quantum in ejusdem causae effectu. Nam, quaeso, undenam posset assumere realitatem suam effectus, nisi a causâ? Et quomodo illam ei causa dare posset, nisi etiam haberet? Hinc autem sequitur, nec posse aliquid a nihilo fieri, nec etiam id quod magis perfectum est, hoc est quod plus realitatis in se continet, ab eo quod minus. Atque hoc non modo perspicue verum est de iis effectibus, quorum realitas est actualis sive formalis, sed etiam de ideis, in quibus consideratur tantùm realitas objectiva. Hoc est, non modo non potest, exempli causâ, aliquis lapis, qui prius non fuit, nunc incipere esse, nisi producatur ab aliquâ re in quâ totum illud sit vel formaliter vel eminenter, quod ponitur in lapide; nec potest calor in subjectum quod priùs non calebat induci, nisi a re quae sit ordinis saltem aeque perfecti atque est calor, & sic de caeteris; sed praeterea etiam non potest in me esse idea caloris, vel lapidis, nisi in me posita sit ab aliquâ causâ, in quâ tantumdem ad minimum sit realitatis quantum esse in calore vel lapide concipio. Nam quamvis ista causa nihil de suâ realitate actuali sive formali in meam ideam transfundat, non ideo putandum est illam minus realem esse debere, sed talem esse naturam ipsius ideae, ut nullam aliam ex se realitatem formalem exigat, praeter illam quam mutuatur a cogitatione meâ, cujus est modus. Quòd autem haec idea realitatem objectivam hanc vel illam contineat potius quàm aliam, hoc profectò habere debet ab aliquâ causâ in quâ tantumdem sit ad minimum realitatis formalis quantum ipsa continet objectivae. Si enim ponamus aliquid in ideâ reperiri, quod non fuerit in ejus causâ, hoc igitur habet a nihilo; atqui quantumvis imperfectus sit iste essendi modus, quo res est objective in intellectu per ideam, non tamen profectò plane nihil est, nec proinde a nihilo esse potest.
15. Nec etiam debeo suspicari, cùm realitas quam considero in meis ideis sit tantùm objectiva, non opus  esse ut eadem realitas sit formaliter in causis istarum idearum, sed sufficere, si sit in iis etiam objective. Nam quemadmodum iste modus essendi objectivus competit ideis ex ipsarum naturâ, ita modus essendi formalis competit idearum causis, saltem primis & praecipuis, ex earum naturâ. Et quamvis forte una idea ex aliâ nasci possit, non tamen hîc datur progressus in infinitum, sed tandem ad aliquam primam debet deveniri, cujus causa sit in star archetypi, in quo omnis realitas formaliter contineatur, quae est in ideâ tantùm objective. Adeo ut lumine naturali mihi sit perspicuum ideas in me esse veluti quasdam imagines, quae possunt quidem facile deficere a perfectione rerum a quibus sunt desumptae, non autem quicquam majus aut perfectius continere.
16. Atque haec omnia, quò diutius & curiosius examino, tantò clarius & distinctius vera esse cognosco. Sed quid tandem ex his concludam? Nempe si realitas objectiva alicujus ex meis ideis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nec formaliter nec eminenter in me esse, nec promde me ipsum elus ideae causam esse posse, hinc necessario sequi, non me solum esse in mundo, sed aliquam aliam rem, quae istius ideae est causa, etiam existere. Si verò nulla talis in me idea reperiatur, nullum plane habebo argumentum quod me de alicujus rei a me diversae existentiâ certum reddat; omnia enim diligentissime circumspexi, & nullum aliud potui hactenus reperire.
17. Ex his autem meis ideis, practer illam quae me ipsum mihi exhibet, de quâ hîc nulla difficultas esse  potest, alia est quae Deum, aliae quae res corporeas & inanimes, aliae quae Angelos, aliae quae animalia, ac denique aliae quae alios homines meî similes repraesentant.
18. Et quantum ad ideas quae alios homines, vel animalia, vel Angelos exhibent, facile intelligo illas ex iis quas habeo meî ipsius & rerum corporalium & Dei posse componi, quamvis nulli praeter me homines, nec animalia, nec Angeli, in mundo essent.
19. Quantum autem ad ideas rerum corporalium, nihil in illis occurrit, quod sit tantum ut non videatur a me ipso potuisse proficisci; nam si penitiùs inspiciam, & singulas examinem eo modo quo heri examinavi ideam cerae, animadverto perpauca tantùm esse quae in illis clare & distincte percipio: nempe magnitudinem, sive extensionem in longum, latum, & profundum; figuram, quae ex terminatione istius extensionis exsurgit; situm, quem diversa figurata inter se obtinent; & motum, sive mutationem istius sitûs; quibus addi possunt substantia, duratio, & numerus: caetera autem, ut lumen & colores, soni, odores, sapores, calor & frigus, aliacque tactiles qualitates, nonnisi valde confuse & obscure a me cogitantur, adeo ut etiam ignorem an sint verae, vel falsae, hoc est, an ideae, quas de illis habeo, sint rerum quarundam ideae, an non rerum. Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis posse reperiri paulo ante notaverim, est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis, cùm non rem tanquam rem repraesentant: ita, exempli causâ, ideae quas habeo caloris & frigoris, tam parum clarae  & distinctae sunt, ut ab iis discere non possim, an frigus sit tantùm privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum. Et quia nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt, siquidem verum sit frigus nihil aliud esse quàm privationem caloris, idea quae mihi illud tanquam reale quid & positivum repraesentat, non immerito falsa dicetur, & sic de cacteris.
20. Quibus profecto non est necesse ut aliquem authorem a me diversum assignem; nam, si quidem sint falsae, hoc est nullas res repraesentent, lumine naturali notum mihi est illas a nihilo procedere, hoc est, non aliam ob causam in me esse quàm quia deest aliquid naturae meae, nec est plane perfecta; si autem sint verae, quia tamen tam parum realitatis mihi exhibent, ut ne quidem illud a non re possim distinguere, non video cur a me ipso esse non possint.
21. Ex iis verò quae in ideis rerum corporalium clara & distincta sunt, quaedam ab ideâ meî ipsius videor mutuari potuisse, nempe substantiam, durationem, numerum, & si quae alia sint ejusmodi; nam cùm cogito lapidem esse substantiam, sive esse rem quae per se apta est existere, itemque me esse substantiam, quamvis concipiam me esse rem cogitantem & non extensam, lapidem verò esse rem extensam & non cogitantem, ac proinde maxima inter utrumque conceptum sit diversitas, in ratione tamen substantiae videntur convenire; itemque, cùm percipio me nunc esse, & priùs etiam aliquamdiu fuisse recordor, cùmque varias habeo cogitationes quarum numerum intelligo, acquiro  ideas durationis & numeri, quas deinde ad quascunque alias res possum transferre. Caetera autem omnia ex quibus rerum corporearum ideae conflantur, nempe extensio, figura, situs, & motus, in me quidem, cùm nihil aliud sim quàm res cogitans, formaliter non continentur; sed quia sunt tantùm modi quidam substantiae, ego autem substantia, videntur in me contineri posse eminenter.
22. Itaque sola restat idea Dei, in quâ considerandum est an aliquid sit quod a me ipso non potuerit proficisci. Dei nomine intelligo substantiam quandam infinitam, independentem, summe intelligentem, summe potentem, & a quâ tum ego ipse, tum aliud omne, si quid aliud extat, quodcumque extat, est creatum. Quae sane omnia talia sunt ut, quo diligentius attendo, tanto minus a me solo profecta esse posse videantur. Ideoque ex antedictis, Deum necessario existere, est concludendum.
23. Nam quamvis substantiae quidem idea in me sit ex hoc ipso quòd sim substantia, non tamen idcirco esset idea substantiae infinitae, cùm sim finitus, nisi ab aliquâ substantiâ, quae revera esset infinita, procederet.
24. Nec putare debeo me non percipere infinitum per veram ideam, sed tantùm per negationem finiti, ut percipio quietem & tenebras per negationem motûs & lucis; nam contrà manifeste intelligo plus realitatis esse in substantiâ infinitâ quàm in finitâ, ac proinde priorem quodammodo in me esse perceptionem infiniti quàm finiti, hoc est Dei quàm meî ipsius. Quâ enim ratione intelligerem me dubitare, me  cupere, hoc est, aliquid mihi deesse, & me non esse omnino perfectum, si nulla idea entis perfectioris in me esset, ex cujus comparatione defectus meos agnoscerem?
25. Nec dici potest hanc forte ideam Dei materialiter falsam esse, ideoque a nihilo esse posse, ut paulo ante de ideis caloris & frigoris, & similium, animadverti; nam contrà, cùm maxime clara & distincta sit, & plus realitatis objectivae quàm ulla alia contineat, nulla est per se magis vera, nec in quâ minor falsitatis suspicio reperiatur. Est, inquam, haec idea entis summe perfecti & infiniti maxime vera; nam quamvis forte fingi possit tale ens non existere, non tamen fingi potest ejus ideam nihil reale mihi exhibere, ut de ideâ frigoris ante dixi. Est etiam maxime clara & distincta; nam quidquid clare & distincte percipio, quod est reale & verum, & quod perfectionem aliquam importat, totum in eâ continetur. Nec obstat quod non comprehendam infinitum, vel quod alia innumera in Deo sint, quae nec comprehendere, nec forte etiam attingere cogitatione, ullo modo possum; est enim de ratione infiniti, ut a me, qui sum finitus, non comprehendatur; & sufficit me hoc ipsum intelligere, ac judicare, illa omnia quae clare percipio, & perfectionem aliquam importare scio, atque etiam forte alia innumera quae ignoro, vel formaliter vel eminenter in Deo esse, ut idea quam de illo habeo sit omnium quae in me sunt maxime vera, & maxime clara & distincta.
26. Sed forte majus aliquid sum quàm ipse intelligam, omnesque illae perfectiones quas Deo tribuo, potentiâ quodammodo in me sunt, etiamsi nondum sese exerant, neque ad actum reducantur. Experior enim jam cognitionem meam paulatim augeri; nec video quid obstet quominus ita magis & magis augeatur in infinitum, nec etiam cur, cognitione sic auctâ, non possim ejus ope reliquas omnes Dei perfectiones adipisci; nec denique cur potentia ad istas perfectiones, si jam in me est, non sufficiat ad illarum ideam producendam.
27. Imo nihil horum esse potest. Nam primo, ut verum sit cognitionem meam gradatim augeri, & multa in me esse potentiâ quae actu nondum sunt, nihil tamen horum ad ideam Dei pertinet, in quâ nempe nihil omnino est potentiale; namque hoc ipsum, gradatim augeri, certissimum est imperfectionis argumentum. Praeterea, etiamsi cognitio mea semper magis & magis augeatur, nihilominus intelligo nunquam illam idcirco fore actu infinitam, quia nunquam eo devenietur, ut majoris adhuc incrementi non sit capax; Deum autem ita judico esse actu infinitum, ut nihil ejus perfectioni addi possit. Ac denique percipio esse objectivum ideae non a solo esse potentiali, quod proprie loquendo nihil est, sed tantummodo ab actuali sive formali posse produci.
28. Neque profecto quicquam est in his omnibus, quod diligenter attendenti non sit lumine naturali manifestum; sed quia, cùm minus attendo, & rerum sensibilium imagines mentis aciem excaecant, non ita facile recordor cur idea entis me perfectioris necessariò ab ente aliquo procedat quod sit revera perfectius, ulterius quaerere libet an ego ipse habens illam ideam esse possem, si tale ens nullum existeret.
29. Nempe a quo essem? A me scilicet, vel a parentibus, vel ab aliis quibuslibet Deo minus perfectis; nihil enim ipso perfectius, nec etiam aeque perfectum, cogitari aut fingi potest.
30. Atqui, si a me essem, nec dubitarem, nec optarem, nec omnino quicquam mihi deesset; omnes enim perfectiones quarum idea aliqua in me est, mihi dedissem, atque ita ipsemet Deus essem. Nec putare debeo illa forsan quae mihi desunt difficilius acquiri posse, quàm illa quae jam in me sunt; nam contrà, manifestum est longe difficilius fuisse me, hoc est rem sive substantiam cogitantem, ex nihilo emergere, quàm multarum rerum quas ignoro cognitiones, quae tantùm istius substantiae accidentia sunt, acquirere. Ac certe, si majus illud a me haberem, non mihi illa saltem, quae facilius haberi possunt, denegassem, sed neque etiam ulla alia ex iis, quae in ideâ Dei contineri percipio; quia nempe nulla difficiliora factu mihi videntur; si quae autem difficiliora factu essent, certe etiam mihi difficiliora viderentur, siquidem reliqua quae habeo, a me haberem, quoniam in illis potentiam meam terminari experirer.
31. Neque vim harum rationum effugio, si supponam me forte semper fuisse ut nunc sum, tanquam si inde sequeretur, nullum existentiae meae authorem esse quaerendum. Quoniam enim omne tempus vitae in  partes innumeras dividi potest, quarum singulae a reliquis nullo modo dependent, ex eo quòd paulo ante fuerim, non sequitur me nunc debere esse, nisi aliqua causa me quasi rursus creet ad hoc momentum, hoc est me conservet. Perspicuum enim est attendenti ad temporis naturam, eâdem plane vi & actione opus esse ad rem quamlibet singulis momentis quibus durat conservandam, quâ opus esset ad eandem de novo creandam, si nondum existeret; adeo ut conservationem solâ ratione a creatione differre, sit etiam unum ex iis quae lumine naturali manifesta sunt.
32. Itaque debeo nunc interrogare me ipsum, an habeam aliquam vim per quam possim efficere ut ego ille, qui jam sum, paulo post etiam sim futurus: nam, cùm nihil aliud sim quàm res cogitans, vel saltem cùm de eâ tantùm meî parte praecise nunc agam quae est res cogitans, si quae talis vis in me esset, ejus proculdubio conscius essem. Sed & nullam esse experior, & ex hoc ipso evidentissime cognosco me ab aliquo ente a me diverso pendere.
33. Forte verò illud ens non est Deus, sumque vel a parentibus productus, vel a quibuslibet aliis causis Deo minus perfectis. Imo, ut jam ante dixi, perspicuum est tantumdem ad minimum esse debere in causâ quantum est in effectu; & idcirco, cùm sim res cogitans, ideamque quandam Dei in me habens, qualiscunque tandem meî causa assignetur, illam etiam esse rem cogitantem, & omnium perfectionum, quas Deo tribuo, ideam habere fatendum est. Potestque de illâ rursus quaeri, an sit a se, vel ab aliâ. Nam si a se, patet ex dictis illam ipsam Deum esse, quia nempe,  cùm vim habeat per se existendi, habet proculdubio etiam vim possidendi actu omnes perfectiones quarum ideam in se habet, hoc est omnes quas in Deo esse concipio. Si autem sit ab aliâ, rursus eodem modo de hac alterâ quaeretur, an sit a se, vel ab aliâ, donec tandem ad causam ultimam deveniatur, quae erit Deus.
34. Satis enim apertum est nullum hîc dari posse progressum in infinitum, praesertim cùm non tantùm de causâ, quae me olim produxit, hîc agam, sed maxime etiam de illâ quae me tempore praesenti conservat.
35. Nec fingi potest plures forte causas partiales ad me efficiendum concurrisse, & ab unâ ideam unius ex perfectionibus quas Deo tribuo, ab aliâ ideam alterius me accepisse, adeo ut omnes quidem illae perfectiones alicubi in universo reperiantur, sed non omnes simul junctae in uno aliquo, qui sit Deus. Nam contrà, unitas, simplicitas, sive insepararibilitas eorum ommum quae in Deo sunt, una est ex praecipuis perfectionibus quas in eo esse intelligo. Nec certe istius omnium ejus perfectionum unitatis idea in me potuit poni ab ullâ causâ, a quâ etiam aliarum perfectionum ideas non habuerim: neque enim efficere potuit ut illas simul junctas & inseparabiles intelligerem, nisi simul effecerit ut quaenam illae essent agnoscerem.
36. Quantum denique ad parentes attinet, ut omnia vera sint quae de illis unquam putavi, non tamen profecto illi me conservant, nec etiam ullo modo me, quatenus sum res cogitans, effecerunt; sed tantùm dispositiones quasdam in eâ materiâ posuerunt, cui me, hoc est mentem, quam solam nunc pro me accipio, inesse judicavi. Ac proinde hîc nulla de iis difficultas esse potest; sed omnino est concludendum, ex hoc solo quòd existam, quaedamque idea entis perfectissimi, hoc est Dei, in me sit, evidentissime demonstrari Deum etiam existere...
37. Superest tantùm ut examinem quâ ratione ideam istam a Deo accepi; neque enim illam sensibus hausi, nec unquam non expectanti mihi advenit, ut solent rerum sensibilium ideae, cùm istae res externis sensuum organis occurrunt, ve occurrere videntur; nec etiam a me efficta est, nam nihil ab illâ detrahere, nihil illi superaddere plane possum; ac proinde superest ut mihi sit innata, quemadmodum etiam mihi est innata idea meî ipsius.
38. Et sane non mirum est Deum, me creando, ideam illam mihi indidisse, ut esset tanquam nota artificis operi suo impressa; nec etiam opus est ut nota illa sit aliqua res ab opere ipso diversa. Sed ex hoc uno quòd Deus me creavit, valde credibile est me quodammodo ad imaginem & similitudinem ejus factum esse, illamque similitudinem, in quâ Dei idea continetur, a me percipi per eandem facultatem, per quam ego ipse a me percipior: hoc est, dum in meipsum mentis aciem converto, non modo intelligo me esse rem incompletam & ab alio dependentem, remque ad majora & majora sive meliora indefinite aspirantem; sed simul etiam intelligo illum, a quo pendeo, majora ista omnia non indefinite & potentiâ tantùm, sed reipsâ infinite in se habere, atque ita Deum esse. Totaque vis argumenti in eo est, quòd agnoscam fieri non posse  ut existam talis naturae qualis sum, nempe ideam Dei in me habens, nisi revera Deus etiam existeret, Deus, inquam, ille idem cujus idea in me est, hoc est, habens omnes illas perfectiones, quas ego non comprehendere, sed quocunque modo attingere cogitatione possum, & nullis plane defectibus obnoxius. Ex quibus satis patet illum fallacem esse non posse; omnem enim fraudem & deceptionem a defectu aliquo pendere, lumine naturali manifestum est.
39. Sed priusquam hoc diligentius examinem, simulque in alias veritates quae inde colligi possunt inquiram, placet hîc aliquandiu in ipsius Dei contemplatione immorari, ejus attributa apud me expendere, & immensi hujus luminis pulchritudinem, quantum caligantis ingenii mei acies ferre poterit, intueri, admirari, adorare. Ut enim in hac solâ divinae majestatis contemplatione summam alterius vitae foelicitatem consistere fide credimus, ita etiam jam ex eâdem, licet multo minus perfectâ, maximam, cujus in hac vitâ capaces simus, voluptatem percipi posse experimur.
TranslatePress website Latin to English translation (2023) that uses the Google Translate program since paragraphs 19. below are identically translated with odd choices.
About God, that he exists.
1. I will now close my eyes and stop my ears, I will withdraw all my senses, I will either erase from my thoughts all the images even of corporeal things, or certainly, since this is hardly possible, I will hang them as empty and false to nothing, and speaking only to myself and examining myself more closely, little by little I will try to make it more familiar and familiar to me. I am a thinking thing, that is, doubting, affirming, denying, understanding a few things, ignorant of many things, willing, unwilling, imagining and feeling; for as I observed before, although the things which I feel or imagine are perhaps nothing outside of me, yet those ways of thinking, which I call senses and imaginations  in so far as there are only certain ways of thinking, I am certain that they exist within me.
2. And in these few I have listed all that I really know, or at least what I have observed that I know up to now. Now I will carefully look around to see if perhaps there are still others with me that I have not yet looked at. I'm sure I'm overthinking it. Do I then even know what it takes to be sure of something? Of course, in this first knowledge there is nothing else, but a certain clear and distinct perception of it, which I affirm; which of course would not be sufficient to render me certain of the truth of the matter, if it could ever happen that something which I perceived so clearly and distinctly was false; and therefore I now seem to be able to establish as a general rule that all this is true, which I perceive very clearly and distinctly.
3. However, many things I previously admitted as absolutely certain and clear, which were later discovered to be doubtful. What then were these things? Of course, the earth, the sky, the stars, and everything else that I used with my senses. But what did I clearly perceive about them? Of course, the very ideas, or thoughts, of such things, were opposed to my mind. But even now I do not believe that those ideas are in me. But there was another thing which I affirmed, and which also because of the habit of believing I thought I perceived clearly, but which I did not really perceive: namely, that there were certain things outside myself, from which these ideas proceeded, and to which they were entirely similar. And this was in which I was either deceived, or certainly, if I judged the truth, it did not happen by the power of my perception.
4. What is the truth? When I considered something very simple and easy about Arithmetic or Geometric  matters, such as that two and three joined together make five, or the like, did I at least look at them clearly enough to affirm that they are true? Indeed, I afterwards judged that there was no other reason to doubt them, than because it occurred to me that perhaps some God could have put such a nature upon me, that I should be deceived even about those things which seemed most obvious. But whenever this preconceived opinion of God's supreme power occurs to me, I cannot but confess that, if He wills, it is easy for Him to cause me to err, even in those things which I think I see most clearly with the eyes of my mind. Whenever I turn to the very things, which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so clearly persuaded by them that I spontaneously break out into these words: anyone can deceive me, but he will never make me nothing, as long as I think I am something; or that sometimes it may be true that I never existed, when it is already true that I am; or perhaps even that two and three together may be more or less than five, or the like, in which of course I recognize a manifest inconsistency. And certainly since I have no occasion to think that any God is a deceiver, nor do I yet know sufficiently which God is, there is a very thin and, so to speak, metaphysical reason for doubting, which depends only on that opinion. But in order that this also may be removed, as soon as the occasion arises, I must examine whether there is a God, and, if so, whether he can be a deceiver; for being ignorant of this matter, I do not seem to be able to be absolutely sure of anything else.
5. Now, however, order seems to demand that I should first distribute all  my thoughts into certain categories, and inquire in which of them truth or falsity properly consists. Some of these are, as it were, images of things, to which the name of an idea properly belongs; as when I think of a man, or a Chimaera, or Heaven, or an Angel, or God. Others, indeed, have other practical forms: so that, when I want, when I fear, when I affirm, when I deny, I always grasp some thing as the subject of my thought, but something even more than the likeness of that thing I embrace in thought; And of these, other wills, or affections, and other judgments are called.
6. Now as regards ideas, if they are looked upon alone in themselves, and I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot properly be false; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is no less true that I imagine the one than the other. There is also no falsity to be feared in the will itself, or in the affections; for although I may desire things that are wrong, and even things that do not exist at all, it is not for that reason that it is not true for me to desire them. And therefore the judgments alone remain, in which I must be careful not to be deceived. Now the principal and most frequent error which can be found in them consists in the fact that I judge that the ideas which are in me are similar to or conform to certain things placed outside me. for indeed, if I only considered the ideas themselves as certain modes of my thought, and did not refer to anything else, they could scarcely give me any material for error.
7. And of these ideas some are innate, others adventitious,  others seem to me to have been made by myself: for when I understand what matter is, what truth is, what thought is, I do not seem to have these from any other source than from my own nature; But now that I should hear a noise, see the sun, feel a fire, I have hitherto decided to proceed from certain things placed outside me; and finally the Sirens, Hippogryphs, and the like, are invented by myself. Or perhaps I may even think that they are all adventitious, either all born, or all made: for I have not yet clearly perceived their true origin.
8. But here it is chiefly to be inquired of those things which I regard as taken from things existing outside myself, what reason moves me to think that they are similar to these things. Of course, I seem to be taught by nature. And moreover I experience that they do not depend on my will, nor therefore on myself; for they are often opposed, even unwillingly: as already, whether I will or not, I feel heat, and therefore I think that sensation, or the idea of heat, comes to me from a thing different from me, namely from the fire whose warmth I sit upon. And nothing is more obvious, than that the light should judge this thing to put its likeness into me rather than anything else.
9. I shall now see whether these reasons are sufficiently firm. When I say here that I was thus taught by nature, I understand that I was led to believe this only by some spontaneous impulse, and not that it was shown to me that it was true by any natural light. These two differ greatly; for whatever things are shown to me by natural light, so that whatever I doubt, it follows that I am, and the like cannot be doubted in any way, because there can be no other possibility, which I trust as much as this light, and which  cannot be true to teach but as for natural impulses, I have already often judged that I was influenced by them to the worse, when it was about choosing the good, and I do not see why I trust them more in any other matter.
10. Next, although those ideas do not depend on my will, it does not therefore follow that they necessarily proceed from things placed outside of me. For as those impulses of which I have just spoken, although they are in me, yet seem to be different from my will, so perhaps there is also some other faculty in me, not yet sufficiently known to me, the producer of these ideas, as hitherto they have always seemed to me, while a dream, without any help from external things, to be formed in me.
11. And finally, although they proceed from things different from me, it does not follow from this that they must be similar to these things. For in many things I often seem to have detected a great difference: as, for instance, I find with me two different ideas of the sun, one drawn as it were from the senses, and which should be listed chiefly among those which I consider adventitious, by which it appears to me very small, the other, indeed, from reasons Taken from astronomy, this is what has been elicited from certain ideas innate to me, or made by me in any other way, by which it is shown to be several times larger than the earth; both certainly cannot be similar to the same thing existing outside of me, and reason convinces her that she is most unlike him, which seems to have emanated from him most closely.
12. All this sufficiently shows that I have hitherto believed, not from  certain judgment, but only from some blind impulse, that there are certain things different from me, which send their ideas or images to me through the organs of the senses, or by any other agreement.
13. But still another way occurred to me to inquire whether some things, of which the ideas are in me, exist outside me. Of course, insofar as these ideas are only certain ways of thinking, I do not recognize any inequality between them, and they all seem to me to proceed in the same way; but, in so far as one represents one thing, the other another, it is clear that they are very different from each other. For undoubtedly those which present to me substances are something greater, and, so to speak, contain in themselves more objective reality than those which represent only modes or accidents; And again, that by which I understand some supreme God, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and the creator of all things that are besides himself, certainly has more objective reality in itself than those by which finite substances are presented.
14. It is already evident in the light of nature that there must be as much at least in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of the same cause. For, I pray thee, whence could he assume the reality of his effect, except from a cause? And how could he give him that cause, unless he also had it? And from this it follows that nothing can be made from nothing, nor even that which is more perfect, that which contains more reality in itself than that which has less. And this is not only clearly true of those effects whose reality is actual or formal, but also of ideas in which only objective reality is considered. That is, it is not only impossible, for example, for a stone which was not before to begin to be now, unless it is produced by some thing in which the whole thing is, either formally or prominently, that is placed in the stone; nor can heat be brought into a subject which was not warm before, except by a matter which is of an order at least equally perfect, and is heat, and so on from the rest; but moreover, the idea of heat or stone cannot be in me, unless it is placed in me by some cause, in which it is at least as real as I conceive it to be in heat or stone. For although this cause does not transfer any of its actual or formal reality into my idea, it is not for that reason that it should be thought that it should be less real, but that the nature of the idea itself is such that it does not require any other formal reality from itself, except that which it borrows from my thought. whose method is Now that this idea contains this or that objective reality rather than another, this must proceed from some cause in which it is at least as much formal reality as it contains objective reality. For if we suppose that something is found in an idea, which was not in its cause, then this has nothing; and however imperfect this mode of being may be, in which a thing exists objectively in the understanding through an idea, it is not, at the outset, absolutely nothing, and therefore it cannot be from nothing.
15. Nor should I suspect that since the reality which I consider in my ideas is only objective, it is not necessary  for the same reality to be formally in the causes of these ideas, but it is sufficient if it also exists objectively in them. For just as this objective mode of being belongs to ideas by their very nature, so the formal mode of being belongs to the causes of ideas, at least to the first and foremost, by their nature. And although it may be that one idea may be born from another, it is not given here to progress ad infinitum, but at last it must arrive at some first one, the cause of which is in the star of the archetype, in which all reality is formally contained, which is only objectively in the idea. Insomuch that by natural light it is clear to me that ideas are in me like certain images, which may indeed easily fall short of the perfection of the things from which they are taken, but do not contain anything greater or more perfect.
16. And all these things, the longer and more curiously I examine them, the more clearly and distinctly I know them to be true. But what shall I finally conclude from these? Of course, if the objective reality of any of my ideas is such that I am certain that the same thing is neither formally nor prominently in me, nor that I myself can be the cause of the idea, it necessarily follows that I am not the only thing in the world, but some other thing that belongs to it. It is the cause of the idea that it even exists. If, indeed, no such idea is found in me, I shall have absolutely no argument to make me certain of the existence of any thing different from myself; for I have looked all round with the utmost care, and so far I have been unable to find anything else.
17. And from these ideas of mine, especially that which presents itself to me, about which there can be no difficulty , there is one thing which is God, another thing which is corporeal and inanimate, another thing which is angels, another thing which is animal, and finally another thing which represent other people like me.
18. And as for the ideas which other men, or animals, or angels present, I easily understand that those which I have can be composed of myself and corporeal things and God, although there were no men, nor animals, nor angels, in the world besides me.
19. But as for the ideas of corporeal things, nothing occurs in them, which is so much so that it does not appear that they could have proceeded from me; for if I examine the pencils, and examine each one in the manner in which I yesterday examined the idea of wax, I notice that there are very few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them: namely, greatness, or extension into length, breadth, and depth; the figure which arises from the termination of this extension; the position which different figures occupy among themselves; and the motion or change of that situation; to which may be added substance, duration, and number; but the rest, such as light and colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold, and other tactile qualities, are only very confusedly and obscurely thought of by me, so much so that I do not even know whether they are true, or false, that is, whether the ideas which I have of them are ideas of certain things, or not of things. For although I noted a little before that falsity properly so-called, or formal, can only be found in judgments, there is certainly a certain other material falsity in ideas, when they do not represent a thing as a thing: thus, for example, the ideas I have of heat and cold, so little clear  And they are distinct, so that I cannot learn from them whether cold is only the deprivation of heat, or heat the deprivation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or neither. And since no ideas can exist except as things, if indeed it is true that cold is nothing else than the deprivation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive, will not undeservedly be called false, and so on.
- Google translate: 19. But as for the ideas of corporeal things, nothing occurs in them, which is so much so that it does not appear that they could have proceeded from me; for if I examine the pencils, and examine each one in the manner in which I yesterday examined the idea of wax, I notice that there are very few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them: namely, greatness, or extension into length, breadth, and depth; the figure which arises from the termination of this extension; the position which different figures occupy among themselves; and the motion or change of that situation; to which may be added substance, duration, and number; but the rest, such as light and colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold, and other tactile qualities, are only very confusedly and obscurely thought of by me, so much so that I do not even know whether they are true, or false, that is, whether the ideas which I have of them are ideas of certain things, or not of things. For although I noted a little before that falsity properly so-called, or formal, can only be found in judgments, there is certainly a certain other material falsity in ideas, when they do not represent a thing as a thing: thus, for example, the ideas I have of heat and cold, so little clear  And they are distinct, so that I cannot learn from them whether cold is only the deprivation of heat, or heat the deprivation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or neither. And since no ideas can exist except as things, if indeed it is true that cold is nothing else than the deprivation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive, will not undeservedly be called false, and so on.
20. It is certainly not necessary for me to assign any author different from myself to them; for if indeed they are false, that is, they represent no things, it is known to me by natural light that they proceed from nothing, that is, that they exist in me for no other reason than that something of my nature is lacking, and is not quite perfect; but if they are true, because they present so little reality to me that I cannot even distinguish it from non-reality, I do not see why they cannot be from me.
21. Of those things which are clear and distinct in the ideas of corporeal things, I see that some could have been borrowed from the idea of myself, namely, substance, duration, number, and if there are other things of that kind; for when I think that a stone is a substance, or that it is a thing that is fit to exist by itself, and likewise that I am a substance; yet in reason the substances seem to agree; and likewise, when I perceive that I am now, and remember that I was some time before, and when I have various thoughts whose number I understand, I acquire  ideas of duration and number, which I can then transfer to any other things. But all the rest from which the ideas of corporeal things are fused, namely, extension, shape, position, and motion, are not formally contained in me, since I am nothing else than a thinking thing; but since there are only so many modes of substance, and I am substance, they seem eminently to be contained in me.
22. Therefore, the idea of God alone remains, in which we must consider whether there is something which could not have proceeded from me. By the name of God I understand a certain infinite, independent, highly intelligent, highly powerful substance, and from which both I myself and everything else, if anything else exists, whatever exists, was created. Of course, all these things are such that, the more carefully I pay attention, the less they seem to have proceeded from me alone. Therefore, from the foregoing, it must be concluded that God necessarily exists.
23. For although the idea of substance is in me from the very fact that I am substance, yet there would not be the idea of infinite substance, since I am finite, unless it proceeded from some substance which was really infinite.
24. Nor should I think that I do not perceive the infinite through a true idea, but only through the negation of the finite, as I perceive quietness and darkness through the negation of motion and light; for on the contrary I clearly understand that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and consequently that in a certain way the perception of the infinite is earlier in me than that of the finite, that is, of God than of myself. For by what reason should I understand that I doubt myself,  desire myself, that is, that I lack something, and that I am not at all perfect, if there were no idea of a more perfect being in me, by whose comparison I should recognize my shortcomings?
25. Nor can it be said that perhaps this idea of God is materially false, and therefore that it can come from nothing, as I observed a little before about the ideas of heat and cold, and the like; for, contrary to the fact that it is most clear and distinct, and contains more objective reality than any other, there is nothing more true in itself, nor in which there is less suspicion of falsity. This idea, I say, of a supremely perfect and infinite being is most true; for although it may perhaps be imagined that such a being does not exist, yet it cannot be imagined that the idea of it presents nothing real to me, as I said before about the idea of cold. It is also most clear and distinct; for whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly, which is real and true, and which implies some perfection, is contained entirely in it. Nor is it a hindrance that I do not comprehend the infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither comprehend, nor perhaps even touch with thought, in any way; for it is of the nature of the infinite, that it may not be comprehended by me, who am finite; and this alone is sufficient for me to understand, and to judge, all those things which I clearly perceive, and which I know to convey some perfection, and also perhaps innumerable other things which I am ignorant of, being either formally or eminently in God, so that the idea which I have of him is of all that is in me most true, and most clear and distinct.
26. But perhaps I am something greater than I myself understand, and all those perfections which I attribute to God are in a certain way in me, even if they have not yet  manifested themselves, nor are they reduced to action. For I already feel that my knowledge is gradually increasing; I do not see what prevents it from increasing so much more and more ad infinitum, nor even why, with such increased knowledge, I should not be able to obtain with its help all the other perfections of God. and finally why the power to these perfections, if it is already in me, is not sufficient to produce the idea of them.
27. No, none of these can be. For in the first place, although it may be true that my knowledge is gradually increasing, and that there are many powers in me which actually do not yet exist, yet none of these pertains to the idea of God, in which nothing at all is potential; for this very thing, being gradually increased, is the surest evidence of imperfection. Furthermore, even if my knowledge is always increasing more and more, nevertheless I understand that it will never actually be infinite, because it will never reach such a point that it is not capable of still greater growth. But I judge that God is actually infinite, that nothing can be added to his perfection. And finally, I perceive that the objectivity of the idea does not come from the potential alone, which, properly speaking, is nothing, but can only be produced from the actual or formal.
28. Nor indeed is there anything in all these that is not manifest by natural light to a diligent observer; but since, when I pay less attention, and the images of sensible things blind the mental field, I do not so easily remember why the idea of a being more perfect than myself necessarily proceeds from some being who is really more perfect, I should like to inquire further whether  I myself, having that idea, could be if no such being existed.
29. Of course, from whom would I be? Of course, from me, or from my parents, or from others less perfect than God; for nothing more perfect than itself, nor equally perfect, can be thought or imagined.
30. And if I were from myself, I would neither doubt, nor wish, nor lack anything at all; for I would have given to myself all the perfections of which there is any idea in me, and thus I myself would have been God. Nor should I think that perhaps those things which I lack can be acquired with more difficulty than those which are already in me; for on the other hand, it is clear that it was much more difficult for me, that is to say, a thinking thing or substance, to emerge from nothing, than to acquire knowledges of many things of which I am ignorant, which are only accidents of that substance. And certainly, if I had that greater thing from me, I would not have denied myself at least those things which can be more easily held, but neither would I have denied any other of those things which I perceive to be contained in the idea of God; namely, because nothing seems more difficult to me to do; but if things were more difficult to do, they would certainly seem even more difficult to me, since I would have the rest of what I have from myself, since in them I will experience my power to be limited.
31. Nor do I escape the force of these reasons, if I suppose that I may always have been as I am now, as if it followed from this that no one should be sought to be responsible for my existence. For since every period of life can be divided into  innumerable parts, each of which is in no way dependent on the others, from what I was a little before, it does not follow that I ought to be now, unless some cause, as it were, creates me again for this moment, that is me keep For it is clear to those who attend to the nature of time, that the same force and action are needed to preserve any thing in each of the moments it lasts, as would be needed to create it anew if it did not yet exist; insomuch that to distinguish preservation from creation by the sole reason is also one of those things which are manifest in the light of nature.
32. And so I must now ask myself, whether I have any power by which I can bring about that I, who I already am, will become a little later also: for when I am nothing else but thinking about things, or at least when precisely that part of me I am now doing what is the matter, thinking that if there were such a force in me, I should doubtless be aware of it. But I experience that there is none, and from this very fact I know very clearly that I depend on some being different from myself.
33. Perhaps, in truth, that being is not God, and I am either produced by my parents, or by any other causes less perfect than God. Nay, as I have already said before, it is clear that there ought to be as little in the cause as there is in the effect; and therefore, when I am a thinking thing, and having a certain idea of God in me, whatever may finally be assigned to my cause, it must be admitted that that thing is also a thinking thing, and that I have an idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God. And it is possible to ask about it again, whether it is from himself or from another. For if from itself, it is clear from what has been said that it is God itself, because, namely,  as it has the power of existing by itself, it undoubtedly also has the power of actually possessing all the perfections whose idea it has in itself, that is, all that I conceive to be in God. But if it is from another, let him ask again in the same way about this other, whether it is from himself or from another, until finally he comes to the ultimate cause, which will be God.
34. For it is quite clear that no progress can be given here to infinity, especially since I am dealing here not only with regard to the cause which once produced me, but especially with regard to that which preserves me at the present time.
35. Nor can it be imagined that several partial causes may have concurred to bring me about, and that I have received from one the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God, from another the idea of another, so much so that indeed all those perfections are found somewhere in the universe, but not all united together in one to someone who is God. For on the contrary, the unity, simplicity, or inseparability of all that is in God, is one of the chief perfections which I understand to be in him. And surely this idea of the unity of all his perfections could not have been put into me by any cause, since I had no ideas of other perfections either: for he could not have made me understand them together and inseparable, unless he had made me at the same time to recognize what they were.
36. Finally, as far as my parents are concerned, all that I have ever thought about them may be true, yet they certainly do not preserve me, nor have they made me in any way, in so far as I am a thinking thing; but they only placed certain dispositions in that matter, which I judged myself, that is, the mind, which alone I now take for myself, to contain. And hence there can be no difficulty about them; but it is absolutely necessary to conclude that, from this alone that I exist, and some idea of the most perfect being, that is God, is in me, it is most evidently demonstrated that God also exists...
37. It only remains to examine how I received this idea from God; for I did not draw it with my senses, nor did it ever come to me without waiting, as the ideas of sensible things usually do, when these external things meet, or seem to meet, the organs of the senses; nor was it made by me, for I can take nothing away from it, and add nothing to it; and therefore it remains that it is innate to me, just as the idea of myself is also innate to me.
38. And of course it is not surprising that God, in creating me, gave me that idea, so that it was like the mark of an artist imprinted on his work; nor is there any need for that note to be something different from the work itself. But from the fact that God created me, it is very credible that I was somehow made in his image and likeness, and that likeness, in which the idea of God is contained, is perceived by me through the same faculty through which I myself am perceived by myself: that is, while I turn the line of my mind to myself, not only do I understand that I am an incomplete thing and dependent on another, and a thing indefinitely aspiring to greater and greater or better things; but at the same time I also understand that he, on whom I depend, has all these greater things not only indefinitely and in power, but also infinitely in himself, and thus to be God. And the whole force of the argument lies in this, that I acknowledge that it is impossible  for me to exist in such a nature as I am, that is, having the idea of God in me, unless indeed God also existed; having all those perfections which I cannot comprehend, but which I can reach by thought in any way, and subject to no defects at all. From which it is quite clear that he cannot be deceptive; for every fraud and deception depends on some defect, it is manifest by the natural light.
39. But before I examine this more carefully, and at the same time inquire into the other truths which may be gathered from it, it pleases me to dwell here for a while in the contemplation of God himself, to weigh his attributes with me, and to look at and marvel at the beauty of this immense light, as far as the dim line of my intellect can bear , to worship For as we believe by faith that the supreme happiness of another life consists in this sole contemplation of the divine majesty, so also we experience that from the same, although much less perfect, the greatest pleasure of which we are capable in this life can be perceived.